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“Cold War Reckonings is not only a sophisticated work of cultural criticism but also an astounding articulation of political theory. Analyzing literary and cinematic texts alongside occasions like
PEN regional meetings, Jini Kim Watson offers an altogether original story about the Cold War and
decolonization in Asia, on the one hand, and about the relationship between capitalism and author-

In short, it offers a new theory of the state in general, and of the capitalist authoritarian state in
particular.” —Jodi Kim, University of California, Riverside
“Jini Kim Watson’s Cold War Reckonings is an important, brilliant, and extremely engaging book that
is beautifully written and bold and innovative in its arguments. Watson shows how the social and
political promises of decolonization were derailed by the developmentalism that permitted certain
sectors of postcolonial states to seize power by vowing to ‘fast-forward the time of national development.’ Treating Third World dictatorial regimes neither as unprepared political actors nor as
dupes, Watson shows the overlapping interests between global capitalism and authoritarianism in
some of Asia’s ‘capitalist success stories.’” —Joseph Slaughter, Columbia University
Cold War Reckonings tells a new story about the Cold War and the global shift from colonialism to
independent nation-states. Across a body of transpacific cultural works, Jini Kim Watson reveals the
problem of “free world” authoritarianism to be not a deficient form of liberal democracy but the
result of Cold War entanglements with decolonization.
Focusing on the U.S.-allied illiberal regimes of South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, and
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decolonization, postcolonial sovereignty, and the developmental state within capitalist modernity.
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itarianism, on the other. The book profoundly shifts our understanding of the Cold War, arrested
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Indonesia, the book scrutinizes cultural texts ranging from dissident poetry, fiction, and writers’
conference proceedings of the Cold War period to more recent literature, graphic novels, and films
that retrospectively look back to these decades with a critical eye. Watson’s book argues that the
cultural forms and narrative techniques that emerged from the Cold War–decolonizing matrix offer
new ways of comprehending these histories and connecting them to our present.
JINI KIM WATSON is Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature at New York University.
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Introduction
Ruling Like a Foreigner: Theorizing “Free World”
Authoritarianism in the Asia-Pacific Cold War

Hitler’s Moustache
I’m surely in good company
with Mao’s pate,
Pinochet’s smirk,
Mussolini’s jaw,
Hitler’s moustache,
Franco’s height,
Kim’s jowl,
Gaddafi’s nose,
Mugabe’s philtrum . . .
all the very best of them.1
Singaporean poet Cyril Wong published his sly rendition of the dictatorial
personality, The Dictator’s Eyebrow, in 2013. In this extended fifty-page poem,
the dictator’s own eyebrow becomes the narrating subject of history, finding
itself “in good company” with other trademark authoritarian facial features
from Hitler’s moustache to Mao’s hairline to Mugabe’s upper lip. The eyebrow-
narrator goes on to describe a series of humdrum duties as the typical “work”
of the dictator:
Another witchhunt; another day.
A leader’s work is never done.
How many colleagues, journalists, teachers,
opposition-members, artists and students

1
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have you brought to their knees
with the threat of imprisonment[?]2
Wong’s satiric poem plays on one of the great political tropes of the twentieth
century: the larger-than-life, over-the-top dictator, whose personal excesses
and unchecked power have long been recognizable traits ripe for parody. As a
whole, the fifty-one-stanza poem functions as an identikit image of the
twentieth-century tyrant. As Gwee Li Sui writes in the introduction, the eyebrow expresses “the inevitable fusion in time of power and personality, power
and idiosyncrasy.”3 Wong’s poem is indicative of the way we often view the
problem of dictatorship, and its cognate authoritarianism, as a single and unified phenomenon or substance focalized through the larger-than-life personality of a tyrant. At the same time, the poem seems to suggest an implicit
geographical and temporal transfer, whereby mid-century European fascist
leaders (Hitler, Mussolini, Franco) appear alongside past, recent, and even
current Third World autocrats (Mao, Pinochet, Gaddafi, Mugabe, Kim).
Wong’s satire, I suggest, pokes fun at the tyrant’s recognizable and interchangeable traits, while raising questions about the way authoritarianism
“travels” from Europe and becomes naturalized as part of a larger, generalizable deficit of the Global South.
In a collection of essays from 1999, postcolonial critic and anthropologist
David Scott also tackles the problem of illiberal political forms in the post
colonial world. He takes stock of the independent nationalist project some
forty years after the heyday of decolonization, a period often referred to as the
“Bandung Era” after the historic 1955 Conference of African and Asian nations
in Bandung, Indonesia. For Scott, several things signal the decisive end of the
“Bandung project”: the end of the “bipolar global order,” until which time
“the Soviet Union . . . maintained at least a strategic interest in blocking U.S.
hegemony in the Third World”; the “lost years” of structural adjustment
during the 1980s; and the rise of the U.S. as “unipolar hegemon.”4 In contrast
to the possibilities that arose out of Bandung, the post-1991, post–Cold War
period confirms liberal capitalist democracy as the only viable political model,
reinforcing the binary of modern West and backward Global South. Worse,
accounts of liberal democracy have “set the standard for the assessment of all
political institutions and political discourses”5 such that illiberalism has all but
come to function as a signifier of the political defects of the non-West:
Postcolonial formations must fare badly inasmuch as their modernities can only be questionable (questionably adequate, questionably
secure) ones. Their nonmodern, nonliberal, and nondemocratic
forms of political community can only appear as, at best, a safely past
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past, and they can only be urged to enter more conscientiously—that
is, less ideologically—upon the project of perfecting their modernities, where it is assumed of course that this task can only take place
within the concepts and institutions through which their social lives
have been reshaped by the intrusion of Western power.6
For Scott, with the end of the Soviet and non-aligned blocs and the potential
moral authority of socialism gone, the ideology of neoliberal capitalism
appears more and more hegemonic as the “end of history” famously posited
by Francis Fukuyama.7 The fraught democracies and struggling economies of
postcolonial societies—with their seemingly interchangeable autocratic leaders—are cast as backward, belated, and politically empty vessels waiting to be
filled up with adequate amounts of tutelary “liberalism” and “modernity.”
But if we shift our locus of analysis from the Caribbean to the Asia-Pacific
region, things look somewhat different.8 From this vantage point, we might
rather say that it is less the unrelenting political and moral dominance of the
West that has triumphed over alternative socialist national projects, and more
that certain illiberal Asian states—with a different relationship to the Cold
War—have emerged as credible models for Global South capitalist modernity.9 Focusing on East and Southeast Asia, this book tells a new story about
authoritarianism, the Cold War, and the global shift from colonialism to independent nation-states. In it, I examine cultural production on and of a number
of authoritarian, non-communist states variously aligned with the United
States—those paradoxically unfree spaces within the “free world”—for what
they reveal about the supposed divisions between First World and Third
World, liberalism and illiberalism, and capitalist “free world” democracy and
socialist tyranny. As Scott suggests, it is obvious that we cannot think of Third
World or Global South illiberalisms in terms of an inherently stagnant, Orientalist, and non-modern deficit. And yet neither can we think of them only
as the failure of Bandung national projects to materialize in the face of a
monolithic “Western power.” Cold War Reckonings: Authoritarianism and the
Genres of Decolonization argues that the question of authoritarian capitalist
states demands an accounting of the specific conditions and modalities of
Cold War decolonization as they unfolded in the region. Consequently, its
focus is certain modernizing, autocratic capitalist states that were birthed by
this Cold War–decolonizing matrix. Put otherwise—and contra Scott—it is
not the end of the Cold War, but its congealed presence in forms of East and
Southeast Asian developmental state-formations that needs to be accounted
for. The book is structured as the working-through of five clusters of theoretical-
aesthetic tropes (one cluster per chapter) in which I bring together cultural
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production, the Cold War, and postcolonial illiberalism in new ways. These
clusters are freedom, decolonization, and alignment; writerly freedom and the
state; separation and futurity; exile and anachronism; and atrocity, justice, and
the post–Cold War. While these tropes in themselves are not exclusive to these
regimes, they become pronounced flash points of tensions that structure Cold
War decolonization. I focus on cultural texts that reveal the way the Cold War
violently meets decolonization in the context of the following Asia-Pacific
regimes: the South Korean military dictatorship (1961–87); the Marcos period
in the Philippines (1965–86); illiberal Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew (1959–
90); and Indonesia’s Suharto regime (1965–98). Taiwan under the Kuomintang
is also addressed in certain sections.10 The book begins by examining regional
writers’ conferences of the 1960s to the early 1980s before moving to poetry,
essays, and fiction of the early Cold War period. I then turn to the recent proliferation of novels and films that retrospectively look back to these decades.
Writers and artists include F. Sionil José, Kim Chi-Ha, Pramoedya Ananta
Toer, Ninotchka Rosca—writing during the high Cold War years—and
Mohamed Latiff Mohamed, Sonny Liew, Jeremy Tiang, Hwang Sŏk-yŏng,
Tan Pin Pin, Han Kang, Joshua Oppenheimer, and Yoon Je-kyoon—whose
retrospective gazes look back from the late 1990s or after.11 To be clear, I do
not mean to celebrate these regimes as some victory of a non-Western “alternative” modernity or as the heroic defeat of Enlightenment rationality by
something deemed “Asian” and therefore resistant. Rather, my goal is to historicize and better understand their constitution and contestations—especially the role played by internal leftist struggles that seem to push back from
the “wrong side of history.” This book’s cultural archive constitutes an attempt
to grasp the political and cultural genres pertaining to non-and anti-communist,
illiberal formations both as they were emerging and as retrospective objects.
Part of its goal, therefore, is to denaturalize the occurrence of authoritarianism
in the Global South, where “Kim’s jowl” and “Mugabe’s philtrum” too easily
become synecdoches of a far more complex historical, political, and cultural
conjuncture.

Cold War/Postcolonial
The methodological approach of Cold War Reckonings aims to move us
beyond both typical postcolonial conceptions of power and a “three-worlds
ideology.” Articulated by Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery, the latter concept refers to the academic partitioning of the world into separate objects of
study: mainstream social science and history for the First World, socialist or
post-socialist studies for the Second World, and postcolonial studies for the
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Third.12 In moving beyond “three worlds” thinking, we can recognize the
ways in which what Odd Arne Westad has called the global Cold War produced specific responses to problems of decolonization:13 “US and Soviet
interventionisms to a very large extent shaped both the international and the
domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural changes in
Third World countries took place.”14 And yet in Cold War studies, the cultural
and literary histories of the worlds that grew under the war’s shadow are just
being written. Conversely, as Monica Popescu notes, the shaping influence of
the Cold War on Global South cultural production has been little recognized
by postcolonial studies or world literature.15 In fact, as Chen Kuan-hsing has
argued, to think about the Cold War’s epistemological legacy is an intellectual
project on par with that of postcolonial studies:
Just as the formal end of colonialism did not lead overnight to a dissolution of its cultural effects, so the subjectivities formed during the
cold war remain within us. Our worldview, political and institutional
forms, and systems of popular knowledge have been deeply shaped by
the cold-war structure.16
If Chen calls for scholars to “de-cold war” alongside the critical project of
decolonizing knowledge and institutions, Bhakti Shringarpure argues that “a
renewed postcolonial Cold War historiography is urgently needed.”17 Such
critical projects require that certain assumptions of postcolonial studies be
revised. Writing of the influential theories that have emerged to “provincialize” Europe and pluralize modernity, Heonik Kwon notes that in these critiques “there are no traces of a modern Europe as we know it; that is, the
Europe that, after experiencing a catastrophic war, was divided into mutually
hostile forces in an undeclared ideological war.”18 Such a perspective thus
misapprehends the object of critique—Western imperialist power—by “relegat[ing] bipolar history to an analytic void.”19 This is especially relevant for
East and Southeast Asia, a region in which the “bipolar Manichean rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union was triangulated,”20 and the
Cold War unfolded not merely as a “historical epoch or event, but as itself a
knowledge project or epistemology.”21 And just as the “Cold” War is a misnomer for violent conflicts in Asia and other parts of the Third World, the marker
of 1989 or 1991 as the “end” of the conflict “pertains only to the Western Hemisphere’s temporality.”22 In that sense, this book is also about the production of
our broader post-socialist present, even though it does not engage directly with
territories that were formerly socialist.
To interrogate the oxymoronic formation of “free world” authoritarianisms in East and Southeast Asia is therefore to consider “how Cold War
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representations have shaped and continue to shape theory and politics.”23
Caroline Hau reminds us that by being enmeshed in the U.S.’s hegemonic
web that replaced European and Japanese colonial power, states in “free
Asia” experienced a freedom from communism rather than a substantial
postcolonial democracy.24 Moreover, the logic of a temporary militarization
of society was acceptable in areas of the world where “Communists or left-
wingers had already staged attempts at gaining political power.” Here, the
“combination of [military] training and technology would enable the soldiers
to hold the ground while the political and economic forces of modernization
took hold of society, removing it from the danger of a Communist take-
over.”25 The U.S. Cold War imaginary tried to resolve these ideological contradictions by distinguishing those tolerable Third World right-wing regimes
from the “true” enemy of communist totalitarianism via the notion of transition. Speaking of Latin America during the Cold War, historian Greg Grandin writes, “Washington found that it greatly preferred anti-Communist
dictatorships to the possibility that democratic openness might allow the
Soviets to gain a foothold on the continent.”26 U.S. foreign policy partly justified itself through the belief that political liberalization “was more likely”
to occur under right-w ing dictatorships, making an implicit distinction
between these merely transitional autocratic forms and the more permanent, essential totalitarianism of communist regimes.27 With a focus on the
way conceptions of human rights became narrowed to U.S.-style individual
liberal freedoms, Crystal Parikh has noted that mid-century U.S. administrations “saw radical or socialist politics as vehicles of dangerous unrest, and
they limited support for nationalist movements to those that championed
stable states, free of the taint of communism.”28 Like these scholars, I
emphatically refute the notion of “free world” autocracy as a tutelary, transitional stage on its way to liberal democracy. Rather, I consider such regimes
to be the concrete and specific result of the way decolonization unfolded
through and as the Cold War. Whereas Western Cold War ideology has
insisted on the spurious distinction between (il)liberal capitalism and communist tyranny, in a reverse tendency certain strands of postcolonial thinking continue to lament democratic failures primarily in terms of the
enduring half-life of European colonial rule; its symptoms are most visible
in the failure to industrialize and the extravagance of dictatorial, clientist
states. In my telling, however, authoritarian rule is not only compatible with
(sometimes stupendous) economic growth, but emerges as the political form
necessary for a certain kind of postcolonial economic development. Within
the Cold War matrix, such regimes paradoxically aim to advance decolonization by reproducing elements of the colonial state.
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Put otherwise, this book aims to make visible a certain genealogy of authoritarianism that troubles analytic frameworks produced both by Cold War and
postcolonial epistemes. The most dominant (and enduring) of the former is
the theory of totalitarianism that emerged at mid-century; William Pietz has
noted that totalitarianism was “the theoretical anchor of cold war discourse.”29
It posited a historically new kind of regime that, emerging in Nazism and
finding full realization in Stalinism, wields utter and total ideological control
over the individual through the modern technologies of surveillance, prisons,
and police terror.30 Articulated in the influential mid-century writings of
George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Arthur Koestler,
and others, it became a keystone of Western anti-communist discourse and
policy and was the foil to Western liberal democracy.31 Although totalitarianism found its “ultimate ground of meaning and authority” in the “literary
works of certain writers,”32 Hannah Arendt’s major work The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) perhaps advanced its most influential definition by conjoining Nazism and Stalinism into a single phenomenon: “Up to now we know
only two authentic forms of totalitarian domination: the dictatorship of
National Socialism after 1938, and the dictatorship of Bolshevism since 1930.”33
For Arendt, this form of domination is historically novel and exceeds simple
dictatorship, tyranny, or one-party rule because of the “onion-like structure of
the movement [Nazism or Bolshevism],” which aims to penetrate every level
of the bureaucracy and state machine. Such “organizational omnipotence”
famously results in “the fictitious quality of everyday reality” where lying and
subterfuge reign.34 Totalitarianism’s other distinctive trait, memorably fictionalized in Orwell’s 1984, is thus the destruction of the private sphere. A totalitarian government not only “isolat[es] men, their political capacities,” but
“destroys private life as well.35 Yet Arendt provides a far richer account than
simply an account of “the ingenious devices of totalitarian rule.”36 In her wide-
ranging study, there are two crucial historical roots to totalitarianism: anti-
Semitism and imperialism, which together constitute a genealogy of modern
state violence. While Arendt was certainly no postcolonial theorist, her
approach importantly invokes the operations of colonial rule as what set the
stage for totalitarianism in Europe: “Lying under anybody’s nose were many
of the elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the basis of racism.”37 The striking formula Arendt arrives at is that
the totalitarian ruler or dictator is simply ruling like a foreigner “in the same
sense as a foreign conqueror may occupy a country which he governs not for
its own sake but for the benefit of something or somebody else.”38 In short,
“The totalitarian dictator is like a foreign conqueror who comes from nowhere,
and his looting is likely to benefit nobody.”39 Paradoxically, despite the fact that
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Arendt’s “totalitarianism” is partially theorized in historical reference to colonial domination, her focus on European political formations—and her study’s
uptake in Western Cold War discourse—means it has been less useful in diagnosing the specificity of modes of unfreedom that actually emerge in the formerly colonized world. Equally, the outsized influence of the mid-century
notion of totalitarianism has meant that today’s resurgence of ethno-nationalist
autocrats is often understood as a “return” of something that had long been in
abeyance. As I shall address in the Epilogue, such narratives miss the constitutive role of Global South decolonization struggles in producing our own
authoritarian moment.
Meanwhile, from works that would form the canon of postcolonial studies,
the most prescient early account of Third World dictatorship is surely Frantz
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (Les Damnés de la Terre, 1961). The book
is at once the extraordinarily powerful “handbook” of Third World liberation
and a cautionary tale of betrayal by the national bourgeoisie. The latter, notoriously, “discovers its historical mission as intermediary” at independence and
seamlessly steps in where the colonizers left off to exploit and rob the nation.40
Fanon is also under no illusion that the Soviet-U.S. standoff is anything but
another ruse of Third World domination: “Today the peaceful coexistence
between the two blocs maintains and aggravates the violence in colonial
countries.”41 And while the global Cold War escalates every local conflict into
a bipolar power contest, the colonized people respond with greater awareness
of the internationalist dimensions of struggle: “They no longer limit their
horizons to one particular region since they are swept along in this atmosphere of universal convulsion.”42 Nevertheless, Fanon’s main objection to the
bipolar conflict is the impossibility of the Third World’s development and
neutrality.43 Although the latter “allows underdeveloped countries to receive
economic aid from both sides,”44 the Cold War
does not permit either of these two sides to come to the aid of under
developed regions in the way they should. Those literally astronomical
sums invested in arms research, these engineers transformed into technicians of nuclear war could raise the living standards of the under
developed countries by 60 percent in fifteen years. It is therefore
obvious that the underdeveloped countries have no real interest in
either prolonging or intensifying this cold war.45
While Fanon’s trenchant critique of the neocolonialist elite and Cold War
pressures would prove devastatingly accurate in many sites, he did not live to
see the full extent of the shaping role of the Cold War on postcolonial societies. That Third World nations should “refuse to get involved in such rivalry”46
also misses the fact that for some new nations such refusal was an impossibility.
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Put more strongly: In some sites, the Cold War constituted the very form that
decolonization took. Kwon writes, “The bipolar political conflicts in the Asia-
Pacific region advanced as part of decolonization,” which was not the case in
all other parts of the world.47 Fast-forwarding to contemporary postcolonial
thinking, the figure (along with Scott) who has most influentially grappled
with repressive state forms of the Global South is Achille Mbembe, whose
notion of commandement elegantly describes the reactivations of colonial dictatorship in the post-independence period.48 For Mbembe, focusing on sub-
Saharan postcolonial states, commandement does not function by the coercion,
violence, or exploitation of colonial rule, but is legitimated by a symbolic
regime defined by the grotesque, lascivious, and extravagant personal rule of
its leaders. The pressures of the Cold War, however, do not play a part in his
analysis. Moreover, by way of the Orwellian notion of “double speak,” post
colonial tyranny tends to slide into depictions of communist totalitarianism:
“This is why the rhetorical devices of officialese in the postcolony can be compared to those of communist regimes—to the extent, that is, that both are
actual regimes given to the production of lies and double-speak.”49 Here, postcolonial authoritarianism is readily accessed through the tropes of mid-century
fascism. While such a brief and partial summary of each of these rich thinkers
ignores many nuances, I want to suggest that from both Cold War discourse
and postcolonial studies, we have few analytic models through which to think
autocracy simultaneously in its bipolar and decolonizing dimensions.
Cold War Reckonings seeks to critically synthesize and reconnect a number
of historical processes and cultural discourses usually addressed in separate
disciplines: cultural accounts of decolonization and postcolonialism; Cold
War ideological contests and alignments; and the concrete problems of repressive states in the postcolonial world. In resituating the “postcolonial” with
regard to “post–Cold War,”50 my goal is to think about postcolonial authoritarianism less as a monolithic essence that besets the Third World via the dictator’s “fusion of power and personality” or “symbolic regime,”51 and more as the
process by which decolonization is crosshatched by the structure of global
bipolarism.52 Indeed, the cultural texts I assemble in this study reveal how the
experiences of decolonization in the Asia-Pacific region are theoretically and
experientially inseparable from the Cold War. For these reasons, I look especially to texts that open up other worlds, political imaginaries, and temporalities from the supposed certainties about this period. However, this book does
not argue for literature’s unmediated access to political reality—in which we
would read a fictional narrative as directly illustrative of history, culture, or
identity.53 Nor does it recover a politicized textual agency that depends on
stylistic subversion and innovation for its impact, whereby formal devices are
“said to serve as signs of ‘resistance’ and opposition to the dictator.”54 Finally,
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I am not importing the significant study of the “dictator novel”—largely a
Latin American and African genre—to the Asia-Pacific region.55 I am interested, rather, in the way a variety of cultural genres transpose and organize the
raw materials of social and historical worlds in ways that map certain rationalities of power while helping us reimagine the sedimented narratives that
inhere in Cold War and postcolonial discourses. In particular, I argue that the
struggles and imagined futures of leftists, radical nationalists, and others who
occupy the “wrong side” of neoliberal history are necessary for a more nuanced
understanding of autocratic rule in the region.
Throughout, my book intentionally crosses boundaries of area studies and
postcolonial studies by comparing cultural production from East Asia alongside that from Southeast Asia, thereby examining the postcolonial aftermaths
of British, Dutch, American, and Japanese colonial empires. I bring further
comparative axes to the project by incorporating insights from scholars of temporality and postcolonial time (Reinhardt Koselleck, David Scott, Gary
Wilder); the global politics of anti-communism and human rights (Greg
Grandin, Crystal Parikh, Vijay Prashad, Joseph Slaughter); state-formation in
other Global South contexts (Akhil Gupta, Naomi Schiller); and post-
dictatorship transitions (Lisa Yoneyama and scholars of South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission). This book argues for the ability of imaginative texts to dislodge a number of conceptual certainties: of authoritarianism
“there” and freedom “here”; of the assumed temporal boundaries of colonial/
postcolonial and Cold War/post–Cold War; and notions of repressive state
control versus economic liberalism—assumptions we have inherited from
both postcolonial and Cold War epistemes. In short, Cold War Reckonings
seeks to bring Chen’s call to “de-cold war” critical thought together with postcolonial studies’ attention to decolonizing Euro-American knowledge forms
and institutions. In it, I seek to develop a critical idiom that brings together
two hermeneutics—the postcolonial analytic of “Europe and its other” and
the critical Cold War lens of bipolar global restructuring—in ways that challenge and enrich each other. In seeing these struggles as connected and
entangled in new ways, we better understand the ways these histories are
embedded in our present—helping, perhaps, to explain the residues and reactivations of autocracy today.

Revolutionary Promotion:
The Authorities of Cold War Development
In East and Southeast Asia, perhaps the most obvious legacy of the Cold War
is simply war: the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and
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its “sideshows” the Cambodian and Laos conflicts.56 Intimately related but less
discussed than those conflicts are the instances of “free world” state violence
carried out in the name of suppressing domestic communism and other political opponents. A chronology here might include the 2.28 massacre of 1947
and subsequent White Terror period in Taiwan; South Korea’s Cheju Island
Uprising and massacres of 1948–49; the 1950s counterinsurgency military
actions that crushed the Huk Uprising in the Philippines; Singapore’s 1963
purge of leftists in Operation Cold Store; the 1965–66 massacre of leftists in
Indonesia; and the violent crackdown of the 1980 uprising in Gwangju. As we
already noted, for U.S. foreign policy such violence was often understood as
the unfortunate cost of keeping the even larger evil of communist totalitarianism at bay. As Richard Nixon notoriously commented in 1971 of Latin American dictators, “It is an orderly way which at least works relatively well. They
have been able to run the damn place.”57 It was hoped, of course, that after
economic development and more tutelage in liberal democracy, such violence
would recede.
Usually disconnected from such accounts of state violence is the other
major legacy of Cold War decolonization in this region, the “developmental
state,” which has been credited with creating the Asian economic “miracles”
and consolidating capitalism in the region.58 First modeled on the Japanese
economic engine of the 1950s and ’60s, the developmental state is typically
characterized by authoritarian rule, strong state-business relations, tight control over labor, and the overriding imperative to create economic growth. It
was able, moreover, to harness “very real fears of war and instability toward a
remarkable developmental energy,”59 not forgetting, of course, that “American
and other imperial ambitions helped create the disorder in the first place.”60
Confounding the usual terms of political analysis, the developmental state is
at once “strong” in terms of the “struggle to industrialize” but “weak” in terms
of the “enmeshment” in the web of U.S. power; in short, they are
“semisovereign.”61 By the 1990s the “Asian miracle” economies were widely
lauded and had inspired hundreds of studies from the perspective of U.S.-
based modernization studies.62 Later sections of Wong’s poem succinctly illustrate its characteristics, indicating that The Dictator’s Eyebrow may be less
about a transhistorical, generic dictator, and more about a form of political
rationality particular to the Asia-Pacific:
Let’s call oppositional forces
anarchists. Let’s call us “we”.
Let’s term “them” anything we like.
Let’s insist that they threaten
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everything we stood for and built.
I bristle with indignance at the podium,
enthralling newfound allies,
enemies cowering in dingy basements.
I fall on all the right words like
“stability”, “progress” and “nation”.
...
Stick on “democracy” like a price-tag
then pick it slowly off the dulled back
of society caught up in its pragmatisms
and material pursuits. Every part of the plan
is in place, oiled and ready. You can only
move on up from here. Gather intel
to ensnare rebels on bogus charges;
terrorism is so in this year. Let me do my job
on the news, suffusing your face with regretful
authority. The future’s now ready for capture.63
Although tropes of “gather[ing] intel” to ensure “stability” and “progress” may
speak to any authoritarian government, references to “a society caught up in
its pragmatisms” where “You can only / move on up from here” explicitly evoke
the U.S.-aligned Cold War developmentalist state in the region. Such catch-
phrases (and the author’s country of origin) make it hard not to identify the
implied subject of the poem: Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s “founding father,”
who began his career as an anti-colonial lawyer and would remain prime minister for three decades. Lee ruled through the People’s Action Party, or PAP,
the only governing party independent Singapore has known. Between the
1960s and 1990s, the PAP delivered astonishing material progress and security
to its citizens while crafting a flexible economic and financial system highly
responsive to global fluctuations,64 making it a touchstone of successful Third
World development and globalization. Yet Singapore reinvented itself, paradoxically, by “borrow[ing] many of the elements of self-fashioning from the
colonial state,”65 that is, by limiting liberal freedoms, disciplining labor, and
quashing political opponents. To borrow Arendt’s phrase, it succeeded in part
by “ruling like a foreigner.”
Further, as Chua Beng Huat observes, Singapore accepted and leveraged
its “frontline” status in “resisting the spread of communism” in return for a
lucrative alliance with the U.S.-led free world.66 Citing the priority of
national survivalism whenever challenged, the PAP found that “fighting
communism was not only financially lucrative but also a convenient excuse
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for domestic political repression by any politician with a tenuous hold on
power.”67 The relationship of the stupendous export-oriented growth of Singapore, along with that of South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, to Cold
War U.S. military backing, loans, and infrastructure—not to mention the
massive regional economic boost from both the Korean and Vietnamese
conflicts—has been well documented.68 Notwithstanding significant differences in economic and political formations, the second tier of “Newly
Industrializing Countries” in the Asia-Pacific, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, charted similar developmental course.
Paul Hutchcroft notes, for example, that due to the importance of military
bases in the Philippines for the U.S.’s Vietnam War effort, “the United States
rewarded [Marcos’s] martial law with large increases in grants and loans.”69
During Suharto’s New Order period, the Indonesian economy similarly benefited from “the political victory of counter-revolutionary social forces” as
well as the “generous levels of foreign aid, privileged access to lucrative
Western export markets, and access to important new technology” afforded
by Cold War exigencies.70 As the Cold War–era dissident writers analyzed in
Chapter 2 reveal, capitalist developmental states paradoxically emerged not
merely alongside but in response to the early successes of People’s Republic
of China, the unified Vietnamese state, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
We must further recognize that—especially after the Sino-Soviet split by
the early 1960s—China was the more relevant Communist power in the
region. Robert Young writes of the significance of the 1949 revolution: “For the
first time, a non-white, formerly semi-colonized country achieved an independent communist government through a military campaign: national liberation and socialist revolution had been brought together.”71 While communist
revolution was made newly tangible for the region’s anti-colonialist nationalists, a side effect was that communism would become partly coded through
Chineseness, both supplanting and reproducing colonial epistemologies of
race, with particular consequences for the multiracial postcolonies of Southeast Asia. We will see later in this book how both departing colonizers and
non-communist national elites would view Chinese communities with sometimes lethal suspicion. The larger point to be made, however, is that in many
respects these authoritarian regimes might be viewed as the less revolutionary
mirror images that sought to compete with both the revolutionary appeal and
modernizing capabilities of their communist siblings.72 In the most material
sense, Cold War binarism and its triangulation through decolonizing Asia
created the conditions for programs of transpacific capitalist accumulation
and authoritarian repression in these states.
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How might we further probe the imbrications of decolonization and the
Cold War via the developmental state? Having already noted the mixed inheritances of Arendt’s major work on totalitarianism, I turn here to her lesser-
known theoretical work on the problem of authoritarianism. We might note
here that the term “totalitarianism”—which for Arendt connoted power that
colonized even the most private aspects of the individual—is rarely in political
parlance today (except as hyperbole). “Authoritarianism” and its slightly stronger cognate “dictatorship,” on the other hand, seem resurgent.73 In Arendt’s
1954 essay “What Is Authority?” she usefully makes the distinction between
authority and violent coercion:
The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the
one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of
the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy
itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both
have their predetermined stable place.74
Arendt describes a situation—unlike the case of tyranny or outright dictatorship, in which brute power issues from the person of the dictator—where the
source of authority defers to a force outside itself. Arendt recalls Plato’s appeal
in The Republic to the “rightness” of the authority of the doctor over his patient
and of the ship’s captain over the sailors. In this account, external authority is
a source that “transcends the political realm, [and] from which the authorities
derive their ‘authority.’ ”75
While Arendt goes on to examine the appeal to external authority in Greek
and Roman thought (through Plato’s notion of “the good” and the role of
ancestors and founders of Rome, respectively), I wish to bring her thinking to
bear on the way decolonization can be understood as a nation’s forced entry
into a “a global political scenario.”76 To do so allows us to consider how this
historic moment of restructuring—the simultaneous dis-embedding from
colonial rule and re-embedding into a bipolar matrix—enabled novel kinds of
appeals to outside authorities. Despite vehemently rejecting the West’s racialized logic of colonial tutelage, nearly every decolonizing nation aspired to
modern industrial development to “catch up” with the West, as many speeches
from the 1955 Bandung Conference make clear; such desires would be echoed
in the Asian Writers’ Conferences that I examine in Chapter 1.77 As long as one
essential task of the new nation-state was to overcome the lack of material
development understood as colonialism’s legacy, the desire for development
could be construed as an indisputable external authority that legitimized the
internal hierarchy of the authoritarian state, whether of communist or capitalist inclination. This is not to say, of course, that such authority did not also
work by outright violence as well, as we have mentioned.
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Popescu, building on the work of Susan Buck-Morss, has written of the profound desire for Soviet-style modernization on the part of certain Third World
intellectuals. In her analysis of the Soviet travelogue, A Soviet Journey (1978) by
South African political exile Alex La Guma, Popescu notes the way in which
it appears to La Guma that “Soviet people can speed up time.”78 Thanks to
Lenin’s revision of Marxist historical progress, the USSR “aimed to fast-forward
the Soviet nations through stages deemed inevitable in the development of a
society.”79 In an opposing but complementary mode, Park Chung Hee envisioned the righteous restoration of Korean sovereignty through a rapidly accelerated and rabidly anti-communist modernization, measured above all by
export earnings. The national export target even took physical form in the
Seoul export tower (Fig. 1), which kept a running annual tally of the country’s
exports in U.S. dollars.

Figure 1. Seoul’s Export Tower, December 1970, listing US$1 billion as the
achieved target export earnings.
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The point is that, although we typically think of the Cold War as a spatialized confrontation between blocs, spheres of influence, and curtains—whether
iron, bamboo, or color80—Third World futurity and temporality is of crucial
importance to understanding Cold War decolonization.81 The logic of progress promised by the export tower may best be described as revolutionary promotion. Theodore Hughes has described how “President Park offered the
promise of promotion through the world system, from periphery to core power,
as the one-way road to achieving autonomy and reunification.”82 Anti-
communist, developmentalist “promotion” would thus actively resolve the
problems left over from decolonization, namely, the divided peninsula, poverty, and U.S. military occupation. In a similar logic, Lee Kuan Yew saw his
nation’s progress as one of revolutionary advancement from poverty-ridden
Third World nation to First, attested to in the very title of one of his best-
selling memoirs, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000
(2000). In this formulation, of course, “Third World” is stripped of its earlier
meanings of solidarity and self-determination among once-colonized nations.
Instead, the logic of promotion offered through capitalist modernization—
widely disseminated through W. W. Rostow’s 1960 theory of stagist economic
development—was interpreted as the promised leap into the future and escape
from Third World backwardness, and could explicitly compete with the fast-
forwarding of time modeled by the communist world.
The Cold War could intersect with and bolster right-wing authoritarian
appeals to development with special intensity because of the perceived “time
lag” of colonial underdevelopment. Particularly in the “free world,” the
authority of the bipolar contest structured the very nature of nationalist progress. As we will see in texts such as Jeremy Tiang’s State of Emergency (Chapter 3), Han Kang’s Human Acts, and Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing
(Chapter 5), the figure of the communist threatened national development
and could send the country on the road to unholy collectivist ruin. Such
threats, in turn, were manipulated to control political opposition and discipline labor, subduing workers for the sake of building export-oriented industries and attracting foreign investment. Although the Philippines is not usually
included in the Asian Tigers honor role, Marcos’s “transnational accumulation strategy” was explicitly modeled on the authoritarian successes of South
Korea and Taiwan and, accordingly, required the militarized enforcement of
“political stability.”83 Caroline Hau duly notes that we ought to view the Marcos state and the more lauded “Asian miracles” as “occupying the same continuum.”84 Relatedly, in writing of the mass killings in Indonesia in 1965–66,
Hilmar Farid points out that state violence is too often understood solely
through the lens of human rights: “State violence in this case played a crucial
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role in creating a cheap and submissive labour force and Indonesia’s selling
point for attracting foreign capital during the New Order period.”85 We might,
then, better understand the intersection of the Cold War and decolonization
as not merely producing the unfortunate side effect of violence and authoritarian governance, but as inaugurating and authorizing the frantic competition
to fast-forward the time of national development. In “free world” Asia, this
intersection made illiberalism the necessary counterpart to a translocal formation of postcolonial capitalism.
To return to Arendt again, if Plato was “looking for a relationship in which
the compelling element lies in the relationship itself and is prior to the actual
issuance of commands,”86 for authoritarian postcolonial leaders, the a priori
element sustaining their authority could always be evoked through the gap
between actual and desired development, between the impoverished and
shameful now and the materially secure future. Versions of this basic formula
are, of course, all too common on the left and the right of the political spectrum: Soviet and Chinese Five-Year Plans were echoed in Park Chung Hee’s
own Five-Year Plans, part of his “Yusin” or “revitalizing” reforms, while similar
visions for the future are implied in Suharto’s “New Order” regime, Marcos’s
“New Society,” and Lee Kuan Yew’s vision of Singapore as a “first world oasis.”
Important differences between these regimes will be explored in the following
chapters, but, returning once more to Wong’s poem, we might term this general style of authoritarian rule “regretful authority.”87 Neither lagging outside
Western modernity nor explained by the racialist concepts of Asian model
minorities or “Confucian Capitalism,”88 “regretful authority” corresponds to
a mode of autocratic postcolonial rule in which decolonization is pursued
through, not despite, bipolarity. By conflating economic growth with national
time, and by replacing political revolution with revolutionary development,
the conceit of such regimes is the long-anticipated restoration of a national
community.89 Sovereignty is reclaimed via a necessarily painful—but perhaps
only temporary—process of modernization that suspends or brackets discussion about the political processes of modernization itself. As Wong’s indignant
eyebrow reassures us, “The future’s now ready for capture.”90
I have been arguing that it is not enough to understand Asian capitalist,
developmental states as merely the result of fortuitous structures left by colonialism and redeployed by a canny, complicit postcolonial elite. They are, I
suggest, characterized by a novel political-economic grammar—or, to use
Ann Laura Stoler’s phrase, “genre of rule”—that emerged in the Cold War–
decolonizing matrix.91 Nor is the Asian developmental state a retreat to the
specificity of a regional anomaly or historical outlier. Hughes describes how
under the military dictatorship of Park Chung Hee, South Korea “became in
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the early 1970s—and remains as of this writing [in 2012]—a favored site for the
display of successful development; it followed Japan’s postwar lead as a model-
minority case in the world system.”92 From our supposedly post–Cold War
moment, the constitutive authoritarianism of these capitalist success stories
has been all but occluded, and they are heralded retrospectively as being on
the “winning” side of (neoliberal) history, whether or not their transitions to
democracy are complete. Wong’s poem—to which I turn one last time—satirizes such a one-sided view:
. . . And let’s
inventory the tangible successes: a flourishing
banking sector, industries and bottomless
reserves; laws hammered into place
so with each election there can be
no contest; a resentful minority shrinking
out of sight as we speak.93
But the influence of the Asian developmental state has not gone unrecognized by the left. In Vijay Prashad’s 2007 elegy for the Non-A ligned Movement (or NAM), The Darker Nations, he observes that that the “tangible
successes” of the East Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Hong Kong were not just outliers of postcolonial development but actively
“dampened the enthusiasm for the Third World’s exertions to transform the
world order.”94 Their enviable economic success by the 1970s and ’80s “enabled
the Tigers to exert themselves in the NAM forums against the line proposed
by Castro and the Left.”95 These Asian states not only bucked the trend of
Third World developmentalism—in which developmentalist programs in
Latin America and Africa stalled for a variety of reasons96—but contributed to
the pushing back of socialist and leftist political possibilities more generally.
In particular, the economic rise of Singapore was to have several lasting
effects, of which perhaps the most far-reaching was to “uncouple the linkage
between economic and political reform of the world order.”97 Prashad explains:
By the 1980s, NAM [the Non-A ligned Movement] was infected with
the belief that economic development is a technical problem that
should not be bothered with the question of power. The Tigers’ example and leadership drove the Third World abandonment of the political critique of the economic order. The debt crisis shook the Third
World agenda at about the same time as the Tigers experienced their
economic takeoff. Whereas the Tigers continued to attend the Third
World forums, they now did so to promote their path as well as combat
the ideas of import substitution and anti-imperialist cooperation.98
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What Prashad’s otherwise astute account occludes,99 I argue, are the internal contestations around the “abandonment of the political critique of the
economic order.” The now-globalized logic of “pragmatic survivalism” that
places a firewall between the political and the economic cannot, I contend,
be properly understood without returning to the vicissitudes of Cold War–
decolonization struggles in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines
and the Korean peninsula. Anti-communist development is not only what
routs a leftist Third Worldist orientation à la Prashad, but comprises a set of
fought-over reorderings that struggled to overcome certain contradictions of
colonial society in the name of regaining sovereignty. Thus, one final claim
of this book is that the triumphalism of the West in “winning” the Cold War—
confirmed by Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis—has disavowed the role of
communists and leftists not only in the Soviet-aligned Third World, but also
within those U.S.-aligned postcolonies where nationalist historiographies also
tend to hold fast to a Cold War lens.100 A more nuanced understanding of the
global Cold War emphasizes “the unequal relations of power among the political communities that pursued or were driven to pursue a specific path of
progress within the binary structure of the global order.”101 Such a perspective,
in turn, demands a “more complex, multidimensional matrix of ‘us’ and
‘them’ ”102 beyond the assumed civilizational power binary between metropole
and periphery, and East and West. It is precisely to see these formations as
simultaneously postcolonial and a result of bipolar complications that is at
stake for this study. I read the retrospective cultural productions of the second
half of the book as a kind of historical auditing of, or reckoning with, the developmental states forged by Cold War decolonization, revealing how their internal struggles have been passed down to the present. These texts revisit this era
not in order to provide a neutral balance sheet of its pros and cons—economic
growth here, human rights violations there—but to specify, as Paik Nak-chung
has put it, “the precise weight to be given to each, and determine the actual
relationship between the two aspects.”103 What did those struggles and desires
look like, and how do cultural texts map, take stock of, and reimagine them?
What are the ethical and political stakes of remembering them?

Genres of Cold War Decolonization
In the final section of the Introduction, I outline the stakes of the book in
terms of my cultural archive and reading practices. The first thing to note is
that the complex internal and external underpinnings of authoritarian governance are much less legible than those of colonialism proper. Because the
problem of “free world” native dictatorships scrambles both the foreign oppressor/native resister paradigm, and the totalitarian East/liberal West dyad, Cold
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War Reckonings traces a set of new motifs, tensions, debates, and the literary
and filmic forms they take. As I have already suggested, I am interested not
only in the “exit narrative” of European or Japanese colonialism, but the way
that decolonization was “an entry, with considerable baggage, into a new
world order with its own delimiting determinations for civil and political practices.”104 Such dilemmas suggest that strategies for representing and critiquing
postcolonial regimes will necessarily depart from those that animated various
anti-colonial writings.
In his well-known 1986 essay on Third World literature, Fredric Jameson
discusses the literary responses by canonical postcolonial writers such as Senegal’s Ousmane Sembene and Kenya’s Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o to their countries’
neocolonial realities. Such writers, he notes,
find themselves back in the dilemma of [Chinese nationalist writer] Lu
Xun, bearing a passion for change and social regeneration which has
not yet found its agents. I hope it is clear that this is also very much an
aesthetic dilemma, a crisis of representation: it was not difficult to identify an adversary who spoke another language and wore the visible
trappings of colonial occupation. When those are replaced by your
own people, the connections to external controlling forces are much
more difficult to represent. The new leaders may of course throw off
their masks and reveal the person of the Dictator, whether in its older
individual or new military form: but this moment also determines
problems of representation.105
Jameson’s important point here, overshadowed by the controversy around his
essay,106 concerns finding adequate expressive form for the specificity of postcolonial—rather than colonial—unfreedoms. For writers and cultural producers, questions of visualizing “connections to external controlling forces”—or
indeed the domestic power of the “Dictator”—constitute a distinct problem
that emerges in the latter part of the twentieth century. In 1976, Ng ũgı̃ wa
Thiong’o himself had theorized the “crisis of unclarity” in “Black run neo-
colonial states.”107 He observed that “the native comprador bourgeoisie are the
most dangerous because they confuse the people. The real powers behind the
neo-colonial throne are invisible. The visible rulers have the same colour of
skin and hair as the rest of the population.”108 Where Ng ũgı̃ goes on to call for
the strengthening of democratic cultures,109 Jameson’s essay discusses the special role of allegorical and satirical genres, speculating that “under the circumstances, traditional realism is less effective.”110 For both, representations of
postcolonial authoritarianism demand new critical and aesthetic tools.
Correspondingly, certain accepted wisdoms of postcolonial literary analysis
and its dominant genres may need revisiting. We can recall that much classic
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anticolonial writing—from José Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere (1887), Gandhi’s Hind
Swaraj (1909), C. L. R. James’s The Black Jacobins (1938), to Frantz Fanon’s The
Wretched of the Earth (1961)—was, despite the diversity of its genres, often
characterized by the careful analysis, refusal, and opposition to the imperial
state’s racial, economic, and cultural organization in the service of anticipating national sovereignty and self-determination. In the tradition of anti
colonial “combat literature” à la Fanon, the raison d’être of such literature is
to call “upon a whole people to join in the struggle for the existence of the
nation.”111 As Jameson intuits, such a politico-aesthetic strategy is inadequate
for what he calls (somewhat sweepingly) “the poisoned gift of independence.”112 Or, as Duncan Yoon has more recently noted in an essay on the
Afro-A sian literary organizations that followed Bandung, “however critical
‘revolutionary literature’ was of colonialism, it would take another aesthetic
to address the antagonism of the independent nation. That is, as important
as ‘combat literature’ was to the birth of the postcolonial, it was not able to
address the various entanglements of the postcolony.”113 These observations
square with the problem Christopher J. Lee has aptly called the “tensions of
postcoloniality.” Lee elaborates how the contradictions at hand are no longer
the “tensions of empire,” but the “inherited colonial legacies and possible
postcolonial futures that African and Asian countries had to negotiate.”114 Put
otherwise, if earlier genres often privileged the colonial state as an unambiguous object of critique, what representational logic is demanded by authoritarian postcolonial regimes?115
We may note that the autocratic turn in the Global South has been rendered
visible through a variety of genres, including prison literature (for example,
Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o’s 1981 Detained and Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet, examined
in Chapter 2), the testimonio (most famously I, Rigoberto Menchú from 1983),
magical realism, especially in the portrayal of Latin American potentates
(such as Miguel Angel Asturias’s 1946 El Señor Presidente and Gabriel García
Márquez’s 1973 Autumn of the Patriarch), and what may be called “failed state
fiction.”116 In this book, I am interested in cultural forms that mediate the
emergent “genre of rule”117 of postcolonial authoritarianism within the Cold
War–decolonizing matrix. I contend that imaginative works that reckon with
“tensions of postcoloniality” in non-communist Asia do so most profoundly
through an impure mix of genres that historicize and theorize these fundamental shifts in political terrain, doing so in order to grasp “the crisis of unclarity.”
One consequence is that this book dwells less on those genres and thematics
mentioned above, as well as those most established within postcolonial studies. In terms of privileged genres in the field, “the novel under decolonization
was clearly a medium for the expressiveness of national consciousness” and
has garnered the lion’s share of scholarly attention.118 This project, by contrast,
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takes a more promiscuous approach to genre, reading across novels, poetry,
reportage, conference proceedings, the Bildungsroman, the graphic novel,
documentary and fiction film. More than defining a “new” privileged genre
to replace the novel or the testimonio, I am interested in the way these adulterated forms raise questions about the very relationship between decolonization
as both political and cultural genre. In Peter Hitchcock’s useful discussion of
the “genre of postcoloniality,” he warns us that “the gauntlet of genre definition
is a sign of hubris—the manner in which the literary critic asks to be shot.” Better, he suggests, to define genre “in more open, relational terms. Rather than
fixing a point of origin the genre is defined by a particular combination of characteristics that may surface and subside at different moments in history.”119 In
a similar tack, my use of genres is less about taxonomies, classifications, or
the “being of genre,” and more about “the intricate workings of the process of
genre.”120 For example, I am interested in the way writing against the state
might take on—and trouble—the genre of historical fiction, while narratives of
leftist exile surface in conjunction with the trope of anachronism. Such intermixings, I suggest, are strategies to map the double transformation from colonialism into postcolonial developmentalism, a process that might be described
by Antonio Gramsci (in different circumstances) as “restoration-revolution.”121
These forms parse the postcolonial as both reproduction and possibility
through a range of genre mixings, borrowings, and recombinations.
This approach takes me in two directions, explored in Parts I and II of the
book respectively. In the first, via an admittedly more familiar mobilization of
genre, I examine certain cultural modes and conventions that Cold War
decolonization precipitated, namely, the regional writers’ conference and the
genre of “persecuted” or dissident literature, exemplified by three “Asian Sol
zhenitsyns.” We see there how geopolitical contests produced distinct debates
around freedom of expression, “engaged” versus “pure” literature, and individual versus collective liberty. Both genres draw on longer traditions that
enshrined the free passage of literary exchange, and yet here are indelibly
marked by the bipolar historical conditions—and contortions—of possibility.
In the second half of the book, I grapple more directly with local mediations
of a newly global political genre: anti-communism. As we will see, anti-
communism is not only the ideological entry fee for alignment with the “free
world,” but it is a versatile political-aesthetic concept that can articulate with
a number of other authorities, such as colonial race thinking (which begets
“red” bloodlines), boundary definitions of the “other” of the postcolonial
nation, and an all-purpose justification for frenzied capitalist development.
Importantly, the texts in this section critically incorporate the tropes of anti-
communism by adapting a range of literary-political modes such as the
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Bildungsroman of the new nation, the tale of historical anachronism, and the
legal form of the truth commission. One further motif drawing together the
heterogeneous archive of these three chapters is that of temporality. If the
external authority of anti-communist development short-circuits the richness
of possible decolonizing futures—internationalist, democratic-socialist, or
other—many of the book’s texts locate coercion and violence in the state’s
infrastructures of temporality. They take us from tyrannies of colonial domination to dictates of developmentalism through narrative genres that experiment with and reflect upon foreclosed futures of the past and sedimented
histories of our “post–Cold War” present. Together, I consider these texts
genres of Cold War reckoning. My title is an attempt to capture both the tensions at a specific geopolitical conjuncture and the gesture of “settling
accounts” with the past.

Chapter Outlines
Finally, let me briefly outline the structure of the book and the terrain of each
chapter. Part I, “Authorities of Alignment, 1955–1988,” examines the pressures
that reshape notions of literary and political freedom under bipolar recruitment. Chapter 1, “Writing Freedom from Bandung to PEN International,”
lays the historical groundwork for regional debates over decolonization, “free
world” incorporation, and development. Scrutinizing the proceedings of a
number of PEN Asian Writers’ Conferences held in different Asian cities from
the early 1960s to 1980s, I trace the dilemmas of literary and cultural producers
as they attempt to theorize a collective future beyond both colonialism and
superpower subordination. Reading the conference form itself as a distinctly
Cold War genre, we see how notions of freedom and cultural autonomy prove
to be anything but stable: They range from the PEN-endorsed defense of “free
words” and exchange across the “free world” to radical calls for political solidarity and “cultural import substitution.”
Next, for several high-profile writers whose works have been typically categorized as “dissident writing,” I consider the way their aesthetic retooling of
prominent oppositional literary genres exposes the fault lines around post
colonial sovereignty and the Cold War reproduction of colonial rule. In this
chapter, “In the Shadow of Solzhenitsyn: Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Kim
Chi-ha, Ninotchka Rosca, and Cold War Critique,” I compare writings of and
on three literary figures who ran afoul of the South Korean, Indonesian, and
Philippine governments, respectively. Although the works of Pramoedya, Kim,
and Rosca continue longer traditions of allegorical and satirical writings that
critique state power, their imaginative renderings theorize authoritarianism
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specifically as the withholding of national sovereignty for the reproductive
imperatives of a transpacific capitalism. I argue that, despite differences in
literary form, languages, and postcolonial contexts, these figures challenge
liberal, human-rights notions of the dissident Third World writer via their
emphasis on global political economies, regional histories, and Cold War
restructuring.
In Part II, “Genres of Cold War Reckoning, 1997–2017,” I shift my attention
to post-1990 texts that look back to the Cold War decades. This part examines
how retrospective accounts of decolonization scrutinize anew the relationships between state violence, anti-communism, and developmentalism. Chapter 3, “Separate Futures: Other Times of Southeast Asian Decolonization,”
turns to narrative inscriptions of the tumultuous independence, merger, and
separation of Singapore and Malay(si)a. The chapter looks closely at Mohamed
Latiff Mohamed’s Confrontation (Batas Langit) (1997), Jeremy Tiang’s State
of Emergency (2017), and Sonny Liew’s The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye
(2015) for the ways they work through separation, unification, and division as
processes of decolonization that foreclose radical nationalist and leftist energies. Employing the literary forms of fictionalized memoir, a multi-perspectival
family drama, and a graphic novel, these loose Bildungsromane provide a
window onto those other “futures past” (Koselleck) that were available at
decolonization.
In the final two chapters of the book, I endeavor to trace the repressed aftermaths of the Cold War in the present. There I argue for a textual and filmic
poetics of untimeliness that challenges the linearity of both postcolonial historiography and the triumphalism of (post–)Cold War epistemes. First, in pondering the problem of the “meritorious dictator” in Singapore and South
Korea—that is, acknowledging the period of remarkable economic growth as
simultaneously one of political repression—Chapter 4, “The Wrong Side of
History: Anachronism and Authoritarianism,” argues for the poetics of anachronism as a defining (post–)Cold War genre. Hwang Sŏk-yŏng’s fictionalization of the failed 1980 Gwangju Uprising in The Old Garden (Oraedoen
Chŏngwŏn) (2000) and Tan Pin Pin’s banned documentary on political exiles
To Singapore with Love (2014) narrate former leftist and anti-imperial struggles
of liberation from the perspective of defeated political dissidents, communists,
and student leaders. The figure of anachronism, I contend, indexes the fraught
continuities between an apparently “past” era of Cold War anti-communism
and our triumphant neoliberal present.
Then, the fifth chapter, “Killing Communists: Transitional Justice and the
Making of the Post–Cold War,” examines Joshua Oppenheimer’s controversial documentary The Act of Killing (2012) and Han Kang’s Human Acts

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 24

5/18/21 3:13 PM

INTRODUCTION: RULING LIKE A FOREIGNER

25

([Sonyŏni onda] (2014) for their intimate reckoning with past state atrocities.
Framing my analysis in terms of the temporal logic of transitional justice, I
consider Han’s exquisite portrayal of pain and Oppenheimer’s striking aestheticization of killing to ask whether the genres of truth commissions—individual
truth-telling, commemoration, reconciliation, and official mourning—are
able to proffer notions of justice and ethical reckoning within today’s authoritative temporality of the “post–Cold War.” Together, the retrospective reckonings of Part II question the historical turning point of 1991 and disclose how
forms of anti-communist, capitalist orthodoxy continue to haunt and shape
our “post–Cold War” present.
Finally, the book’s Epilogue, “Authoritarian Lessons for Neoliberal Times,”
considers the apparent resurgence of authoritarian and populist regimes in our
political present. While rightly highlighting the role of neoliberalism in creating today’s authoritarianisms, recent works of political theory on the subject
are still largely limited to a North Atlantic perspective. I turn to accounts of
neoliberalism that, in contrast, underscore the way Cold War decolonization
helped create the very conditions for the neoliberal victory of capitalism. I
return to questions of “success and failure” and the historical balance sheet via
a reading of Yoon Je-kyoon’s blockbuster 2014 film Ode to My Father (Kukje
sijang), a film that spurred controversy for representing the Park Chung Hee
regime for its developmentalist triumphs while downplaying its human rights
violations. I argue, instead, for the unavoidable ambivalence of the capitalist
developmental state, which renders the choice between economic triumphalism or authoritarian human rights abuses a false one. The rise of today’s neoliberal authoritarianism, in sum, can be understood only by a proper reckoning
with the entangled processes of decolonization and the Cold War.
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Writing Freedom from Bandung
to PEN International

Relatively speaking, all of us gathered here today are neighbours.
Almost all of us have ties of common experience—the experience of
colonialism. Many of us have a common religion, common cultural
roots, and the so-called “underdeveloped” nations have more or less
similar economic problems . . . and yet, we know so little about each
other.
—President Sukarno, Speech at the Opening
of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, April 1955
“We have to recognize our being part of Asia, our being Asian.”
“But Asia means backwardness” . . .
“And even if we had a revolution and won in the end, what would we
do? We would still have to produce and sell—sell to, yes, America.”
—F. Sionil José, mass, 1978
In the years spanning 1962 to 1981, five Asian Writers’ Conferences were
held in different Asian cities under the auspices of PEN, the international
literary organization founded in London in the 1920s. Following the inaugural
meeting in Manila in 1962, the next four conferences would be held in Bangkok in 1964, Taipei in 1970, Taipei again in 1976, and finally, Manila in 1981.1
These meetings brought together writers, critics, university academics, and
the occasional politician or diplomat to exchange ideas and debate trends in
literature and culture in an ostensibly pan-A sian forum. Attended by delegates
from a number of countries in the region, including the Philippines, the
Republic of China (that is, Kuomintang-governed Taiwan), South Korea,
29
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South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Japan, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, these conferences brought together writers from societies that had recently
emerged from colonial rule and now largely found themselves—with some
important exceptions such as India—in the U.S.-aligned camp of the Cold
War. At the 1964 conference held at Thammasat University, Bangkok, the formal luncheons, plenaries, and a royal reception with the king and queen of
Thailand at the Grand Palace were followed by a panel titled “The Contribution of Asian Writers to World Understanding.” In his paper, Vu Hoang-
Chong, delegate from Vietnam, opined that,
culture constitutes the most lasting and efficient means of arriving at
mutual understanding between peoples of different languages and civilizations. The emphasis has been the more significant after the Second
World War when colonialism, the once-dominant factor in East-West
relationships, has been virtually eliminated in free Asia. In our “crisis of
growth,” we, the newly independent countries, are but too willing to
make our voices heard throughout the world, and the heritage of culture bequeathed us over the centuries is but too willing to display itself
on its way to gaining more friends and better understanding.2
Vu’s quote underscores some significant aspects of these early PEN-sponsored
conferences. Most obvious is the optimism that infuses this literary gathering,
where colonialism has been “virtually eliminated in free Asia” and gives rise
to “the newly independent countries.” With colonialism gone, a central motivation of the conference is to promote “mutual understanding” and friendship
between peoples who had been arbitrarily kept apart by colonial borders, giving voice to their rich but hitherto obscured “heritage of culture.” Yet these
are countries also grappling with the “crisis of growth” that pertains to newly
won independent nationhood:3 the conditions giving rise to this inter-A sian
conference are therefore not simply those of emancipation and the opportunity to gain “more friends.” The key expression, I wager, is “free Asia,” which
demands to be read for its double meaning: both “free” from colonialism, and
“free” as in the U.S.-led and non-communist, capitalist “free world.”4 This
chapter argues that the PEN regional meetings are a unique lens through
which to see how tensions between newly won postcolonial freedoms and
Cold War pressures of alignment are worked through on the terrain of literary
exchange and cultural cooperation. Moreover, the conferences themselves
may be read as a distinct genre of Cold War decolonization, in which debates
over freedom, self-determination, and futurity are especially intense.
We can immediately note that the form of the writers’ conference incites
multiple modes of reading. On one level, we can read these meetings for the
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content of their preambles, speeches, papers, keynotes, and resolutions; some
conference proceedings even include detailed transcripts of discussions that
followed formal papers, providing access to their ephemeral dimensions. The
proceedings also gesture toward the extra-literary aspects of the meetings: the
welcome speeches, luncheons, sight-seeing excursions, receptions with local
dignitaries, and even—in the case of the 1981 Manila Conference—the full
budget and financing details (24,000 pesos were provided by the Ford Foundation, 3,027 pesos of which went toward “Beer and Snacks”).5 The conferences,
therefore, are more than neutral intellectual exchanges. They are performances
of inter-A sian hospitality; opportunities for cultural diplomacy and Cold War
political propaganda; and material events that require substantial funding,
labor, and international coordination. They exemplify one definition of Cold
War literature provided by Andrew Hammond: “an intertwined, multi-generic
set of socio-political concerns and textual practices produced by, and productive of, the historical conditions of the times.”6 I read these debates and performances as part of a much larger literary history of the global Cold War.7
As such, this chapter, unlike the ones that follow, does not focus on close
readings of individual literary works. It serves as a condensed cultural history
of a particular institution, PEN Asian Writers’ Conferences, whose participants self-consciously struggled to theorize a decolonized Asian sphere of
letters—a realm of cultural exchange beyond the fetters of colonial subordination—but within rapidly hardening Cold War boundaries. If, as Joseph Keith
has observed in U.S. Cold War discourses, “the principle of freedom became
increasingly mobilized to define the struggle against the Soviet Union,”8 what
kinds of “principles of freedom” were invoked and theorized in the domain
of postcolonial, non-communist Asia? How does the notion of writing as a
privileged object of freedom—as stressed by PEN’s founding values and
charter—rub up against ideas of culture’s larger role in national and regional
anti-imperialist liberation? How are fears of communist takeover negotiated
alongside the realities of new U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes led by such
figures as Marcos, Chiang Kai-shek, or Suharto? And finally, how might
reading the conferences as a simultaneously postcolonial and Cold War genre
enable us to think in new ways about the intersections of literary freedom,
cultural imperialism, and Cold War authorities? The “principle of freedom”
at stake, as we will see, is threatened by at least two major contaminants: on
the one hand, communist takeover, and on the other, the betrayal by authoritarian comprador regimes. In asking these questions, this chapter aims to
present a broader landscape of the literary-political networks, debates, and
tropes through and against which the book’s later case studies and textual
examples can be read.
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In what follows I first give a brief history of the PEN organization, paying
special attention to its Cold War expansion in Asia. I then move to an analysis
of how different permutations of freedom—literary, individual, national, anti-
communist, and anti-imperial—are deployed and contested in this Cold War
matrix. In particular, I’m interested in what happens to the revolutionary energies of anti-colonialist nationalism when the very notion of revolution appears
to be ceded, under Cold War bipolarity, to the socialist-aligned block. In the
final section of the chapter, I address questions of translation and the problem
of neocolonial authoritarian rule as it manifests in PEN resolutions supporting imprisoned writers around the world. The Asian Writers’ Conferences, in
sum, raise the fraught question of freedom after independence,9 as read
through a little-studied genre of Cold War decolonization.

PEN at the Cold War
Arguably, one of the most dominant conceptions of international cultural
exchange and freedom of expression has been advanced by the organization
PEN International. Deriving its name from the acronym for Poets, Essayists,
and Novelists, PEN was founded in Britain in 1921 by Catharine Amy
Dawson-Scott and John Galsworthy and is now a sprawling international
federation that boasts 145 centers in over 100 countries.10 PEN’s official stance
has always been a liberal one of freedom of expression and political neutrality. Its charter states that literature and art “should be left untouched by
national or political passion” and remain the “patrimony of humanity at
large”; it exhorts its members to “pledge themselves to oppose any form of
suppression of freedom of expression in the country and community to which
they belong.”11 Following its founding, the organization soon established
overseas chapters in Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina in the 1920s and in India
(where Rabindranath Tagore was its first president), China, and Japan by the
1930s.12 Originally conceived as a literary social club in London whose liberal
founders promoted “international friendliness for writers,” the organization’s
vocation was profoundly shaped during the interwar period and the rise of
fascism.13 Following the book burnings in Nazi Germany and the expulsion
of German Jewish writers, PEN—then under the leadership of H. G. Wells—
came to see “literary texts, now tied to the fate of authors, [as what] required
international protection from state suppression.”14 In the 1930s it defended the
writers Federico García Lorca (unsuccessfully) and Hungary’s Arthur Koestler (successfully) against Spain’s Franco. In sum, “Humanitarian [or human
rights] ideas of speech beyond national boundaries, gender equality, international cooperation and education”15 were predicated on the idea of literary
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expression as a special moral and aesthetic object that above all demanded
protection.
By 1949 it had consultative status at the UN and by the mid-1960s, as Frances Stoner Saunders relates, “International PEN had seventy-six centres in
fifty-five countries, and was officially recognized by UNESCO as the organization most representative of all the writers of the world.”16 The global spread
of PEN Centers during the Cold War, in turn, made it a target of the CIA-
backed Congress for Cultural Freedom. Established in 1950, the CCF was a
front organization whose mission was to “nudge the intelligentsia of western
Europe away from its lingering fascination with Marxism and Communism
towards a view more accommodating of ‘the American way.’ ”17 As Peter
McDonald writes of the CCF, “It set out to create an elite worldwide liberal
alliance that would promote Western ideas of culture and act as a bulwark
against communism and the broader threat of totalitarianism.”18 Saunders provides a pithy history of the extensive maneuvering within the American PEN
Center, concluding that by the mid-1960s “the CIA had achieved excellent
penetration of PEN.”19 Indeed, Comment: The Filipino Journal of Ideas, Discussion and the Arts, which published the proceedings of the 1962 conference
in Manila, was published jointly by PEN and the CCF. Thus, although PEN’s
original mission may have been shaped by European debates on fascism, art,
and humanism, it found a particular calling in the postwar geopolitical conjuncture, where Third World decolonization was subtended by the Cold War.
Paralleling the trajectory of postwar human rights generally, PEN’s prominent
cases tended to highlight dissident writers of the Soviet bloc (the Soviets would
not affiliate with PEN until 1988) and Third World authoritarian states. Doing
work in the literary realm analogous to that of Amnesty International and
other human rights NGOs, it is today the preeminent international NGO
promoting literary freedom of expression and continues to actively oppose the
state persecution of writers.
In many ways the work of PEN and the CCF dovetailed to promote similar
liberal notions of culture as “free” from political contamination, privileging
the individual autonomy of the writer/creator. Yet studies such as McDonald’s
have explored the conflicted role that PEN centers and conferences played in
postcolonial national contexts such as in South Africa and India.20 At one
level, PEN’s emphasis on freedom of speech, “unhampered transmission of
thought,” literature as “common currency between nations,” and the dispelling of “race, class and national hatreds”21 fits well with the aspirations of
writers and intellectuals emerging from the restrictions of colonial borders
and institutions. On the other, PEN’s commitments were profoundly complicated by decolonizing contexts, where vastly different conditions would
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challenge its anti-political notions of freedom of expression. Furthermore,
even if Saunders reminds us that the PEN executive was well “penetrated” by
the CIA’s cultural front—ensuring that “free speech” remained the gift of the
U.S.-led “free world”—we cannot assume that the writers, critics, and scholars
that attended its international meetings were simply supporters of U.S. efforts
in the Cold War. Despite being primarily funded by the Ford Foundation, for
example, the 1981 Manila Conference gave airtime to Marxist literary critic
Domingo Castro de Guzman, who vehemently indicted “trivial, superficial
and smallminded” American poets for being “intoxicated by their nation’s
imperial successes and benefit[ing] directly therefrom.”22 F. Sionil José’s longtime participation in PEN is perhaps a more substantial rejoinder. A prolific
writer whose novels on colonialism and class struggle troubled the Marcos
government (as did writings by many journalists and writers, many of whom
were imprisoned),23 he founded both the Philippines PEN Center and the
bookshop and publishing house Solidaridad. He was a key participant at four
of the five PEN Asia Writers’ Conferences; Singaporean critic Dudley de
Souza would give an entire presentation on his novels, subtitled “An Extended
Study in Social Injustice,” at the 1981 Manila conference. José also edited the
Asian PEN Anthology, published by his Solidaridad Press in 1968 and reprinted
by Taplinger Press in New York the same year. I use brief excerpts from José’s
1978 anti-Marcos novel Mass throughout this chapter to give literary grounding to some of the lively debates at the conferences.
Instead of collapsing PEN with the ruses of the CCF, I suggest that the
PEN-sponsored writers’ conferences participate in a set of political-cultural
concerns not unrelated to those articulated at the historic 1955 Asian-A frican
Conference in Bandung, in which representatives from twenty-nine newly
decolonized and decolonizing nations came together to assert their independence from both colonial rulers and the new Cold War superpowers. Vu’s
comments on the shared “heritage of culture” and desire for friendship I
quoted above, for example, might well remind us of the welcome speech made
by Indonesian President Sukarno at Bandung: “Many of us have a common
religion, common cultural roots and the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ nations
have more or less similar economic problems . . . and yet, we know so little
about each other.”24 “Bandung” has since come (sometimes nostalgically) to
signify the birth of the Afro-A sian solidarity movement and the subsequent
Non-A ligned Movement established in Belgrade in 1961; the more radical
anti-imperialist movement of the Tricontinental would follow with the 1966
Havana conference, “expand[ing] the Bandung alliance to the Americas.”25
By extension, as I discussed in the Introduction, for scholars such as David
Scott, Samir Amin, and Partha Chatterjee, the Bandung Era signals an entire
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modality of Third World nation-formation, those “experiments with anti-
imperialist self-determination, with political and economic nonalignment.”26
It is more helpful, however, to view Bandung less as an origin point, and
more as a container of diverse and sometimes competing sentiments. I follow
Christopher J. Lee in his assessment of the complexity of Bandung, a conference so often considered “a foundational moment of the early postcolonial
moment.” He notes that “it equally”
contained the existential predicaments of a newfound sovereignty
and the internal and external political claims and responsibilities that
would soon challenge it, particularly those generated by the cold war.
. . . Bandung contained both the residual romance of revolution, as
well as the realpolitik of a new world order in the making.27
In other words, Bandung was never only about the romance of revolution, or
what Scott has elegantly delineated as the overcoming of colonial alienation
via a “narrative of liberation” (a point I return to at the end of this chapter). It
was also a moment inexorably struck through by Cold War tensions and alignments. If Lee returns to Bandung as a way to chart “the possibilities and predicaments of the early postcolonial period” in relation to our political present,28
I suggest that the PEN Asian Writers’ Conferences provide a window onto a
particular subset of those early postcolonial predicaments, whose contradictions have persisted until, and continue to inform, our present. In one of the
regions of the world most polarized by the conflicts of the Cold War, we see
how “the residual romance of revolution” was refashioned by “the realpolitik
of a new world order.” Whether debating translation goals, realist versus
abstract literary styles, or issuing resolutions of solidarity with detained writers,
the particular form of the conferences indexes the multiple desires as well as
pressures reshaping the region.
By historical coincidence, the inaugural PEN Asian Writers’ Conference
1962 was held in the same year as the second Afro-A sian Writers’ Conference
in Cairo. The latter followed on the successes of the first Afro-A sia Writers’
Conference convened in 1958 at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, under the umbrella of
the Afro-A sian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization established in 1957, which
itself drew direct inspiration from the anti-imperialist Bandung spirit. (The
Afro-A sia Writers’ meetings were subsequently formalized into the permanent
Afro-A sian Writers’ Bureau, or the AAWB.) To be sure, the PEN Asian Writers’ meetings were not governed by the Third Worldist anti-imperialist aesthetics of the literary journal Lotus or Afro-A sian Writers’ Bureau, as recently
discussed by Hala Halim, Rossen Djagalov, and Duncan Yoon.29 One clear
parallel with the AAWB, however, was PEN’s interest in literary translation,
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which I discuss in the final section of the chapter. And there were overlaps in
themes as well as some common participants at Bandung, the Afro-A sian
Writers’ Conferences, and the PEN Conferences. Diplomat, author, and president of the UN General Assembly from 1949 to 1950, Carlos P. Romulo, represented the Philippines at Bandung with one of the opening speeches and
would give the keynote “José Rizal” lecture at the 1962 PEN meeting. At the
1981 PEN Writers’ Conference, literary scholar C. F. Bautista alludes to the
1975 Afro-A sian Writers’ Symposium as an important thematic precursor to
the recent 1977 Philippines PEN Conference, where the latter meeting “functioned as a follow-up to the proposals drawn up in that symposium.”30
My point is that the literary energies of this period cannot be neatly assigned
into categories of aligned and unaligned. The particular forum of PEN Asian
Writers’ Conferences ought, rather, to be understood as part of the larger postwar political and cultural milieu that developed out of the 1950s and ’60s, a
period when competing articulations of freedom, self-determination and
national futures were in global circulation. Functioning primarily as a venue
for cultural and intellectual exchange by writers and critics in non-communist
Asia, the conferences also received the imprimatur of politicians, diplomats,
and university leaders, and in that sense, they may be read at the intersection
of cultural and diplomatic history. Most interesting, the conferences attest to
a historical moment in which decolonization gives rise to new forms, genres,
and experiments in regional and interregional organizations, demanding
attention to the “interpersonal, sociopolitical practices that constituted such
efforts.”31 These efforts, in turn, allow us to map distinct transformations and
fissures around the Cold War–decolonizing conjuncture. In Romulo’s Rizal
speech he credits the great nineteenth-century Filipino writer for showing us
“what things were, and how it was then thought the future would be.”32 We
might approach the Asian Writers’ Conferences from the 1960s to the early
1980s in the same way.

Anti-Communist Friends
How might we parse the complex positionality of these participants from non-
communist or “free world” Asian nations? Admittedly, we must note that, if
the Afro-A sian Writers’ Bureau sought “a definition of culture that took anticolonial struggle as its starting point,”33 early PEN Asia writers sometimes took
anti- communism as its cultural starting point. The strongest articulations,
unsurprisingly, come from writers in Taiwan, (South) Korea, and (South) Vietnam. One extreme articulation is presented at the 1962 Manila Conference by
M. K. Li from the Republic of China, who provides a brief history of Chinese
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literature on Taiwan thus: “In a short period of thirteen years our writers have
created worthy literature in Free China. And I would frankly call it Anti-
communist literature.”34 South Korean delegate Mun Chon No, meanwhile,
describes his nation’s “thirst for liberty” as the result of Asia being the “foremost battlefield where democracy and communism face each other,”35 handily
deploying the standard Western ideological shorthand for the Cold War contest. Addressing questions of literary style and form, Hsiao I Hung from Hong
Kong warns against the collapsing of literature with propaganda, which would
dangerously “subordinate [the writer’s] creation to a certain practical authority,”36 synonymous with the communist agenda. At the 1970 Third Asian Writers’ Conference in Taipei, delegate participant Arved Viirlaid from Estonia,
identified as “Writer in Exile” in the proceedings, could express delight and
camaraderie with his Asian colleagues precisely because of their shared Cold
War context:
But here, I feel you understand me better than the people in Canada,
the United States, or the Western world. You understand what Communism is. You know what tyranny means to a writer. . . . [If only] we
can send our free words, our free thinking to Red China or the Soviet
Union we would find so many friendly writers over there who would
help us to tear down any kind of Iron or Bamboo curtain.37
For Viirlaid, Asian writers understand his plight so much better than Westerners because they are living among the actual conflicts of the Cold War rather
than its abstract ideologies. In his formulation, it is nothing other than the free
flow of literature—“our free words”—that would demolish Cold War barriers.
We cannot help but notice the way Viirlaid echoes the Eisenhower administration’s stress on transnational flows as the perceived counter to communism.
As Christina Klein has documented, Eisenhower and Dulles deployed the
“intertwined concepts of flow and exchange . . . as central ideas during the
Cold War.” They defined “the ‘free world’ as a place where people, commodities, resources, and the products of intellectual activity could move easily
across national boundaries, and distinguished it from the Soviet ‘bloc’ where
all of these things were trapped behind iron and bamboo curtains.”38 An editorial in Taipei’s daily newspaper Lianhe bao (United Daily News) confirms
this view. In a write-up of the opening of the 1970 Writers’ Conference, the
editorial lays blame on the “the Iron Curtain of the West” (xifang de tiemu)
and “the Bamboo Curtain of the East” (dongfang de zhumu) for hindering free
communication and common prosperity.39 Similarly, for Viirlaid, PEN’s
defense of free cultural exchange and the “unhampered transmission of
thought” model the very “principle of freedom” which alone is needed to
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combat the tyranny of communism. PEN’s liberal defense of freedom of
expression, in which literature moves freely from external constraint, is therefore a useful analogy of the “free flows” whereby capitalist liberalism is defined
against the inherent blockages of the Soviet system.40
Nevertheless, the actual form of the conferences indicated their own ideological blockages. Not surprisingly, no writers from the communist Mainland
or North Korea appear to have attended any of the conferences. Moreover, a
Vietnamese delegate at the 1970 Taipei meeting, Nghiem Xuan Viet, complained about the absence of discussion of his country’s war at the conference,
arguing that the first value of any cultural politics must be liberty: “Without
liberty and without surrounding protection of that liberty, we can not live,
therefore, we can not write.”41 Evoking “the common struggle for liberty in
Asia, liberty for mankind,” Nghiem urged other writers to work against “the
denying of basic spiritual values”42 that the encroaching threat of communism
represents. We may surmise that the final Saturday evening’s reception given
by “His Excellency President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek and
Madame Chiang” at Chung Shan Hall would have repeated such themes
(Figure 2).43 Further, occurring in the midst of the PRC’s Cultural Revolution
(1966–76), delegate tours to Taipei’s magnificent Palace Museum, the Chinese Opera, and the National Museum of History would have performed a
visceral contrast between the Nationalist (Kuomintang [KMT]) Party’s protection of cultural treasures and the Chinese Communist Party’s subordination
of art to political exigency. Such extraliterary activities remind us of the way
the conference as a whole may function as a performative genre of cultural
diplomacy. Put otherwise, efforts staged by the 1970 Taipei conference map
the region’s concrete experience of Cold War conflicts—especially the competition between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party—into a cultural ideology that posits both writerly freedom and freedom in general at odds
with the depredations of communism. If PEN centers helped consolidate a
universal language around the protection of literary freedom as a basic human
right, in decolonizing Asia it did so via the simultaneous construction of Cold
War boundaries between nations that valued “liberty” and those that didn’t.
By extension, a similar boundary operated between literature that was aesthetically autonomous and that which descended to propaganda.
Paradoxically, the “free flows” and unhampered transmission of thought
are even less evident at the 1976 conference in Taipei, where the trend of
increased international representation by delegates is sharply reversed. Compared to 1970, this meeting counted participants from only four countries
beyond the Republic of China: Japan, Hong Kong, (South) Korea, and Saudi
Arabia.44 Such a decrease reflects the fallout following Henry Kissinger’s and
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Figure 2. President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang (Soong Mei-ling) entering a reception hall at the 1970 Asian Writers’ Conference held in Taipei.

U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visits to Beijing, in 1971 and 1972 respectively,
after which the United States changed its diplomatic affiliation from the
Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The UN
seat and powerful Security Council membership also switched from the
Taipei-based Nationalist government to Beijing’s Communist Party;45 Chiang
Kai-shek had died just the previous year. The isolation of Taiwan is further
evidenced by the fact that the 1981 Manila meeting calls itself the Fourth PEN
Asian Writers’ Conference, apparently ignoring the 1976 Taiwan meeting
altogether.46 At the latter, the geopolitical standoff across the Taiwan Strait
(which continues today) results in a more explicitly anti-communist sentiment than at earlier meetings, while the “principle of freedom” is ever more
narrowly defined.
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The 1976 opening remarks by Y. C. Chen, president of the Taipei PEN
Center, seek to underscore the different experience of the Cold War in Asia
from that in Europe. Chen points to the irony of holding the 40th International PEN Congress in Vienna the previous year (1975) under the theme
“European Writers in Three Decades of Peace”; the latter is obviously the
negative inspiration for the Taipei meeting’s theme “Thirty Years of Turmoil
in Asia.” Chen elaborates: “In the 30 years from the end of World War II,
Europe has had cold war but in general no large-scale hot war. But what about
this Asia of ours?”47 He concludes the conference by again emphasizing Asia’s
ongoing instability: “In those countries that have been afflicted by new wars
and disturbances, countless people have lost their lives. . . . Unrest weighs
heavily upon our whole region.”48 In one sense, Chen’s comments anticipate
recent scholarly interventions such as those from Odd Arne Westad, Jodi Kim,
Andrew Hammond, and Heonik Kwon, whose work has stressed not the “long
peace” experienced in the North Atlantic, but an “epoch of ‘unbridled reality’
characterized by vicious civil wars and other exceptional forms of political
violence.”49 Yet although Kwon and other scholars of the global Cold War have
helped widen scholarly attention to the “multitude of these locally specific
historical realities and variant human experiences,”50 delegates at the 1976
conference remain locked in a defensive geopolitical reality. At its most reductive, the very notion of “freedom” of literature and culture is reduced to nothing but the battle against communism, as Wang Chi-tsung attests in a brief
paper titled “Literature in Agitated Time”:
Judging from the thirty years of Asian literature created in turmoil, we
can say that the worst enemy of free literature are the Communist theories, both in literature and in general. The anti-communist theme is
the most important one in Asian literature, I believe. In the progress of
time, it is likely that there will be great writers like Pasternack [sic] and
Solzhenitsyn, who will show to the world the essence of Asian culture
and will be a part of great world literature.51
In this strained formulation, Asian literature will ascend to the status of “great”
world literature precisely by virtue of its anti-communism. Note here the
assumed correlations between “free literature,” the “essence of Asian culture,”
and world literature, even as the reduced conference attendance makes clear
the shrinking world of allies for the KMT’s republican stronghold on Taiwan.52
Obviously, no mention is made of the KMT’s own increasing repression
around publishing and literary freedom, which would culminate in the accusation of leftist, “nativist” (hsiang-t’u) writers at the 1977 KMT-convened Symposium of Writers for promoting Taiwanese separatism.53
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Finally, we can observe the strangeness of a debate on social realism that
follows a paper by Yen Yuan-shu of National Taiwan University. In a discussion on the avowedly anti-communist fiction of Chen Jo-hsi, the author’s
choice to write in a social realist mode is not critiqued for the reason we might
assume—its perceived ideological alignment with the Soviet world. As Hammond reminds us, Soviet ideologue Andrei Zhdanov’s anti-formalist prescriptions for Soviet art were frequently contrasted to the U.S.’s sponsorship of
modernism’s experimental aesthetics.54 Instead, the Taiwanese conference
participants fault social realism for portraying the Mainland as anything other
than a horrific, intolerable state of misery. That such portrayals can be published in Taiwan gives rise to puzzlement at the “freedom of speech of our
island that allows stories like that . . . to be printed at all.”55 Rather than see
these debates as irredeemably ideological, however, I suggest we read them as
attempts to make sense of the shifting “principle of freedom” as it is navigates
both bipolar geopolitical standoffs and the liberal insistence on free communication and exchange. Refracting such tensions into the domain of the literary conference, PEN’s commitment to “freedom of expression”—which in
Taiwan in 1976 can officially refer only to “anti-communism”—grates against
liberty as defensively defined in Cold War Asia. In envisioning a world of letters created negatively through the artistic principle of freedom from (communist) constraint, other possibilities for world-making, solidarity, and futures
forged against bipolarism itself are foreclosed in the 1976 KMT-sponsored
PEN Conference.
By the 1981 Manila Conference (technically the fifth Asian Writers’ Conference), with the theme “Literature and Social Justice,” the European PEN
executive itself seems to have recognized the way “freedom of expression” had
become an “aligned” concept in the cultural Cold War. International PEN
secretary, former soldier, and novelist Peter Elstob opens the conference with
a general disclaimer as to PEN’s ideological allegiances:
A principle which has emerged very clearly in recent years is that a
P.E.N. Centre never speaks for its government and its delegates can
never be called to account for the actions of their government. . . .
I mentioned that we considered the cases of writers imprisoned in
more than thirty countries and that member will immediately tell you
that no one political ideology is responsible for oppressing and suppressing writers.
Perhaps the two worst countries for an independent-minded writer to
live in today are Argentina and Cuba, and their politics could hardly be
further apart; two others almost as bad are Czechoslovakia and Chile.56
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Elstob strategically calls out pairs of repressive governments, one communist
and one capitalist, with the assurance that neither right-wing nor left-wing
governments have a monopoly on repression. But his comments also suggest
a certain symmetry of authoritarianism during the Cold War, acknowledging
that the “free world” may not be as liberal as advertised.

Between Revolution and Development
If anti-communism looms large as a primary contaminant to freedom, a different but parallel articulation of unfreedom also comes into focus at the early
conferences. The latter stresses common colonial histories, poverty, and persistent underdevelopment as the problems Asian nations face during and after
decolonization. As we saw earlier in the quote from Sukarno, economic “backwardness” as a shared Asian and African characteristic was a trope repeatedly
used at the 1955 Bandung conference. Romulo’s speech there well evokes the
shared sense of urgency around this issue:
Lastly, I have said that all of us here are concerned with peaceful economic growth. This brings us closest of all to the hub, the center, the
heart of our common preoccupations, because the political forms and
methods we seek and choose, the social ideas and ideals we embrace,
are all wrapped up in the way in which we strive for growth. Economic
growth, economic change, transformation of our backward and inadequate economies—these we all seek. These we must seek, else we stagnate and die.57
In his speech at the closing session, Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru
confirms the urgent need for development: “We have been backward; we are
backward. We have been left behind in the race, in the world race, and now
we have got a chance again to make good.”58 It is not difficult to agree with
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s assessment that the discourse of Bandung “often
displayed an uncritical emphasis on modernization” to the extent that “the
figure of the engineer was one of the most eroticized figures of the postcolonial
developmentalist imagination.”59 We might, in fact, perceive here a central
tension of postcoloniality as that between cultural modernity and modernization, expressed in the jostle between the figure of the writer and the engineer.60 The preoccupations with modernization at Bandung would permeate
the PEN conferences, as we see in the opening statement at the 1962 Manila
Conference by Philippines Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez. Like the young
protagonist in F. Sionil José’s novel Mass who claims “Asia means backwardness”
(in the scene I quoted as the epigraph), Pelaez describes poverty as Asia’s “only

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 42

5/18/21 3:13 PM

Writing Freedom from Bandung to PEN International

43

common factor.”61 Yet it is precisely the shared experience of colonialism
across almost all of Asia that simultaneously gestures toward a resurgent pan-
Asian identity: as a region of proud civilizations no longer subordinated to the
West or to Japan, it is poised now for an era of national rebirth, sovereignty,
and prosperity.
A central problem that PEN Asian writers grapple with, then, is defining
the role of culture and letters—embodied in the figure of the writer—in the
“striving for growth” that Romulo and Pelaez give voice to. At the 1970 Taipei
conference, a panel featuring F. Sionil José, longtime PEN member from
India Sophia Wadia, and Iranian delegate Dr. Z. Rahnema, for example,
debate issues of tradition and modernity; multilingual, vernacular, and
regional language politics; the influence from the West of “realism, romanticism, symbolism, surrealism and so on”;62 and the technological problems of
printing presses and literary dissemination. Catalogued under the problems of
culture and modernization, these questions of reforms, mass education, and
the pressing task of developing their nations are discussed again and again by
delegates. In this sense, the threat to freedom comes not from communists on
the other side of the Iron or Bamboo Curtains, but from the internal struggle
to transform those “backward and inadequate” economies (Romulo). At the
1962 Manila conference, N. V. M. Gonzalez, one of the Philippines’ most
esteemed twentieth-century authors, describes the task of the writer as seeking
a form adequate to the complex temporality of the postcolonial Asian nation,
that is, of “a society living simultaneously, as it were, several hundred years in
time.”63 For Gonzalez, the literary artist “can be the most deceptively effective
in cutting away the drag of centuries with which like a sea-anchor Asian societies float about in the storms of the present.”64 Indonesian delegate S. Takdir
Alisjahbana,65 meanwhile, looks forward to a “new worldwide literature” and
corresponding humanism made possible by “the accomplishments of science,
technology, and economics which characterize modern culture.”66 There is a
sense among these speakers that the fundamental struggle of the postcolonial
nation is that of temporality: The present is compelled to vanquish the “drag
of centuries” in order to build, as Vice President Pelaez has it, “a whole new
structure of society.”67 For the writers, this is not viewed merely as technological progress but one that must produce a new culture, a new humanism and
society. One of the more intractable conceptual and political problems that
emerges is how to articulate collective desires for “a whole new structure of
society” in a world where revolution was now unavoidably associated with
communism.
In other words, PEN Asian writers find themselves in the peculiar dilemma
of vehemently desiring the social revolution that should follow formal political
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emancipation, but lacking the vocabulary to describe it because of Cold War
proscriptions. We may recall here Reinhart Koselleck’s fertile discussion of the
temporal implications of revolution in his study of historical time, Futures
Past. Since the French Revolution, he argues, revolution involves not just the
overthrowing of a political regime, but promises “the social emancipation of
all men, transforming the social structure.”68 In one of his few comments on
the non-European world, Koselleck notes that, “while the political emancipation of former colonies may be nearly complete, political freedom becomes a
reality only if emancipation is construed as a social process.”69 If, in non-
communist Asia, national “growth” and “development” are precisely the
social processes thought to effect such a transformation, these require a different set of social and cultural energies than those that helped to overthrow
colonialism. At the 1962 conference, liberal Indonesian critic Alisjahbana—a
staunch defender of universal, nonpolitical literary values—describes the
apparent delay between political emancipation and social change as due to
the necessary collective “cooling off period” after national awakening.70 S. M.
Kismadi, also of Indonesia, similarly credits anti-colonial nationalism with the
achievement of Asia’s recent independence, but identifies revolutionary energies as what must now be reined in. If the role of the Asian writer has hitherto
been to help “set in motion the Asian revolution,” what, he ponders, is the
writer’s present role?71 Lamenting the double-edged sword of “collective passions”—so essential to national revolutions but which risk submerging “individual passions”—Kismadi suggests that the writer’s role is the “defense of
individual rights against the new order.”72 (Although we can assume he is
speaking against the communists, the phrase “the new order” unwittingly and
proleptically names the Suharto regime that would follow on the heels of the
anti-leftist massacres of 1965–66.) Perhaps Filipino delegate Raul S. Manglapus puts the dilemma most succinctly in his speech “Progress and the Writers
of Asia”: “The leadership of almost one half of the world today believes also in
revolution, in the struggle of class against class. In our half of the world—what
revolution is there to believe in?”73 An instructive scene from José’s novel Mass
raises a parallel quandary. The young protagonist Pepe discusses the possibilities for revolutionary action with his mentor, legendary peasant leader Ka
Lucion. In response to Pepe’s enthusiasm for action, the older man cautions,
“This is not the time. . . . The Americans are here. . . . They will interfere. The
oligarchy will convince them that your revolution is communist, even if it is
not.”74 Radical change, in this historical-geographical conjuncture, can only
be interpreted as communist.
José’s warning is diagnostic of the specific entanglements of decolonizing
Asian countries and the demands of bipolar alignments. If, as Leo Ching has
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suggested, we see here a trans-imperial shift from formal Japanese, European,
and U.S. colonial occupations to a configuration of nation-states inserted
within a new U.S.-led transpacific bloc,75 conference participants express deep
anxieties over both uncontainable revolutions on the left and a hovering
suspicion about the ability of this new international order to deliver the goods
of modernity and social emancipation, a disappointment that would be
forcefully articulated in 1965 by Kwame Nkrumah as neocolonialism.76 They
thus recall an earlier moment of Romulo’s speech at Bandung, in which he
warns—à la Fanon—against the mere replacement of a foreign ruler with a
local oligarchy. Even Romulo, the U.S.-allied liberal diplomatic, recognizes
that the situation of ruling like a foreigner reproduces “autocratic rule, control
of the press, and the police state [which were] exactly the worst features of
some colonialist systems against which we have fought.” Thus, “it is perilously
easy in this world for national independence to be more fiction than fact.”77
What emerges in these discussions is twofold: on the one hand, a vehement
desire to conquer postcolonial temporality and modernize society as the means
to self-determination and autonomy; on the other, a haunting suspicion about
whether modernization under alignment will resist—or reproduce—imperialist, authoritarian forms of rule. The epithet “free Asia”—used enthusiastically
by some conference participants—again reveals the ambivalence of “free”:
free from colonialism, but forced into anti-communist military alliances and
dependent trade and development with the so-called “free” world. Underwriting what Gilbert Rist has called “the development age” of the postwar period
is the accepted tenet that underdevelopment was a “lack” that impelled all
societies to replace tradition with modernization.78 And yet the desire to vanquish those “backward and inadequate economies” (Romulo) to achieve
national autonomy places the political present in a state of abeyance. As I
examine more fully in the following chapters, the future-making ambitions of
these regimes—such as Suharto’s “New Order” and Park Chung Hee’s “Revitalization reforms”—tap into decolonizing desires to claim an accelerated
path to national prosperity,79 while restricting the route toward that modernity
to one of “technical measures outside the realm of political debate.”80 These
technical measures, in turn, were often used precisely to deflect bipolar political tensions, such as when the KMT “responded to [its] political crisis [by]
accelerating the modernization process, determined to strengthen Taiwan’s
global position by building it into an economic powerhouse.”81 In this formulation, authoritarian development and anti-communist repression are mutually reinforcing.
Let us pause here to reflect on the previous two sections. First, I have noted
that PEN’s foundational defense of freedom of expression, international
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“friendliness,” and cosmopolitan cultural exchange is recoded through anti-
communist friendships as a defense of Asian territories from the tyranny of
collectivism. The older literary trope of writerly freedom against the state is
thus mobilized as a geopolitical bulwark against possible communist take-
overs and, at its extreme, anti-communist literature is conflated with (“free”-)
world literature, confirming a notion of literature as “anti-political, individualist, moral and aesthetic.”82 Second, parallel discussions of postcolonial development, reform, and tradition versus modernity reveal an emerging anxiety
around unfreedoms precipitated by developmental imperatives and U.S. hegemony. To return to Mass, José’s character Pepe voices the double bind of non-
communist Asia’s development: “Even if we had a revolution and won in the
end, what would we do? We would still have to produce and sell—sell to, yes,
America.”83 The larger point is that PEN’s supposedly universal concepts of
“freedom of expression” and literary exchange as baseline goods for organizing post-imperial cultural flows come under pressure from Cold War exigencies. Indeed, they prove inadequate for—and indeed mask—the complex
transformations occurring at this conjuncture. Let us move forward to the
1981 Asian Writers’ Conference to see a different “principle of freedom”
elaborated.

New Authorities
The 1981 Manila Conference—and the last regional conference I examine—
may be readily contrasted with the 1976 Taipei Conference, in which we saw
increasingly contorted literary theories to preserve the fiction of freedom
“here” and authoritarianism “there.” In fact, the two conferences offer seemingly divergent views on liberation’s contaminants: an overwhelming, monolithic sense of communist tyranny, on the one hand, and the increasing
disappointments and new authorities of the “free world” postcolony, on the
other, the latter made unavoidably visible by the Marcos regime. We should
bear in mind, however, that we cannot read the conference materials as representative of all cultural energies of the period; too much remains unknown
about who was invited, who wasn’t, who refused to attend, and why. Furthermore, if we attend to the distinct political-cultural landscapes in Taiwan in
1976 and the Philippines in 1981, we can avoid reading the differences between
the two conferences as a simple evolution of political consciousness. The
Republic of China, recall, had already been under martial law for going on
thirty years (and would be for another ten); ongoing tensions across the Taiwan
Strait would keep a lid on organized resistance and the KMT would remain
exclusively in power for another two decades. The Philippines, by contrast,
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saw a more uneven postwar political development with five different presidents of the Republic preceding Marcos’s presidency in 1965. The rapid
growth of protest movements and the rise of radical nationalism in the late
1960s and ’70s was due to a multitude of causes, including “the Vietnam War
and opposition to it, the French student revolt, the Chinese cultural revolution, [and] the rigged election of 1969 [when Marcos was reelected].”84 Marcos’s martial law of 1972 itself was justified to prevent government overthrow
by two forces: the Moro Liberation Front of Muslim separatists and the newly
resurrected Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), largely inspired by the
Chinese and Vietnamese struggles.85 Even as Marcos’s switch in policy to
export-oriented industries and agricultural and land reforms saw some success
by the mid-1970s, by the early ’80s his regime was in crisis both financially and
politically, while his repressive tactics were actually drawing more people into
communist and other opposition movements.86 Until his ouster following the
EDSA Revolution of 1986, it would be a regime largely dominated by the military and technocrats “who shared his idea of national development,” that is,
massive foreign debt, U.S. military aid, and extravagant public spending,
while most economic benefits went to the Marcoses’ patronage networks.87
The shadow of eleven years of martial rule under President Marcos—only
lifted earlier in the same year as the 1981 conference—and the increasingly strident resistance to the regime obviously influenced the conference’s tone and
theme of “Literature and Social Justice.”88 In a paper titled “The Filipino Writer
and Social Justice,” Mauro R. Avena speaks of Marcos’s duplicity in no uncertain terms:
We were a nation stunned when Marcos, his legitimate term as President about to terminate for good the following year, imposed martial law
in 1972. He had—if anyone outside the First Lady, his cabinet, the military, and the would-be civilian community guards believed then—the
noblest of motives: “. . . to save the Republic, and to reform society.”89
If Marcos’s turn to martial law was rationalized as “saving the Republic” from
the MLF and the CPP,90 it bears a family resemblance to Park Chung Hee’s
own Emergency Declaration in South Korea just three weeks earlier. Indeed,
by the end of the 1970s the consolidation of right-wing authoritarianisms in
East and Southeast Asia forces a new complexity to the “principle of freedom.”
In turn, we see that theorizations of literature, culture, and freedom at the
Manila conference respond more directly to a set of emerging contradictions
in the region. One symptom is that the terms “Third World” and “developing
society” replace “free world” used in the earlier conferences, indexing a stronger sense of shared Global South dilemmas.
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The final keynote lecture included in the 1981 proceedings begins with a
sense of the now-generalizable predicament of Third World authoritarianism,
and does so through the critical lens of human rights—a lens that, like PEN’s
defense of freedom of expression in the Third World, comes of age in the
postwar decades.91 The speaker is Salvador P. Lopez, liberal journalist, professor, president of the Philippines PEN Center, former Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and Philippine ambassador to the UN.92 In “Some Reflections on
Human Rights,” he extols the innate rights that all humans are born with and
reminds his audience that the Philippines was represented at Eleanor Roo
sevelt’s 1947 UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (by none other
than Carlos Romulo, speaker at both Bandung and the inaugural PEN Asian
Writers’ Conference in 1962). Speaking of the shared disappointment in the
state of the Third World, he poignantly asks “What has gone wrong?”93 In
articulating an answer, he lays firm blame on approaches to the problem of
underdevelopment. For Third World societies, “the presumed advantages” of
authoritarian rule “can become irresistible” since “the democratic process is
often slow and time-consuming and tends to act as a brake on the engine of
national development.”94 Although ignoring the larger, more persistent global
inequalities that might play a role in reproducing underdevelopment, Lopez
exhorts his audience to think of individual political rights and social-economic
rights as two sets of freedoms that cannot be separated: “The development of
the human being requires an integrated process that addresses itself to body,
mind and spirit.”95 I wish to read Lopez’s speech as symptomatic of a moment
when the authoritarianism of the non-communist Third World—personified
by Marcos—has become perceivable in a new way, and is thereby opened up
to theorization and critique.
Indeed, the conference theme of “Literature and Social Justice” allows for
not just an assessment of Marcos-style repression—which perhaps was unwise
at this forum—but the diagnosis of the multiple, wider problems besetting
postcolonial societies, from economic underdevelopment, class and gender
oppression, the problem of minorities, and environmental destruction.
Throughout the various papers, we see a multilayered indictment of the
betrayal of the national liberationist project—or what was earlier discussed as
the Bandung Era—but from the specific location of a region still squarely
caught in the bipolar contest. South Korean delegate Duk-yong Kong, for
example, could speak of Choi In-hun’s 1960 novella of the Korean War, Forum
(Kwangjang, more commonly translated into English as The Square), in which
the protagonist falls into nihilistic despair after experiencing the disappointments of repressive systems in both the North and the South.96 Although there
are a wide range of analytical frameworks—from Lopez’s liberal human rights
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approach to literary histories, surveys, and polemical position papers—such
indictments fall most readily into two prominent, although related, strains:
Marxist and cultural nationalist.
Although writers and critics from North Korea, Vietnam, and the PRC are
still absent, the presence of Marxist and pro-socialist understandings of literature at this conference is striking. Cecil Rajendra, lawyer, poet, and critic
from Malaysia, for example, excoriates the Cold War liberal assumptions that
view social commitment and literary autonomy as incompatible, a standpoint
which is unwittingly complicit with authoritarian rule:
It is pertinent also here to observe how authoritarian regimes and the
literary establishment, often poles apart on questions of censorship,
security and individual freedom, join hands and seem almost to echo
each other in their vociferous denunciation of the creative writer who,
directly or tangentially, intercedes for social justice.97
Rajendra refutes exactly the sentiments of earlier PEN participants from
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indonesia who worried about the dangers of literature succumbing to the “practical authority” of communism and
insisted on the containment of anti-colonial energies. Bangladeshi participant
and novelist Selina Hossain goes even further:
The capitalist or the so-called Western democratic way of life
includes literature and art in its system of manipulation. The goal of
this system is to limit the development of individuals, to make it conform to the requirements of modern capitalist production. On the
other hand, the literature of socialist orientation selects and assimilates the best achievements of humanity and is deeply-rooted in the
consciousness of the class struggle of the toiling masses. This socialist
orientation views the writer not as an indifferent observer but as an
investigator of life. He analyses real phenomena and passes judgement on them according to his aesthetics.98
Hossain submits that Western literature and art function as nothing less than
ideological alibis for capitalism and, flipping the usual connotations, condemns Western art for promoting conformism. In contrast, “reflecting social
relationships, which are primarily production relationships” is the remit of a
presumably socialist realist Third World literature.99 And if the role of literature and art in the developing world is qualitatively different, this is because
it is where “chaos reigns, tyranny rules and agents of imperialists sow havoc.”100
Domingo Castro de Guzman’s piece “Notes on Art, Freedom and Society”
concurs by proclaiming that “it is impossible to be a true or great artist in the
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present anywhere in the world without being anti-capitalist.”101 Radically
departing from both anti-communist fears and concerns over rapid modernization, such a conception of tyranny is predicated on the explicit awareness
of the profound difficulty in transforming the material relationships of the
former colony in relation to both new and old imperial powers (noting, of
course, the unique position of the Philippines in having the same colonial
ruler as new Cold War hegemon). Literary prescriptions that cordon off art
from social struggle therefore have no place in the Third World. Consequently, unfreedom refers not to the menace of Soviets or Maoists as at earlier
PEN meetings, but emerges as a corollary of the effort to contain the communist challenge through expanded capitalist production. Thus, in something of
an echo of Fanon’s famous description of the colonized word, the Third World
as a whole “is a tragic land, tyrannized in the name of democracy, religion and
civilization.”102
Alongside the Marxist critiques, a related strand of analysis emerges that
we might label cultural nationalist. Replacing those discussions from the
1964 Bangkok Conference—that seem naive just a decade and a half later—
on the way Asian “contributions” to world literature will revive the continent’s proud cultural heritage in a post-imperial world, speakers now describe
embattled cultures struggling to contend with the continued cultural imperialism of the West. Four different papers use the analogy of “excess foreign
consumption” to diagnose the problem of subordinated national cultures.
Michio Ochi, in a brief overview of modern Japanese literature, claims the
“imported modernization” of Western literary genres “caused a peculiar distortion in Japanese literature,”103 a problem that writers are still struggling to
overcome. In a paper on the state of publishing in the Philippines, the director of New Day Publishers in Quezon City, Gloria F. Rodriguez, decries the
literal problem of import/export imbalance: “Take a typical National or Alemar Bookstore, the two largest multi-branch bookstores in the country; a
comparative study of the non-textbook titles carried would, I am sure, show
that at least 85% of them are from abroad.”104 Rodriguez laments that “the
Filipino people are mainly English-speaking and reading” and compares the
situation with more fortunate Indonesia, where “publishers don’t have as
much competition from abroad since the majority of their readers are literate
only in Bahasa Indonesia.”105 But it is poet and critic Virgilio S. Almario who
makes the analogy between economic trade balances and literature most
explicit.106 He blames Filipino writers’ “consumerism” of Western modernist
literature as what diverted their attention away from social issues and “towards
intensely subjective and personal experimentation.”107 In terms of a solution,
he offers the following:

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 50

5/18/21 3:13 PM

Writing Freedom from Bandung to PEN International

51

Experiences of developing countries in the economic and political
fields can be a guide in the formulation of a sounder educational and
cultural policy. Selective and conditional importations with more and
more incentives for local industries characterize the developing countries’ program for economic self-sufficiency. An analogous procedure is
undergone to attain political independence. Without totally ignoring
the value of cultural interdependence, similar restrictions on the
importation of ideas must be imposed in literature and culture.108
In short, Almario proposes an import-substitution model for nurturing
national cultural production in the Third World. His thoughts productively
anticipate those of Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson, whose 1992–93 article, “On Literary and Cultural Import-Substitution in the Third World,” takes
seriously the notion of import-substitution as a way to theorize literary and
cultural influence beyond simple cultural imperialism.109 Jameson explains its
appeal: If consuming American cars or films may be “politically disgraceful
for a Third World nation . . . to set up your own automobile factory or your
own film studio is surely not.”110 Jameson’s larger point is to show how “cultural
import-substitution” produces innovative forms and genres that are not merely
derivative of the Western original. In a provocative analysis of the Latin American testimonio narrative form, he traces a shift from the centered, bourgeois
subject of Western autobiographical narrative to “a new conception of collectivity and collective life . . . specific to the culture and experience of the Third
World itself.”111 Similarly, for Almario, it is the specificity of the social and the
collective that is lacking in Filipino literature too imitative of the “intensely
subjective and personal” style of Western modernist literature.
Striking here is the departure from cosmopolitan writerly exchange and
freedom of expression as the master cultural values appropriate for a world of
formally equal, independent nation-states. In formulations like Almario’s, it is
the unevenness of Third World economic and cultural development that
demands a new theorization of literature’s relation to freedom. Replacing the
self-evident value of “free words” and their power to break down barriers, a
deliberate “restriction” on foreign cultural consumption may be required in
order to nurture the development of an aesthetic form adequate to local conditions. We can place this discussion in the larger global context of uneven
media and publishing power, a topic brought to light by Sarah Brouillette’s
study of UNESCO and the developing world. In reconstructing this little-
known history, Brouillette describes the struggles that took place under the
banner of UNESCO during the 1960s and ’70s to correct the dominance of
Western media and publishing power in the Third World. Tallying with

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 51

5/18/21 3:13 PM

52

AUTHORITIES OF ALIGNMENT, 1955–1988

perspectives at the 1981 Manila Conference, Brouillette describes UNESCO’s
(ultimately stymied) efforts to even the playing field as
sometimes about unearthing the total interdependence of economic
and intellectual systems and recognizing that the book had become
a specific kind of tool: a tool controlled by a small part of the world’s
population, but needed for participation in a global conversation
about what kind of global order would unfold in the wake of
colonialism.112
We can think of the Asian Writers’ Conferences as a forum in which the supposedly universal, liberal defense of cultural exchange is challenged in the
face of a growing awareness of the “interdependence of economic and intellectual systems” and the betrayal by neocolonial, authoritarian regimes. We
can therefore chart a certain shift in the tenor of debates, from individual
freedom as the basic (anti-communist) condition for writing liberty, to concerns with the material and intellectual authorities left in place by colonialism
and reactivated by the “free world’s” capitalist integration. In the final section
of this chapter, I briefly take up two final features of these meetings as a lens
through which to access this complex landscape: the conference resolution
and translation projects.

Resolutions and Translations
The conference resolution is a distinct subgenre that carries within it many of
the contradictions of the period’s debates that we have already discussed. The
resolution itself, after all, is a curious formal addendum to the conference
genre. Usually placed at the end of the proceedings, it appears as a de facto
conclusion to all that has preceded it, as if the many papers and discussions
were all just preamble to its declarations. Unlike the individual papers, which
may well contest and contradict each other, the resolution indicates a collective will and implies that a democratic process has already occurred in its
production. Like the form of the “communiqué” (the “final communiqué” of
Bandung being one well-known example), it is consensual, democratic, and
outward facing, while its performativity also makes it a relative of the genre of
the manifesto. For these reasons, I suggest that the conference resolution
functions as a peculiarly concentrated literary-political genre that invokes sovereignty, agency, and international solidarity even as it subscribes to a fundamentally liberal form of protest.113 In their own way, the resolutions from 1962
to 1981—ranging from modest translation projects to calls for the release of
detained writers—make visible the larger regional complexities that ultimately

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 52

5/18/21 3:13 PM

Writing Freedom from Bandung to PEN International

53

frustrate both ideals of liberal postcolonial cultural dialogue and attempts to
recognize larger, structural problems of decolonization.
At the Bangkok PEN Writers’ Conference of 1964, only two resolutions—or
“recommendations” as they are called there—were passed: one dedicated to
founding an ongoing translation project for inter-A sian publications and one
for the compiling of an Asian Writers’ Bibliography. As I have suggested above,
the concerns of PEN Asian Writers around the nature and conditions of postcolonial freedom were not wholly unrelated to those of avowedly anti-
imperialist writers in the Afro-A sian Writers’ Bureau. As with the latter, PEN
translation projects emerged out of the conviction that the boundaries of the
colonial world had artificially kept Asians ignorant about each other’s societies
and histories, and that no sense of solidarity could proceed without familiarity
with each other’s cultures. Norman Cousins, the liberal American journalist
and longtime editor of the Saturday Review, wrote the introduction to the 1968
Asian PEN Anthology (edited by F. Sionil José), in which he announced that
“the primary purpose of this volume . . . was to introduce Asian writers to
Asians” (xv).114 We must note the heavy irony, of course, that it required an
American writing in English to make this pronouncement. By the same token,
there seems to have been little discussion over non-European languages as the
target language for the translations, at least in its initial stage. The Bangkok
proceedings allude to three different motions which would translate works
into (1) English, (2) English and/or French, and (3) English or French or any
other major language,115 with the last motion declared passed with only the
Philippine delegate dissenting; they had voted for the second option. There is
no recorded discussion about what “any other major language” would include.
A proposed second stage would use English as “the common language from
which further translations to other Asian languages could proceed.”116
PEN’s language politics can be here contrasted with those of the Afro-
Asian Writers’ Bureau. Hala Halim’s work underscores the importance of Arabic for the association’s publication Lotus, which was published trilingually
along with French and English from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. Arabic,
Halim argues, “contests the hegemony of imperialism’s linguistic legacy,”117
and advances the “impetus to reorient intercultural dialogue, as no longer
primarily between metropole and colony but between former colonies” along
a “south-south” axis.118 One challenge for PEN writers is that no obvious
equivalent to Arabic exists in Asia. Of two possible contenders for a regional
East Asian language, Chinese and Japanese, the latter was tainted by being
the language of the enthusiastically “pan-A sianist” Japanese empire, and,
although widely spoken in Korea, Taiwan, and beyond at mid-century, it was
not even raised in the proceedings. Chinese, we can surmise, was difficult
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both because of its association with communism (we can think of a non-
communist postcolony like Singapore and its vexed relationship to Chinese
language education) as well as its own complex imperial history in Asia. Either
Malay or Indonesian might have been a possibility for Southeast Asia, but
again are not mentioned. Revealingly, the Japanese PEN Center was tasked
with the Asian Writers’ Bibliography project precisely because of a shortage of
English language skills in the Thai PEN Center. At the 1976 Taipei conference, mention is again made of a possible translation center to be established
so “that all the countries in Asia could participate,”119 a somewhat ambitious
goal given the limited attendance at this conference. It is then lamented that
“even among the nations of Asia we do not have a common language that we
can understand each other. We still have to resort to English. It’s a great pity
but it’s a fact.”120
Japan’s curious status in the translation debate discloses larger paradoxes
concerning that former imperial power, whose delegates were present at all
PEN conferences discussed in this chapter, as well as at Bandung (think, for
example, of the outrage if the French or British had appeared at the latter).
The country’s odd positioning can be best analyzed through the vector of
decolonization’s intersection with the Cold War, noting that the massive
swath of the Pacific under Japanese control by 1945 (including its longtime
colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria) scrambles the binary of transcending Western colonial rule in order to enter independent sovereignty.
While the leaders of communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam
could make great political use of their anti-Japanese credentials, this was more
difficult in “free Asia.” Leo Ching, following Yoshimi Shun-ya, describes how
“the United States has replaced, displaced, and subsumed the Japanese empire
in the region.” In its decision to promptly occupy, demilitarize and repurpose
Japan as the region’s capitalist motor, the U.S.’s anti-communist bloc “created
a division of labor among the Asian nations” with other countries serving as
American military installations.121 As a result, Japan’s strategic and economic
roles effectively blocked attempts to reckon with its past status as colonial
aggressor.122 Kuan-Hsing Chen elaborates:
Historical issues of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea could
not be tackled because the Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese
states were locked into the pro-American side; to address such historical issues would have entailed confronting internal contradictions
within the capitalist bloc.123
Partly as a result of these “internal contradictions” that could not be
addressed—especially clear regarding the role of Japan—the Writers’
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Conferences had difficulty affirming a horizontal, “south-south” language
politics. Moreover, that Japan becomes the site of English translation resources
triangulates and obscures the actual regional hegemon, the United States.124
The translation resolutions, therefore, speak both to the desires for a post-
imperial cultural sphere, and the limits to its possible realization.
If, at the earlier conferences, the resolutions are limited to inter-A sian translations and the bibliography, by the 1981 Manila conference, three of six resolutions aim squarely at the plight of writers detained by repressive
governments.125 These are Poland (Resolution 1), the Philippines (Resolution
2), and South Africa (Resolution 3). Extracts from each are as follows:
[Resolution 1] The Asian Writers Conference meeting in Manila,
hosted by the Philippine Center of International P.E.N., expresses
deep concern over the situation of P.E.N. members and writers in
Poland. We ask you urgently to inform us about your present condition. We extend to you our fraternal greetings.126
[Resolution 2] The Conference expresses concern over the continued
detention, including solitary confinement, of some writers in prison;
the continuing threat to rearrest writers who have been provisionally
released; and the reports that at least one poet-journalist has disappeared under mysterious circumstances.
The Asian Writers Conference therefore appeals to his Excellency
the President of the Philippines, to release writers in prison against
whom no charges have been filed . . . .127
[Resolution 3] The Asian Writers Conference . . . notes with great concern the continuing flagrant repression of the basic human rights of
the black African people in South Africa, and the freedom of black
African writers, artists and intellectuals.
The Conference expresses its strong sense of solidarity with the
black African people . . . and appeals to all writers, artists and intellectuals in the world to help and support their struggle in South Africa.128
Note that in terms of speech acts, each resolution has a slightly different structure, addressee, and appeal. Resolution 1 is the most intimately worded. It
“expresses concern” for Polish writers and “ask[s] you urgently to inform us
about your present condition.” Contrast this with Resolution 2’s expression of
similar concern followed by direct personal appeal to Marcos, “his Excellency
the President of the Philippines,” to release writers in prison. Finally, Resolution 3 moves beyond the concern for specific writers. It invokes the larger
political situation of the “flagrant repression of the basic human rights of the
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black African people in South Africa” before expressing the conference’s solidarity with them. These resolutions are bold articulations of solidarity, especially the Philippines one, given the many local writers implicated in the
direct appeal to President Marcos. They exemplify PEN’s founding principles
of “humanitarian ideas of speech beyond national boundaries” and international cooperation,129 returning us to the liberal notion of literary texts primarily as objects whose aesthetic autonomy is to be protected from the overreach
of authoritarian states. When read more closely, however, we see that the resolutions again index a number of “internal contradictions” (Chen) that the
Cold War’s intersection with decolonization has produced, even if the resolutions cannot name them per se. In a sense, what draws the Third World—and
some countries of the Second World—together now is less the optimism of a
new era of post-imperial cultural exchange, but a shared experience of
repressive governments. In fact, we can read the three appeals as corresponding to three possible authoritarian permutations of the global Cold
War: the Soviet repression of intellectuals and writers on the Eastern European front of the Cold War; the U.S.-support of an anti-communist dictator in
the Third World; and the South African apartheid state, where an anti-
colonial liberation struggle was prolonged and intensified by the support of
NATO countries for the white-minority government and Soviet backing for
the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe.
The genre of the conference resolution, nevertheless, hews to a postwar
vision of a world composed of formally equal and sovereign nation-states.
McDonald has noted the way the original PEN charter “echoed the ideals of
the League of Nations,”130 and as we have seen, each of the conferences identifies individual “delegates” by his or her nationality, with the conference
room setups themselves sometimes bearing not a little similarity to the UN
General Assembly meetings. In such a bureaucratic arrangement of formal
national equality, it is difficult to imagine other kinds of indictment being
expressed, for example, against the U.S.’s backing of Marcos (or Park Chung
Hee or, more quietly, of Suharto). Tightly codified by PEN’s liberal-
bureaucratic principles, the very form of the conference resolution itself determines what kind of statements can and cannot be made. While individual
national governments may be named accurately enough as repressive regimes
and dissident writers as their antagonists, the genre has difficulty addressing
larger economic or structural problems of decolonization. Perhaps more problematically, literature as a possible mode of theorizing freedom, solidarity, or
oppression is displaced, as are the “interdependenc[ies] of economic and intellectual systems” (Brouillette) discussed earlier. The effect, though unintended, is the casting of an equivalency across the three different national
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situations of unfreedom. The resolutions thus reinscribe and naturalize a
notion of discrete state power as what violates the rights of individual writers.
Elided is the complex and uneven role of blocs, alignments, and reconstituted
imperial hegemonies, as well as the military and strategic aid and loans that
drove the frantic “bipolar pursuit of modernization”131 typical of many authoritarian regimes. The naming of repressive regimes by the resolutions—as performatively significant as it is—can only go so far in diagnosing those Third
World disappointments emerging by the 1970s.
To conclude, let me return to David Scott’s rich thinking on the temporalities
and predicaments of postcoloniality that I raised in the Introduction. In discussing the once viable “Bandung Project” of non-aligned, cooperative Third
World self-determination, Scott describes how that project’s guidebook and
manifesto, Frantz Fanon’s 1961 The Wretched of the Earth, provided the clearest “narrative of liberation.” The latter offered “a structured story that progressively links . . . a past and a present of Domination to an anticipated future of
Freedom,” in part by “constructing a subject who moves from alienated dehumanization to self-realization.”132 It is difficult, Scott admits, not to remain
seduced by Fanon’s lucid moral-political account of decolonization. Yet in a
post-bipolar, and post-Bandung world, he suggests that such nostalgia is misplaced: The political present calls forth a new “problem space” for postcolonial politics to be worked in and through.
I am entirely sympathetic with Scott’s analysis, which remains relevant
some twenty years after its publication. My point in this chapter has obviously
not been to use a Fanonian model of liberation to assess the PEN Asian Writers’ Conferences. What I’ve sketched out is not a recuperative account of a
literary internationalism and its resistance aesthetics, and we will only be disappointed if we approach the meetings with this goal. Rather, my brief account
intends to bring further complexity to those narratives of decolonization’s
vicissitudes already produced by Scott, Vijay Prashad, and others.133 The latter
have usefully mapped out the “exhaustion” of non-aligned and Bandung projects whose death knells sounded in the 1980s and burials could be confirmed
by the 1990s. Yet in the experiences of certain non-communist Asian postcolonies—those predominantly represented at the PEN conferences—we see
another “problem space” and experience of decolonization being worked
through. The PEN conferences tell a different story of the career of the
“national-modern” (Scott) project inaugurated by Bandung, one in which
Cold War conflicts and pressures contaminate and co-produce notions of freedom, autonomy, authority, and futurity. In particular, we see how the core
liberal principle of “freedom of expression” becomes recoded, challenged,

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 57

5/18/21 3:13 PM

58

AUTHORITIES OF ALIGNMENT, 1955–1988

and retheorized within the changing landscapes wrought by the Cold War–
decolonizing conjuncture. Investigating the specific figure of the dissident
writer is the task of the next chapter. In turn, later chapters demonstrate how
narratives of radical nationalists, leftists, and communists who attempted to
redefine freedom at this conjuncture are all the more relevant to the struggles
of our neoliberal moment.
In sum, the PEN Asian Writers’ Conferences, their form, debates, and resolutions can be viewed simultaneously as conflicted artifacts of a newly independent Asia forged against its former colonial identities, and of a region
grappling with the new political-economic restructuring of Cold War world-
making. They index the often-compromised politics of literary friendships and
alignment; the blurring of hospitality and propaganda; the paradoxes of staging “free” intellectual interchange while excluding one half of Asia; and the
fraught attempts to parse economic, political, and cultural “freedoms.” It is for
these reasons that I read them as a distinctly Cold War–postcolonial genre that
attends to both power formations. And perhaps it is by the very failures of this
Third World without thirdness—the failure to distinguish “free words” from
the “free world”; to articulate a postcolonial revolution beyond development;
to find an inter-A sian language—that we appreciate the contestations over
such world-making.
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In the Shadow of Solzhenitsyn
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Kim Chi-ha, Ninotchka Rosca,
and Cold War Critique

On the 15th August 1945, and then on the 17th August 1945, first
Vietnam, then Indonesia declared independence. . . . These two
countries began a struggle for freedom which spread through Asia and
Africa. After this, in reaction against these anticolonial independence
movements, the Northern countries began the Cold War.
—Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 1995
By all accounts, the 1960s and 1970s saw an efflorescence of Third World
and socialist authoritarianism. Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published his best-known work, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, in 1962,
a novel composed while he was imprisoned in Stalin’s labor camp system and
which quickly became a touchstone of Cold War dissident writing.1 Founded
in 1961, Amnesty International would become crucial to publicizing such dissident work and, by the late 1960s, began naming a number of political prisoners for its annual “Prisoner of Conscience Week.”2 In 1972 these included
Indonesia’s best-known writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, alongside “an anti-
Castro doctor in Cuba, a Taiwanese satirist and two Roman Catholic priests,
one in South Africa and the other in Hungary.”3 In a New York Times article
of November 1972, Ivan Morris, professor of Japanese at Columbia University
and spokesperson for Amnesty International USA, spoke of the organization’s
appeal to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to assist in freeing the twelve.
“More and more countries are turning to police methods,” Morris notes, “suspending human rights, making arrests without charges and torturing prisoners.”4 Reported in similar articles across major Western newspapers, the plight
of each of the twelve prisoners was briefly noted, constituting a snapshot of the
59
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unfreedoms raging in the non-West. Pramoedya, who was imprisoned for
fourteen years from 1965 until 1979 by the Suharto government, is referred to
in a number of articles as the “Indonesian Solzhenitsyn.”
Other international campaigns included “The Committee to save Kim
Chi-ha,” a group formed by Japanese academic Tsurumi Shunsuke. The committee sought international publicity for Kim, the South Korean poet who was
jailed—and later sentenced to death—after publishing his withering satire of
the Park Chung Hee regime, “Five Bandits,” in 1970. In 1973 Tsurumi traveled
to Seoul with a petition signed by notable figures including Jean-Paul Sartre,
Simon de Beauvoir, Alex La Guma, Oe Kenzaburo, and Herbert Marcuse.5 In
the international press Kim is referred to as the “Korean Solzhenitsyn.”6
Finally, although lesser known than the other two writers, Filipina journalist
and writer Ninotchka Rosca was detained, along with hundreds of others, by
the Marcos government during its sweeping 1972 crackdown on journalists
and writers. Since her release, she has lived in exile in the United States; she
published her novel on the Marcos regime, State of War, in 1988. A number of
its plots and character sketches, however, appeared in her 1983 short story collection, The Monsoon Collection, which was conceived during her imprisonment in the notorious Camp Crame. In a 2012 magazine article, Lourdes
Gordolan interviews a number of writers who had been detained by the
regime, and wonders about the paucity of Philippine literature documenting
this period: “Why is there no One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich for the
Philippine experience?”7
All three cases help confirm that the figure of the imprisoned dissident
writer, epitomized by Solzhenitsyn, is one of the most recognizable tropes of
Cold War authoritarianism.8 But why exactly does the fate of “prisoners of
conscience”—and the genre of dissident literature in general—become such a
flash point for diagnosing unfreedom during the Cold War? Given the appellations of “Indonesian” or “Korean Solzhenitsyn,” what is occluded when the
Second and Third Worlds are collapsed in an assumed shared condition of
tyranny, despite obvious variations in the political orientations of those
regimes (communist, socialist, capitalist, pro-West, non-aligned, and so on)?
Put otherwise, how has a Cold War lens shaped the way we view typical genres
of dissident literature, such as historical allegory, political satire, and the novel
of resistance? Conversely, as I discussed in the Introduction, in the field of
postcolonial studies, the privileging of colonial power forms and epistemologies has tended to occlude the way global bipolar restructurings shaped new
states. Despite the plethora of literary texts concerned with the unfreedoms of
the postcolonial state, Neil Lazarus observes that “scholars in the field have
evidently not known how—other than through [a] wholesale repudiation—to
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account for the setbacks and defeats of the post-independence years.”9 Moreover, while “nearly all of the discussion has centred on the ‘Janus face’ of
nationalism in general . . . very little of it has addressed the specific agency of
the postcolonial state, captured by the political class at independence, and
actively deployed by it—for better and, mostly, worse—thereafter.”10 Pramoedya
Ananta Toer, Kim Chi-ha, and Ninotchka Rosca are writers whose works force
us to grapple with an interpretative quandary: No longer part of the exemplary
anti-colonial struggles “that emerged significantly as part of the organized
national liberation struggles and resistance moments,”11 neither do they fit the
model of anti-Stalinist dissident literature. My goal is, again, to trace the
uneven fault lines between the decolonizing world, the “free world,” and the
“unfree” Soviet bloc by asking how the shorthand liberal notion of “dissident
writer” has continued to shape our conceptions of twentieth-century dictatorships and authoritarianism. In the preceding chapter we saw how PEN Asian
Writers debated the values of literary freedom in an era defined simultaneously by new regional writerly networks and the hardening of Cold War
boundaries and nationalist projects. Here, I consider three specific instances
of clashes between writers and governments for what they reveal about the
subject of postcolonial freedom at this particular conjuncture.
In three sections, this chapter works through Pramoedya’s final novel in his
Buru tetralogy, House of Glass (Rumah Kaca, published 1988, read in translation); Kim’s poetry of the early 1970s, especially his “talk poems,” “Five
Bandits” and “Groundless Rumors” (“Ojŏk” and “Pi’ŏ,” 1970 and 1972); and
Rosca’s novel of resistance, State of War (1988). While these writers exemplify
the figure of the dissident writer as defined by organizations such as PEN and
Amnesty International (Pramoedya would win PEN’s Freedom to Write
Award in 1988), my goal is to investigate the dissident theorizations of post
colonial freedom and autocracy that we find in their works, which have often
been overlooked in the emphasis on their arrests and trials. Despite differences in literary form, languages, and national contexts, I suggest that these
figures both challenge assumptions of an indistinguishable Third World/Second World tyranny and nuance colonial legacies by accounting for the specific violence of Cold War capitalist modernization. While I appreciate the
profound, often life-saving work of human rights campaigns such as Amnesty’s, I mean to think through the tensions inherent in the categories “freedom
of speech,” “dissident writer,” and “prisoner of conscience” as they operate
within the matrix of Cold War decolonization in the Asia-Pacific.
Before moving on to the texts, I want to briefly dwell on the construction of
the dissident writer in international human rights discourse. Joseph Slaughter
has discussed the original Amnesty Campaign of 1961, led by Peter Benenson
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and other lawyers, in which “prisoner of conscience” is defined as “Any person
who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) from expressing
(in any form of words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly holds and
which does not advocate or condone personal violence.”12 The definition itself
draws from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially articles 18 and 19, which recognize freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and
opinion,13 and from a longer tradition of the committed writer in whom “artistic autonomy is opposed to institutionalized politics.”14 These ideas, however,
took on newly charged significance in the Cold War discourse on totalitarianism, in which individual autonomy was thought to be the very target of state
power. Extreme ideology combined with police terror would enable “the will
of the political state to dominate the very process of thought and subjectivity.”15 What was novel about the Amnesty campaign was its strategy of “publicising the personal stories of a number of prisoners” over “publicising [their]
political views.”16 Prisoners of conscience were thus valued less for the content
of their political critiques, and more for the degree to which their personal
stories dramatized the ruthless domination of the state’s ideology over individual will. Moreover, Amnesty’s letter-writing campaign and publicity strategies stressed the “centrality of literary expression” to its efforts17 because the
literary capacity—corresponding to the realm of internal, private thoughts
and beliefs—was precisely what totalitarianism most threatened. As a result,
“the modern Amnesty campaign emerged, at least in part, as a defence of literature, or literary values, forms, and figures of free expression.”18 Such a
defense is advanced in a Guardian article on the 1972 “Prisoner of Conscience
Week,” which describes the collective plight of the twelve as stemming from
their “refusal to adapt their writings, teaching, religious or political beliefs to
political requirements.”19 Similar notions motivate the journal Index on Censorship, founded by Czech exile George Theiner in 1972, which specifically
sought to defend dissident writers “who’d challenged the might of an authoritarian state.”20 A 1988 LA Times article on the death of Theiner names the
“great figures of persecuted literature” who appeared in the Index: “Solzhenitsyn, Miloran Djilas, Vaclav Havel, Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o, Wole Soyinka and
Ariel Dorfman,” while mentioning Pramoedya and Kim Chi-ha as two other
prominent figures. In this formulation, the genre of dissident literature
expresses the unyielding of an individual’s artistic expression to Third World
or Soviet state pressure. Literature itself becomes “persecuted.”21
As we saw in the preceding chapter’s history of PEN International, such a
clear-cut conceptional opposition—artistic will versus the state machine of
terror—has the effect of endowing literature with its special status as artifact
of liberty to be protected. An article on the “Korean Solzhenitsyn” summarizes
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this terror in decidedly Cold War imagery, where the all-powerful dictator is
“sustained by an army. . . , a ubiquitous secret police, and unknown number
of informers and wire-tappers, and the terror of life where no one dare trust
his neighbour.”22 Such stark renderings of power tend to present censorship
and repression, as Peter McDonald puts it in his study of Apartheid South
Africa, as “an abstract drama played out between ‘literature’ and the ‘modern
state,’ ”23 and risk flattening out and de-historicizing contestations over the
meanings of freedom or oppression, that is, the very contestations that the “persecuted” texts themselves might articulate. By contrast, I argue that the writings by Pramoedya, Kim, and Rosca disclose a form of authoritarianism
conceived less as the violation of an individual’s expression or subjectivity by
the state, and more as the historical complication of national sovereignty in
the entry to transpacific capitalism. If Amnesty-type campaigns sought “to
introduce a third character (world opinion) into the two-person drama of political imprisonment, to interpose public opinion between the state and the individual,”24 the three writers I focus on recast this drama entirely. They arrogate
literature to the more ambitious, and perhaps riskier, role of theorizing the
complex historical and material entanglements of the colonial, neocolonial,
and bipolar.
I explore these claims by comparatively attending to two facets that the very
different texts of Pramoedya, Kim, and Rosca evidence: first is their interest in
documenting the recursiveness of colonial authoritarianism. Their works necessarily go beyond the positivist tropes of Cold War arbitrary violence and
secret police in their effort to depict the nonlinear, or sedimented nature, of
postcolonial historical time. At first glance, all three authors employ genres
that are traditionally well associated with the critique of state power: allegory,
satire, and the resistance novel. Yet all three perform distinct genre-mixing to
capture the ongoing pastness in the present, whether it be via historical fiction
that dwells on newness (Pramoedya); a ribald poetic reinscription of folk opera
(Kim); or a novel of resistance-turned-family saga that foregrounds resistance
and reproduction (Rosca). In depicting the unfinished business of decolonization25 through formal attempts to link and question temporalities of past
and present, each writer challenges the historical marker of “independence”
as the dividing line between eras. Second, I explore how each writer forwards
critiques of developmentalist authoritarianism that emphatically challenge
the liberal notion of individual freedom from politics. In particular, we will
see how each text—via very different literary strategies—figures postcolonial
liberation as the ability to imagine political alternatives to the capitalist logic
of promotion within the “free world” system, short-circuiting the will to colonial reproduction. In other words, the problem of authoritarianism and the

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 63

5/18/21 3:13 PM

64

AUTHORITIES OF ALIGNMENT, 1955–1988

writer is not to be found in the neat, ahistorical “two-person drama” of a terrorizing police state encroaching on individual creative expression. It is rather
to be grasped through layered and meandering stories of historical returns,
entangled sovereignties, and (non)capitalist futures.

Looking Back toward the New: Pramoedya’s House of Glass
From Pramoedya’s large oeuvre, I choose to focus on the fourth and final
novel of his acclaimed “Buru Quartet,” a tetralogy so named because it was
famously composed while he was incarcerated on remote Buru Island during
the 1970s.26 The first three novels in the tetralogy are This Earth of Mankind
(Bumi Manusia, 1980), Child of All Nations (Anak Semua Bangsa, 1981), and
Footsteps (Jejak Langkah, 1985), all of which were suppressed by the Indonesian government for their supposed promotion of Marxist-Leninist ideologies.
House of Glass (Rumah Kaca), like the others in the series, was promptly
banned by the Suharto government after its publication in 1988.27 The biography of Javanese-born Pramoedya (1925–2006) reflects his country’s troubled
passage from Dutch colonial territory to independent nation. During the Japanese occupation he worked for the Japanese newspaper Domei; after independence he taught and attempted to run his own literary agency, at a loss.28
He has had the dubious distinction of being incarcerated by not one, but three
regimes: by the returning Dutch colonists; by the Sukarno state (for one
month) for his “overzealous support of the Chinese in Indonesia”; and, finally,
by Suharto’s long-lived New Order regime.29
The literary milieu in Indonesia preceding the 1965–66 anti-communist
massacres and Suharto’s rise to power is worth briefly recalling.30 Following
the conclusion of the four-year revolutionary struggle (1945–49) against the
Dutch,31 a number of national literary debates emerged that echoed those
discussed in the preceding chapter. Non-and anti-communist cultural critics
such as S. Takdir Alisjahbana (present at the first Manila PEN Asia conference
and quoted in Chapter 1) advocated a universalist, non-ideological conception
of literature. He and his allies argued that Indonesia “should embrace Western
culture and continue to seek access to it by cementing close, postcolonial cultural relations with the Netherlands.”32 This approach assumed that free cultural exchange—including that with the former Dutch colonizers—was an
unmitigated good. In contrast, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, Indonesia’s minister for
education, and others looked to recently decolonized neighbors such as India
for cultural inspiration. In his exhaustive study, Keith Foulcher relates: “In
their search for a modern culture,” Hadjar and his allies worried that the
“Roundtable Conference [on Indonesia sovereignty], the Marshall Plan and
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the United Nations [were] all driving Indonesia towards capitalism and American influence.”33 It is in this context that in 1954 the Lembaga Kerbudayaan
Rakyat, or Institute of People’s Culture, LEKRA, was founded, an organization that was closely linked to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).34
Pramoedya would work closely with LEKRA until his arrest in 1965.
As early as 1955, LEKRA had established “twenty-one branches throughout
the archipelago” along with “media channels in Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan”
while supporting cultural works and activism in literature, visual arts, music,
drama, film, philosophy, and sports.35 Two aspects of LEKRA are especially
salient here. First is that its overall goal was to promote culture that should be
“both nationalist and anti-imperialist”; culture was explicitly conceived as
actively helping shape an authentic, modern Indonesian nation through the
selective adoption of Third World and socialist influences to counter an
encroaching Western neo-imperialism.36 National culture was thus conceived
as part of a revolutionary new international culture. Not surprisingly, LEKRA
emphasized Afro-A sian links, and Pramoedya himself attended the 1958 Afro-
Asian Conference in Tashkent and visited China in 1956.37 As Foulcher
summarizes:
It is through [Chinese and Soviet] sources such as these that LEKRA
theorists obtained their sense of internationalism, seeing the ideals of
the Indonesian revolution and indigenous-oriented cultural nationalism as belonging to a world-wide movement towards the progressive
development of the cultural potential of humanity.38
Pramoedya himself was profoundly influenced by a wide array of Western,
socialist, and Chinese works, and he published translations of Steinbeck,
Tolstoy, and Gorky.39 The second aspect to note—and in explicit contrast to
the PEN and Amnesty-endorsed literary value of “freedom of expression” pitted against an overreaching state—LEKRA conceived of art as deeply embedded in nationalist development under the Sukarno government. Indonesian
artists, it followed, should be supported by the government for their important
role in building the nation. Foulcher gives the example of a PKI electoral
slogan in 1955: “For artists, voting PKI means freedom to create and an
improvement in working conditions.”40 Like the argument about cultural
import substitution in the preceding chapter, this position was logically consistent with the rejection and even censorship of imperialist (American) cultural products, such that LEKRA would lead boycott campaigns of certain
Hollywood films.41
The cultural vibrancy—with all its contradictions—of LEKRA came to a
resounding halt in the 1965–66 bloody purges of the PKI and its supporters as
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General Suharto came into power and deposed the PKI’s close ally Sukarno.42
Pramoedya, as we know, was arrested along with an estimated 500,000–
750,000 others and classified as a “B-class” prisoner, which “consists of persons
suspected of having played roles similar to the ones of those in Category A
[those clearly and directly involved in the 1965 attempted coup] but for whose
suspected guilt there is insufficient evidence.”43 The leftist-oriented concept
of socially engaged literature, and its kerakyatan or popular aesthetics, was all
but buried in official Indonesian literary circles as part of the “anti-communist
norms of post-1965 cultural hegemony in Indonesia.”44 Even after the global
publicity around the banning of This Earth of Mankind and Child of All
Nations—which precipitated two national seminars on literature and society
in 1982—the mainstream orthodoxy that understood socialist art “as a challenge to ‘free’ art” remained largely unchallenged in Indonesia for years to
come.45 It is in this context that we can place Pramoedya’s tetralogy, noting the
historical irony that it is the very liberal conception of “persecuted literature”
that catapults Pramoedya to worldwide recognition.46
Set in the early twentieth century, the historical realist novels of the tetralogy center on the character of Minke, a young aristocratic Native who attains
a European education, comes gradually to reject the superiority of European
civilization, and is instrumental in the awakening of the Dutch East Indies
toward a nationalist consciousness. The character of Minke is closely based on
the journalist Tirto Adi Suryo (1880–1918), evidence of Pramoedya’s efforts to
“restore to historical memory” this pioneering nationalist.47 Through Minke,
Pramoedya’s detailed descriptions of the new journals, newspapers, trains, and
common language (the use of the lingua franca Malay, today’s Bahasa Indonesia) bring together the hitherto fragmented spaces of the Indonesian archipelago into a profoundly new sense of world-historical modernity.48 By House
of Glass, however, the first-person narrative of Minke, our exemplary witness
to history, gives way to that of Jacques Pangemanann. Pangemanann—“with
two n’s,” as he repeatedly reminds the reader—is a Native police commissioner
who rises to become a valued “expert” on Native affairs employed at the Dutch
Algemeene Secretariat (General Secretariat). Minke, meanwhile, is exiled to
Ambon early in the novel and effectively remains off-stage for the five-year
duration of the novel.49 Like Minke, the historical Tirto was exiled to Ambon
in the remote Moluccas (Maluku islands), not far from Buru. With Minke
removed from the narrative, we instead follow our antihero, Pangemanann,
and his rise (and fall) as he is tasked with monitoring and suppressing the
emerging local organizations, especially the Sareket Islam (the Islamic Association or Union) founded by Minke.
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For a series of novels that was composed while Pramoedya was imprisoned
by the Suharto regime, the choice to conclude with what is effectively the
state’s narration rather than Minke’s has been puzzling to critics. Peter Hitchcock describes House of Glass as “the most difficult of the Buru Quartet for it
challenges the inevitabilities of national awakening.”50 Indeed, the troubling
allegorical dimensions of the novel are hard to ignore: The repressive Dutch
state that exiles and censors Minke’s work obviously evokes the New Order
regime’s arrest of Pramoedya (and hundreds of thousands of others) in the
name of anti-communist “national security.” Hitchcock rightly identifies “a
double time”51 of the novel which layers the 1910s with the 1960s–80s. Where
the previous novels seemed to chart the inexorable rise of anti-colonialist,
nationalist consciousness, the final novel constitutes a decisive rolling back of
such a movement toward liberation. As such, House of Glass seems to confirm
the very “two-person” drama of repressive state and dissenting individual discussed above. Benedict Anderson, commenting on the novel’s unusual narrator, describes Pangemanann as “the file-keeper and file-contaminator of The
Glass House who is also the ultimate narrator . . . [and] a dystopic prolepsis,”52
foreshadowing the unfreedoms to come under the Suharto regime. Read as
an allegory for the later regime, the novel pointedly asks its readers, “Who are
the new tyrants?”53
Yet Pramoedya’s final novel is much more than a proleptic augur of the
New Order’s unfreedoms. If, as Chris GoGwilt suggests, the tetralogy is a
complex reconsideration of “the significance of a nationalist historiography in
light of the events of 1965,”54 House of Glass explicitly asks the question of
political and social reproduction. What political structures have been revived
or reconstituted in the gap between the Dutch and the New Order regimes,
and how? Conversely, what was lost and must be recovered from the early
decades of nationalist awakening? On closer examination we find that the
problem of ruling like a foreigner is not one of simply “too much state” and its
unchecked repressive apparatuses (the police, jails, surveillance networks).
Nor is it a straightforward lag or “holdover” from the colonial period, expressed
in neat allegorical parallels between the Dutch and the Suharto regimes. We
could say, rather, the novel is an aesthetic investigation into the dialectical
structures of repetition and newness.
The novel is, nevertheless, focalized through a servant of the repressive
colonial state. Like Minke, Pangemanann is something of a singular figure in
the Dutch Indies: Menadonese and Christian by birth, he was raised in Lyons
by a French apothecary, and attended the Sorbonne. His wife is French; two
of their children are studying in the Netherlands and they live a culturally
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European life.55 It is precisely due to Pangemanann’s hybridity that he is
tapped by the government to study the Native organizations springing up, a
task that generates much ambivalence.
And so it was that the police had become both my life and my prison. I
was a policeman and, at the same time, the prisoner of the police . . . .
I had read many books in Europe and I had gained much
knowledge about the liberation of men from oppression—spiritual and
physical, economic and political. So I fully understood that colonial
rule over any part of the world was evil.56
At one level, Pangemanann personifies the native collaborator of colonialism. Constantly slighted by his white superiors and experiencing firsthand the
system’s embedded inequalities, he is hypocritically content to reap its benefits. His conflicted allegiances, however, are often addressed to the absent but
admired Minke—“my teacher”—in the second person, making Pangemanann’s narrative voice simultaneously a vehicle for colonialist discourse and
the nascent anti-colonial movement. This tension is played out in Pangemanann’s relationship to Minke’s manuscripts, which are stolen from Ambon and
delivered to him.
There were 123 notebooks. They were all full of Minke’s terrible scribble and there were many words and phrases scratched out and replaced.
The notebooks were tied together in separate bundles. They were all
written in Dutch. The first bundle contained a story that had already
been published in Malay, entitled Nyai Permana. I put that bundle
aside. The second bundle was entitled This Earth of Mankind, the third
Child of All Nations, the fourth Footsteps.57
In a deft narrative conceit, it is now revealed that the three previous novels
of Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet are in fact nothing but Minke’s own writings
(although the latter are in Dutch not Bahasa Indonesia)—drawing even clearer
parallels between Minke’s incarceration and exile and Pramoedya’s. Hitchcock
observes: “We read Pangemanann reading Minke as if the New Order . . . were
trying to read Pramoedya.”58 Through almost obsessive study of the manuscripts, Pangemanann becomes both the state’s exemplary spy—the manuscripts are used to understand the organizations he must repress—and Minke’s
most devoted student and co-conspirator. Minke’s stolen notebooks thus allow
for a meta-fictional critique of the repressive function of the Suharto state.
Given these canny narrative constructions, it is tempting to assume that
Pramoedya’s abiding concern is writerly freedom during both the Dutch and
the Suharto period. Authoritarianism, whether Dutch or postcolonial, is
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nothing other than the breach of an imagined boundary that should separate
the state from the sovereign interiority of the individual; Minke’s stolen manuscripts are the external correlative of a violated inner consciousness.
I want to argue, however, that Minke’s singular, dissenting consciousness is
not the sole, nor even the main, focus of House of Glass. If Pangemanann is a
character who presages the political failures of Bandung under Suharto’s Cold
War repression, he is also the perfect narrative device to survey and methodically record the exuberant proliferation of organizations, reform movements,
unions, women’s groups, and other associations blossoming in the Indies
during the early twentieth century. In the process of studying archives, journals, newspapers, stolen letters, and notebooks “so that the government might
forever perpetuate its rule,”59 Pangemanann unwittingly records the very
diversity and irrepressible growth of these emergent organizations. Moreover,
if the “action” of the novel is “focus[ed] on reading and interpretation,”60 this
labor is anything but passive. Early in the novel, Pangemanann spends many
months at the state archives researching Native organizations and movements
in order to “make some conclusions about their caliber, the direction of their
thinking, and their attitude toward the government of the Netherlands
Indies.”61 The intelligence report takes him almost one year to complete.62
Although the government subsequently bans the movements and exiles its
leaders, Pangemanann’s workload only increases throughout the remainder of
the novel: We follow him rushing to meetings with concerned Dutch officials,
traveling between towns, arranging more exiles, and desperately following
another new movement’s leader. In the process, the state reveals itself to be in
a permanently reactive position vis-à-vis the constant innovations of Native
society. By the end of the novel, Pangemanann is completely overwhelmed:
“The political situation had changed. I couldn’t keep up with it. There were
new developments each day flowing on from earlier developments which had
already left me behind.”63
Pangemanann’s Sisyphean labor is thus at once evidence of the long arm
of state surveillance and repression—his “house of glass”—and an indication
of its inadequacy. Under the guise of surveillance work, the reader is paradoxically offered a rich ethnography of the Indies’ emergent political society rendered in its transnational historical context. We thus learn of the “Indische
Partij, or the Indies Party, the first political party in the Indies . . . formed just
one year after the Kuomintang was formed in China,”64 which we may compare with Boedi Oetomo, the moderate reform movement promoting Native
education.65 Another party with former members of the Indische Partij subsequently emerges, while the Indies Social Democratic Association is established by political exiles from the Netherlands.66 In one memorable scene,
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Pangemanann’s own nephew urges him to join the new Sarekat Menado,67
one of the many regional ethnic organizations sprouting up, to Pangemanann’s extreme discomfort. Meanwhile, Minke’s Sarekat Islam—the prime
target of the government—is described by Pangemanann as a veritable force
of nature: “a great wave formed by the ocean of life, which had been whipped
into a storm by new modern ideas and ways.”68
Even as Pangemanann works to eliminate the Sarekat by exiling its leader
Minke, the organization continues to incubate new leaders. But each leader is
not to be read allegorically as the possible postcolonial liberator from Suharto’s
rule. Rather, each new leader opens the narrative to yet more social and historical layers of authority. In one chapter, for example, Pangemanann must
study the writings of one of the Sarekat’s emergent leaders, Marco Kartodikromo, which have been seized from a newspaper office. Another autobiographical narrative thus enters Pangemanann’s house of glass, but also the
House of Glass we are reading.69 The investigation into Marco provides the
occasion for a detour into the hardships suffered by peasants under the Dutch
agrarian policy of Cultuurstelsel (culture system), introduced in 1830, a forced-
labor system for plantations that grew export crops. Importantly, not only is
Dutch colonial rule indicted for its racialized labor exploitation, Marco’s diary
delineates a state within the state, or the way the economic structure of imperialism is embedded within the functions we usually consider “the state’s.” In
this case, the Dutch state colludes with foreign, often British, oil companies
that effectively controlled labor and land distribution in the rural areas. As
Marco puts it, “In the government, there was also an Oil Government, and
the people of our village had to obey both of them.”70 As a result, “From being
free farmers they had been turned into the coolies of their former guests.”71
Marco’s embedded autobiography demonstrates Pramoedya’s skillful use of
framed narratives and historical fiction to simultaneously look back from the
novel’s present to the Cultuurstelsl period, while also looking forward to firmly
indict the 1970s and 1980s of the New Order. It forces us to ask: What structures of imperial power—economic, political, social—have been reactivated
in the Cold War conjuncture?
This repetition with a difference allows us to recall the way Suharto’s
regime was crucially supported by American, British, and Japanese foreign
investment and access to global markets, especially during its oil boom of the
1970s.72 More precisely, the New Order’s “victory of counterrevolutionary violence” meant it could act “in a manner conducive to the interests of capital in
general” and recruit back colonial-era economic players after Sukarno’s efforts
to nationalize the economy.73 Historians have noted that, “to a large extent,
it was US-trained economists at the Army Staff and Command College who
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indoctrinated the anti-Sukarno officers with the developmentalist ideology.”74
Pramoedya’s narrative diversion demonstrates the way the state works not just
by its typically recognized apparatuses of bureaucracy, police, and prisons, but
as anthropologist Naomi Schiller notes, through “the workings of the economy and society”75 more generally. By concealing itself as a monolithic entity,
the state “hides the social-economic structures of inequality” that lie behind
its false coherence.76 Marco’s autobiography reveals how such structures were
often established in the longue durée of imperial rule and are actively reconstituted by the bipolar restructuring underwritten in the Asia-Pacific by the
United States. House of Glass thus functions as both a piercing indictment of
the longevity of colonial-capitalist state structures in the postcolony, but also
of the way such structures are actively revived by Cold War economic and
geopolitical imperatives. Freedom, in this rendering, is not simply freedom of
consciousness from the state, but the freedom to refigure historical material in
a way that engenders new ways to think the state in its wider political and social
entanglements.
One of the more humorous ways Pramoedya intervenes in dominant Cold
War notions of liberal freedom is via the character of Pangemanann’s America-
loving Dutch boss, Meneer L—. Determined to speak only in English, Meneer
L— reveres Thomas Edison and talks incessantly of the “new continent or the
continent of freedom, as he called it.”77 While Pangemanann quietly recalls
to himself “the American Indians who had been systematically annihilated”
and the “big plantation fields of America and the Negro nation who slaved in
those fields,”78 his boss sees only a country “where every man can live freely
and lives to be free!” Unaware of his own absurdity, Meneer L— explains,
“There is so much freedom there that there is none left for outside America.”79
He then compares the freedom of the Indies with that of America:
I feel free here in the Indies—free to oppress the Natives. But this is a
different kind of freedom than the freedom to truly make something
of yourself, to become a millionaire who knows no limits to his power
and influence, whose influence will be felt in every corner of the
earth. That can only happen in America—a country of freedom with a
freedom that is unrivalled anywhere.80
In the boss’s enthusiasm, Pramoedya satirizes the Cold War ideal of America
as quantitatively more free than anywhere else. This exalted freedom of individuality—“Where every man can live freely and lives to be free!”—not only
disavows the country’s own historical conditions of settler colonialism and
slavery but also that it is underwritten by its global military power: “Only
America, with its unrivalled technical abilities, can defeat Germany,”81 points
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out Meneer L—. “Freedom” in America, it turns out, is not very “different”
from that in the colonial Indies after all. As theorized by Meneer L—, it is still
the freedom to oppress natives and accumulate wealth, but cloaked in the
rhetoric of entrepreneurialism, to “make something of yourself.” Pramoedya
again reveals how freedom cannot be sufficiently theorized in terms of minimalist conceptions of individual civil and political rights, but must refer to
historical and structural conditions that produce freedom for some and not
others. After trying to discuss the dangers of an arms buildup with his boss,
Pangemanann is forced to give up: “There was nothing more I could say to
this fan of America.”82
For the most part, however, Pramoedya forges an alternative sense of freedom less through debates between characters, and more through the narrative
recovery of the dizzying plurality of the many different organizations—elite,
Indo (that is, Eurasian), Native, worker-based, ethnic-based, women’s,
regional—viewed through the policeman’s eyes. Their sheer number and variety present opportunities for micro-histories of dispossession and economic
injustice—as we have seen—as well as micro-narratives of agency, bravery,
solidarity, and occasional failure and disappointment. The brilliant young
feminist writer, the aristocratic Seondari, is an example of the latter. A former
acquaintance of Minke, she renounces her titles of nobility and appears briefly
in the narrative as a new leader of exceptional promise. However, no sooner
has she emerged as a character than she is tracked down by police (with the
help of Pangemanann’s surveillance) and given the choice of either marrying
and disappearing from public life, or causing her father to lose his official
position and title.83 As we see also in the quartet’s other installments,
Pramoedya is highly attentive to the gendered effects of the intersections of
colonial rule and local patriarchy.84 The result: “It was as if Seondari had vanished into thin air.”85 The effect is an oddly centripetal, or distracted narrative
style such that the further the narrative proceeds, the more minor characters
appear and the more diluted the plot feels.
If the “over-significance of minor characters”86 has been analyzed for ways
it can “restructure the narrative worlds of the novel,”87 I suggest that in House
of Glass the serial appearance and disappearance of new, minor characters has
a specific literary-political function. Despite Pangemanann’s dogged efforts at
cataloguing all these new leaders, the narrative refuses to sustain focus on any
one of Minke’s successors as the reader might expect. Pangemanann himself
complains, “The situation was not getting any simpler at all. New figures
emerged and then disappeared. But there were also names that did not go
away—Soerjopranoto, Djojopranoto, Sostrokardono, Sostrokartono, Goenawan, Gunadi, Soekandar, Seokendar. I could hardly tell one from the other
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. . . no less than ninety names!”88 Pangemanann’s distress is echoed by the
reader who, similarly, has trouble keeping track of the multiple minor characters and narrative threads which refuse to coalesce. Indeed, the novel strains
to contain the stories of all “ninety” or so budding leaders, registering the
groundswell of different movements at the level of literary form. These multiple leaders suggest that the true protagonist of House of Glass is neither Minke
nor his antagonist Pangemanann, but the forging of the new space of political
activity itself. Indeed, our surveiller-narrator instructs the reader:
The role of the individual, be he named Raden Mas Minke or Si Ana
or Siti Ainu, was not important at all. The times guaranteed the birth,
growth, and development of organizations as the vehicle for different
ideas and for the ideas themselves. Of course, the individual left
behind deep marks, . . . but what was more important was the role of
the organizations on the modern history of the Indies, in the way they
changed the Indies and its people, in accordance with the ideals that
had been formulated, struggled for, and developed as the essence of
these organizations’ activities.
And the role of the former police commissioner called Pangemanann was not important either.89
By the time the new, liberal Governor General Van Limburg Stirum arrives,
Pangemanann observes: “Java was beginning to move. There was wave after
wave of strikes. . . . The government faced more and more problems as these
actions resulted in a decline in the national income.”90 What the novel narrates then, is not the exemplary but thwarted leadership of Minke as an allegorical figure of the dissident writer, but rather, the importance of the multiple
spheres of action that he and others were able to bring into being. If Pangemanann concedes that “writing in public with your name right up front . . .
certainly originated with Raden Mas Minke,”91 its potential is only actualized
when the political action it inaugurates becomes anonymized and collectivized: “Java was beginning to move.”
In the final two chapters of House of Glass, Minke returns from his exile in
Ambon. Stripped of his family, his resources, his house (into which Pangemanann has moved), friends, and networks, he wanders Java disconsolately
under Pangemanann’s ever-vigilant eye. After falling ill and being denied
proper medical care, he dies penniless and unrecognized, with only Pangemanann his paradoxical admirer, jailer, and censor, as witness: “Here upon my
desk I had created magic threads that connected me with him. I could feel
every move of his fingers, I could hear his heartbeat. So I also knew that he
did not leave a single word when he died.”92 On the very last page of the novel,
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Pangemanann partially redeems himself by giving Minke’s manuscripts and
notebooks to Nyai Ontosoroh, aka Sanikem, the inspiring, strong-willed
Native businesswoman and mother of Minke’s first wife Annelies.93 Although
this leaves the manuscripts with a potential future life, we are still left with the
final novel’s emphatic sidelining of Minke. In a sense, the first three novels
appear to have been something of a “false lead” all along.
Such a narrative trajectory is, I suggest, precisely the point. House of Glass
is not a dramatization of the “mindless force of state power . . . against creative, critical subjects”94 that the genre of Cold War dissident literature typically invokes; it instead serves as a literary vehicle that contains the proliferating
organizations, strikes, riots, and youth groups that emerge, each with meandering narrative detours and often short-lived leaders. Counterintuitively, the
final installment of the quartet is above all a novel of unfinished beginnings;
it is about the capacity to begin and create something new. In one of the only
instances of direct speech from Minke after his return from exile, he discusses
the future of the Indies with his one remaining friend, Goenawan, who tries
to urge moderation and acceptance of the status quo. Minke retorts: “We all
have to accept reality, yes, that’s true. But just to accept reality and do nothing
else, that is the attitude of human beings who have lost the ability to develop
and grow, . . . to create new realities.”95 When Pangemanann visits Minke’s
grave he notes, in his characteristic doubled voice, “It was I who did that [visit
the grave], alone, as a mark of respect for a man who had set new things in
motion in the Indies.”96 We come to understand that Minke isn’t the privileged
subject of Indonesian nationalist historiography after all; rather, the minor
characters whose lives fall in and out of Pangemanann’s panoptical gaze may
be considered the proper subject of House of Glass. If the Buru Quartet as a
whole clears, as Hitchcock suggests, a “space for politics,” it is precisely
Pramoedya’s backward glance that makes this perceivable.
In both her major work On Revolution and her essay “What Is Freedom?”
Arendt identifies a fundamentally diminished notion of “freedom” in the
modern era that especially takes shape during the postwar reckoning with
totalitarianism’s legacy.
We are inclined to believe that freedom begins where politics ends,
because we have seen that freedom has disappeared when so-called
political considerations overruled everything else. Was not the liberal
credo, “The less politics the more freedom,” right after all? Is it not
true that the smaller the space occupied by the political, the larger the
domain left to freedom? Indeed, do we not rightly measure the extent
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of freedom in any given community by the free scope it grants to
apparently nonpolitical activities, free economic enterprise or freedom
of teaching, of religion, of cultural and intellectual activities? Is it not
true, as we all somehow believe, that politics is compatible with freedom only because and insofar as it guarantees a possible freedom from
politics?97
Arendt’s characterization of freedom here as “free economic enterprise, or
freedom of teaching, of religion, of cultural and intellectual activities” resonates with the conceptions advocated by Amnesty and the Index on Censorship discussed above. In the tendency to view freedom as the freedom from
politics, the space of politics is conceived as a narrow and subtractive one. In
contrast, and in a typical Arendtian return to the ancients, freedom is better
conceived as the faculty to act in a politically constituted space. In the classical world, “freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation the company of
other men [sic] who were in the same state, and it needed a common public
space to meet them—a politically organized world, in other words, into which
each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed.”98 Arendt’s understanding of freedom as the ability to “call something into being which did not
exist before,” 99 or “the sheer capacity to begin,”100 helps us understand
Pramoedya’s decision to conclude the Buru Quartet with Pangemanann’s narrative. Above all, the policeman’s tale emphasizes the ability to “set new things
in motion.”
Further, the novel’s implicit diagnosis of tyranny and freedom necessarily
complicates the figure of Pramoedya as the “Indonesian Solzhenitsyn.” If this
moniker discursively merges the Third World with the Second via the privileged Cold War tropes of secret police, censorship, and arbitrary imprisonment, House of Glass theorizes freedom and unfreedom through repetition
and difference, the dialectics of the individual and the masses, and the
national and transnational determinations of state and economic power.
Mindful of his roots in the LEKRA movement, Pramoedya’s writing is not
primarily an expression of individual artistic consciousness that must remain
untouched by state power, but is the attempt to reimagine the very condition
of moving toward liberation through collective political action. In a 1995 interview, three years before the fall of the Suharto regime, Pramoedya observed
that “the further we get away from the moment of independence in 1945, the
further away Indonesia is from independence.”101 House of Glass gives us a way
to imagine postcolonial futures beyond colonial reproduction and toward radical newness.
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Kim Chi-ha and Disfiguring Development
In the Cold War Western press, the “Korean Solzhenitsyn” Kim Chi-ha was
lauded as another dissident hero speaking truth to an oppressive regime.
Author of the scandalously satirical narrative poem “Five Bandits” (“Ojŏk”),
published in 1970 in the journal Sasanggye, which was subsequently shut
down, South Korea’s “representative poet”102 famously earned the wrath of the
Park Chung Hee military dictatorship. Born in 1941, the poet—whose nom de
plume “Chi-ha” literally means “underground”103—was in and out of prison
for most of the late 1960s and ’70s and sentenced to death in 1974 for speaking
out about the regime’s use of torture; his sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment in 1975. He would be pardoned after Park’s assassination and
the regime change in 1979. Charged with violating the state’s anti-communist
laws as well as President Park’s Emergency Decree Number 9 prohibiting anti-
government criticism, Kim’s arrest and very public 1976 trial spurred an international outcry, alluded to above.104
In a 1978 profile article on Kim in the Index on Censorship, Shelly Killen
draws on Albert Camus’s influential 1957 lecture “Create Dangerously” to
elaborate on the artist’s predicament.105 Camus’s essay, Killen points out, reflects
on “the role of the artist in a society whose existence was threatened daily by
barbarism and the rising power of the totalitarian state.”106 In Camus’s words,
the artist’s battle with the oppressive state is nothing less than a confrontation
between “the martyr and the lion” in “History’s amphitheatre.”107 In his call
for artistic freedom in “Create Dangerously,” Camus charts a course between
the effete “art for art’s sake” movement and the dangers of social realism,
which “sacrifices art for a purpose that is alien to art.”108 Camus goes on to
champion the transcendent powers of art, which triumph over “modern tyrannies, whether they are right-wing or left-wing”:109 “Tyrants know that great
works embody a force for emancipation. . . . And even thousands of concentration camps and prison cells cannot obliterate this moving testimony of dignity.”110 We again recognize the key Cold War imaginary of totalitarianism’s
prison camps and arbitrary tyranny, against which the genre of dissident literature stands uncorrupted. Disregarding the actual political characteristics of the
Park regime, Killen firmly inserts the Korean poet at “the centre of this blood-
drenched arena,” praising Kim’s “incandescent poetry . . . [that] has the power
to rekindle faith in our intrinsic capacity to transcend our present savagery.”111
She goes on to defend his impeccable Catholicism and mock the Park regime
for casting him as a communist. Without mentioning the grotesque, lewd, and
often funny nature of his satirical poetry, Kim is lauded as the paradigmatic
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defender of freedom against a savage and totalitarian state: The “martyr” faces
off against the “lion” of the Park regime.
As with Pramoedya, I argue that Kim muddles such clear-cut renderings
of liberal freedom versus totalitarianism, writer versus tyrant, artistic autonomy versus ideological state. As we saw in the preceding chapter, it was precisely the apolitical notion of “pure literature” that many right-wing regimes
used to legitimate anti-communist artistic repression. Youngju Ryu’s study of
Park’s “Winter Republic” sheds light on this literary milieu. The state’s cultural policies were advocated partly through the government’s Korean Culture
and Arts Foundation, whose head, Mun Tŏk-su, happened to be the president
of the PEN-International Korean Center,112 attesting again to the curious
alignment of principles of “freedom of speech” with right-wing regimes.
Emerging in the early 1970s in opposition to this alignment was the Association of Writers for Freedom and Praxis (chayu silch’ŏn mumin hyŏhŭihoe),
also known as Chasil.113 By focusing on both aesthetic autonomy and praxis,
it sought to resist the false dichotomy of the Park regime’s cultural program,
in which “pure literature” was contrasted with that infected by proletarian
ideology.114
A more uncomfortable alignment was the U.S.’s prominent role in South
Korea. By the early 1970s, the beacon of the free world had been forced to
recognize its own complicity with the increasingly repressive regime that had
imprisoned and tortured Kim. The U.S. was, after all, financing the anti-
communist fight on the Korean peninsula to the tune of $1.5 billion, which
aimed to “modernize [South Korea’s] armed forces”115 and help protect U.S.
security interests there. For U.S. liberals, Kim’s show trial was one of the great
scandals of the Cold War Pacific alliances and highlighted a “central paradox”
about South Korea during the Cold War:116 The “show trials” and “blatant
violation of liberal democratic ideas” were “taking place not in the communist
North Korea, as one might expect, but in the anti-communist South Korea.”117
Ryu observes with irony: “Solzhenitsyn would have found his great writer in
Kim Chi-ha.”118 But how might we read the work of this exemplary “dissident
poet” in terms other than as a “paradox” of the Cold War? This chapter has
been arguing that the dominant epistemic lens of the Cold War dissident
writer—seen so well in the press on both Pramoedya and Kim—cannot
account for the compatibility between the free world’s liberal capitalism and
a transpacific authoritarianism. It has therefore prevented us from seeing other
possible approaches to oppositional literature. In what follows, I read Kim’s
“Five Bandits” and “Groundless Rumors” from the 1970s for the way their
aesthetics bring to life not just the “paradoxically” repressive nature of the
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U.S.-backed Park regime, but the more scandalous compatibility between capitalist development and “present savagery.”119 Kim’s satire must be read, I suggest, for its literary innovations in depicting the new contours of a transnational
political economy that articulates with, rather than contradicts, the authoritarianism of the South Korean state.
In the second part of this section, I then look briefly to Kim’s reception in
Lotus, the journal of the Afro-A sian Writers’ Bureau I touched on in the preceding chapter. The year after the English-language collection Cry of the
People and Other Poems was published in 1974 by Japan’s Autumn Press, Kim
was awarded the Lotus Prize alongside a number of prominent Third World
writers. A very different Kim emerges in these pages, one that expresses the
shared struggle against neocolonialism across the Third World. Such a reading
usefully challenges liberal notions of individual artistic dissidence versus a
monolithic totalitarianism (the “martyr” and the “lion”) to emphasize issues
of national sovereignty and ongoing anti-imperialist struggles. My readings of
Kim’s poems show how the poet forges a specific aesthetic that attends to both
imperialism’s recursivity and Cold War complications.
If Pramoedya’s fictional narratives relied on a firm, historically realist
return to the 1910s in order to pose questions of post-1965 Indonesia, Kim Chi-
ha’s “Five Bandits,” presents us with a less than clear approach to time. Early
in the poem, the speaker ironically invokes a premodern, precolonial era of
plenitude when the nation “enjoyed perfect peace, the most prosperous peaceful peace” (t’aep’ŏng t’aep’ŏng t’aep’ŏng sŏngdaera).120 The poem’s initial use of
archaic Korean literary forms (“Whoever writes poetry . . . Write straight, like
this”; “sirŭl ssŭdoe . . . irŏhk’e ssŭryatda”)121 seems to confirm an ancient setting. Throughout the poem are references to an array of premodern Korean
and Chinese historical figures and battles, including Dongzhuo, a general of
the first century Han dynasty; Wu Cheng’en’s famous sixteenth-century novel,
Journey to the West; and General Wan Li of the Choson dynasty. The genre
of both “Five Bandits” and “Groundless Rumors” is, however, decidedly modern. Ko Won describes Kim’s narrative poems as “marked by comedy, colloquialisms and unrestrained vulgarisms.”122 In them, Kim draws from p’ansori
elements—a traditional form of folk opera—as well as shaman rituals and
vernacular slang in a free verse arrangement the poet called “talk poem” or
damsi. Chan J. Wu has defined damsi as “an open genre in which narrative
and poetry, drama and song, lyric and epic, drama and epic can mix and interact freely,”123 while Ryu reminds us that p’ansori itself was a “hybrid genre that
mixed erudite learning and classical allusions with lewd, ribald, and often
scatological humor.”124 Kim’s “revived form of p’ansori”125 is thus ideal for

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 78

5/18/21 3:13 PM

In the Shadow of Solzhenitsyn

79

representing the larger than life figures of the Park regime, while drawing on
traditional Korean genres of song and verse.
Although the regime seems to exist in an unspecified historical time, the
title of the poem makes clear Kim’s allegorical gesture. In Korean, the phrase
“five thieves or bandits” (ojŏk) was “used to characterize the five government
ministers who in 1910 signed over Korean sovereignty to the Japanese to start
Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea.”126 In Kim’s poem, the five titular subjects are thus neocolonial agents of the Park regime. They are the conglomerate businessman (chaebŏl) or, “ConglomerApe” in the excellent translation by
Brother Anthony of Taizé, the National Assembly member (kukhoi ŭi wŏn) or
“AssemblyMutt,” the high-ranking government official (kogŭp kongmuwŏn) or
“TopCivilSerpant,” the military general (changsŏng) or “General-in-Chimp,”
and the government minister (changch’aguan) or “HighMinisCur.”127 Ostensibly, the occasion for the poem is the gathering of the five thieves as they meet
to celebrate ten years in “the thievery business”128 with a golf match. The gathering is the opportunity for an extended, grotesque, and satirical description
of these five branches of the authoritarian state and their various “talents.”
First under scrutiny is the chaebŏl, or business magnate, synonymous with
those enormously powerful conglomerates like Samsung, Hyundai, and
Lucky-Goldstar (LG), which took off during the Park Chung Hee period.
Draped with gold accessories from his tiepin to his shoes, the chaebŏl tycoon
and his talents are described in culinary terms:
He grills ministers yellow, he boils vice-ministers red,
adds vinegar, soy sauce, mustard, pepper paste, loads of monosodium
glutamate, garnishes all that with shredded peppers, leeks, garlic, then
gobbles, yum-yum,
gulps down bank money replenished by tax funds, money borrowed
from overseas, plus every kind of privileged concession, in a flash,
seduces pretty girls to be his whores, keeps pounding on them day and
night, breeding kids with all his might.129
As has been well documented, the chaebŏl-state alliance was a developmental
model that took advantage of the unusual degree of industrialization and centralization implemented by the Japanese, and was explicitly modeled on the
Japanese zaibatsu conglomerate system.130 It rode the economic boom driven
by the demand for material and supplies for the U.S.-led war effort in Vietnam
(as Japan had done during the Korean War), helping many chaebŏls in their
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takeoff. After bringing the economic elite firmly under control by arresting
“illicit profiteers,” the Park regime gave preferential loans and contracts to
selected businesses,131 effectively creating a class of powerful chaebŏl who benefited from lucrative Cold War military and development loans.132 Kim’s rendering of the chaebŏl ecology gives aesthetic form to this novel alignment of
business, state, and transnational capital: The chaebŏl enjoys “tax money, foreign loans” (segŭmpadŭn ŭnhaengdon, woegugsŏ pitnaen don) from Japan and
the U.S., enthusiastically consumed with traditional Korean seasonings such
“vinegar, mustard, pepper paste,” and so on.
The remaining four thieves are described in similarly withering terms. The
Assembly member shouts out nonsensical slogans to “stupid citizens” such as,
“Revolution! New wrongs for old!” (hyŏngmŏngidat, ku’akŭn sinakŭro), and
“Modernization! . . . Priority to farming! Make poor farmers quit farming!”
(kŭndaehwadat, . . . chungnonidat, pinnong’ŭn inong’ŭro).133 Meanwhile, TopCivilSerpant specializes in taking bribes; the military general steals his soldiers’ rice and “fills the sacks . . . with sand”;134 and the minister demands ever
higher export productivity as he embezzles money on government contracts.
Pramoedya’s attention to the gendered effects of colonial rule are paralleled in
Kim’s depiction of the HighMinisCur, who emerges
glaring eyes veiled by disgusting mucus, his left hand conducts the
national defense with a golf club.
His right hand fumblingly scrawls production, export, construction
[chŭngsan such’ul kŏnsŏl] on a girl’s breast: Ha ha, hey, that tickles, Sir!
You ignorant bitch! [irŏn musikhannyŏn] How dare you say that affairs
of the state tickle?
Export even though people starve. Produce though nothing sells. Use
the bones of those who’ve died of hunger to build a bridge to Japan:
let’s go over and greet their gods! [kamisama bae’alhajat!]135
In images such as the misogynist minister, Kim mobilizes the damsi form to
succinctly encode the material logic undergirding the “miracle” of Korean
industrialization: the reliance on foreign loans, the unrelenting pursuit of
export dollars, fierce anti-communism, labor repression, and low domestic
consumption levels in part enabled by the use of young, female factory
labor.136 One telling poetic result is the renewed aesthetic relevance of the
commodity form. In “Five Bandits,” modern consumer goods—the shoes,
electronics, and textiles produced by Koreans for the world market, as well as
the Western commodities that began to trickle in at this time often through
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American military black markets—take on an aura and authority of their own.
Indeed, the description of the bandits’ space-and time-stretching mansion
actually takes up more lines than the descriptions of the five thieves themselves. Although most critical attention has focused on the personal satires of
the latter, the poem is as interested in the arrangement and description of
grotesque things as in their owners, inspecting the regime’s material economy
in exhaustive poetic detail. In the setup to the following quote, the chief of
police hears of the royal decree for the arrest of the thieves and naively goes to
the mansion intent on capturing them and becoming a hero. As soon as he
arrives, however, he is instantly seduced by its decadent architecture and
amenities:
Then peeping in through the slightly open door, he sees:
nacre cabinets, matte-surfaced steel trunks, phoenix-adorned dragon
chests, dragon-adorned phoenix chests, a chest with three thousand
three hundred and thirty-three levels, flowered wardrobes ornamented
with painted carnations, a jade salver the size of a playing field, candlesticks in gold, silver, and bronze, soaring high as buildings, electric
clocks, electric rice bowls, electric kettles, electric chopsticks, electric
vases, electric mirrors, electric books, electric briefcases. . . .
pewter earthenware, Tang vases, Japanese vases, American vases,
French vases, Italian vases, a television sheathed in a tiger-skin rug, a
Sony recorder in a marquetry chest, a Mitchell camera on a tortoiseshell table, an RCA projector beside a coral bookcase [hwaryu
mun’gapsoge ssoni nogŭmgi, taemo ch’aeksang wi’e mitch’el k’amera,
sanho ch’aekjang kyŏt’e alssi’ei yŏngsagi], a Parker fountain pen in an
amber writing-brush holder, chandeliers with candles lit, castor-oil-
burning standing lamps . . . 137
The picture that emerges here (and in many pages that follow) is one of an
unnaturally proliferating and decidedly hybrid commodity culture: Traditional luxury goods coveted by Chinese and Korean emperors or yangban
(landed elite) merge with the latest modern gadgetry from Japan and the U.S.,
“Sony” and “Mitchell,” to produce a monstrous transpacific commodity form.
The objects function as material sediments of several kinds of authority at
once: the absolutist rule by premodern kings, colonial rulers, and the specific
Cold War character of South Korea’s development. The accumulated loot of
the ruling elite harbors the material traces of the peninsula’s fraught decolonization process, resulting in a poetics of delirium. I suggest that Kim’s
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disfiguring aesthetics thus mark the specific, material “juncture between two
epochal political forms”: the “colonial” and the “bipolar.”138
“Five Bandits” must be read simultaneously as a damning satire of the corrupt personages of the Park regime and as a cutting political-economic critique of South Korea’s incorporation into the capitalist “free world” bloc. Put
otherwise, what is most scandalous about Kim’s poem is the way bipolarized
national development so closely resembles colonial exploitation, or rule by a
foreigner.139 Such repression is neither the generic fall into totalitarian “savagery” depicted by Killen or Camus, nor is it simply due to the lingering aftereffects of colonial dictatorships.140 Rather, tyranny here is a reactivated and
re-formed authority that emerges out of the growing material network of development schemes, investment apparatuses, anti-communist military loans, and
the transnational political economy of imports and exports. When the chief
of police mistakenly arrests Kkwesu, a poor farmer from rural Chollado, the
latter defends himself by insisting he is merely a poor gum peddler.
A gum seller? So much the better. Gum seller, Cigarette seller, Stockings seller, Sweets seller, Chocolate seller, all taken together,
selling foreign goods, [they] make up the Five Bandits, right?141
Power here is precisely the ability to define crime as whatever might hinder
the nation’s development strategy, whether by selling gum or cigarettes.
Kkwesu is subsequently arrested, tortured, booked for “calumny” (mugojwe),142
and perishes in jail.
Indeed, the strident public opposition to the Park dictatorship was largely
motivated by the neocolonial dimensions of South Korea’s developmental
push. Popular outrage erupted at the news of the normalization of Republic
of Korea–Japan relations in 1964–65, prompting campus protests that continued for 532 consecutive days, to which President Park responded with both
“martial law and a garrison decree.”143 Kim, a student at the time at Seoul
National University, would go on to write a scathing poem on the “death” of
Korean democracy,144 helping consolidate his place in the anti-dictatorship
cultural movement. But diplomatic normalization with Japan was not merely
a matter of nationalist pride. Writing about the reestablishment of relations,
Tadashi Kimiya has explained how South Korea’s initial demands for massive
legal reparations from its erstwhile colonizer were eventually placated, with
the help of the U.S. as mediator. Instead of a legal resolution and payment,
Japan provided a total of US$8 billion in “money, goods, and services as economic aid or gifts in order to clear away the South Korean claims against the
Japanese.”145 This strategy alleviated both Japan and the U.S.’s major concern
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about maintaining South Korea as a stable capitalist economy in the face of
North Korea and China’s threat.146 At the same time, as Lisa Yoneyama has
argued, it testifies to the way postwar transpacific “victor’s justice” “instat[es]
the victorious as overseers and protectors of besieged sovereignties,” and
thereby “legitimiz[es] prolonged occupations after cease-fire.”147 The American military occupation coupled with the “gift” of Japanese economic aid
precisely indexes South Korea’s “besieged sovereignty.”
Heonik Kwon, following Jacques Derrida, has written of the peculiar “geopolitics of forgiveness” that emerged in the decolonizing–Cold War matrix.
Around the globe, bipolar imperatives required uncomfortable alliances, such
as the pardoning of French Nazi collaborators in the face of Europe’s rearmament for the Cold War,148 and the backing of the South African state by the
U.S., with the latter becoming “apartheid’s reluctant uncle.”149 For newly
decolonizing Third World states, “The amnesty concerned collaborators with
the colonial regimes, and these acts of forgiveness, often conducted against
the population’s expectations and wishes, weakened the state’s moral legitimacy and distorted subsequent political developments.”150 In South Korea, the
demand for colonial accountability was “distorted” by the free world’s counter-
demand for anti-communist security and militarized industrial development.
Kim’s poem well demonstrates how, with the U.S. Cold War military machine
on one side and the effort to “greet Japanese gods,”151 on the other, any alternative, decolonized path to South Korean modernity was foreclosed. “Five
Bandits” thus anatomizes and satirizes tyranny as the forced participation in
a specifically Cold War developmental-security matrix.
The Western press was not the only keen outside observer of Kim’s case.
If the U.S. and British media were largely fixated on the Park regime’s recalcitrant illiberalism and its “wave of political trials,”152 a different reading of
Kim emerges in Lotus, the journal sponsored by the Afro-A sian Writers’
Bureau.153 In 1975, as mentioned above, Kim was awarded the prestigious
Lotus Prize alongside the prominent Third World writers Chinua Achebe of
Nigeria, Faiz Ahmad Faiz of Pakistan, and M. Mahdi El Gawahri from
Iraq.154 A Lotus issue of 1976 included a special section on the four prize
winners, with brief author profiles of each. Additionally, the issue carried a
four-page review of The Cry of the People and Other Poems and reprinted
three of its shorter poems. In the prizewinner’s profile, Kim is described as
fighting for “the sovereign rights of the Korean people” against the “dictatorship of foreign powers.”155 With obvious resonances of Fanonian “combat
literature,” and in contrast to the liberal understanding of literary freedom
from politics, the Lotus editors remind the reader that “poetry and political
action are inseparable.”156 For the journal’s editors and readers, Kim’s oeuvre
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is exemplary for its struggle for national self-determination in a broader field
of global politics.
Maher Shafik’s four-page review of Cry of the People expresses such an
appreciation yet—like Keller’s piece—is remarkable for how little it actually
refers to Kim’s poetry. After providing biographical information and describing Kim’s arrest and imprisonment after the publication of “Five Bandits,” the
bulk of the review is concerned with explaining the many political and historical “topical references” behind the poems.157 To do so, Shafik assembles
direct (and unattributed) quotes from the volume’s explanatory footnotes.
Thus, he explains how “Groundless Rumors” refers to “the mysterious
Daeyunkak Hotel fire of Christmas Eve, 1971,” and summarizes President
Park’s emergency declaration and his repressive Yusin Constitution of 1972.
The largest single unattributed quote reproduces a lengthy footnote from
“Groundless Rumors” on the political economy of the regime:
President Park dangled a cheap, skilled and docile work force before
foreign investors. In addition to passing laws outlawing labor strikes
in foreign enterprises; “tax-free” zones have been set up. . . . “Export
zones” have also been established “to increase employment and
improve technology,” all goods produced therein being for export only.
Profit transfer rights offered to foreign investors allow hundreds of millions of dollars of untaxed profits to flow out of Korea annually, profits
which derive primarily from the low wages paid to Korean labour.158
The phrases in quotation marks are in the original Autumn Press publication,
where they presumably refer to the state’s discourse. For Shafik, such details
are important because the “topicality” of the Korean situation “does not mean
that Kim’s poems do not have a universal appeal.”159 The review concludes
with some brief sections of “Five Bandits” and “Groundless Rumors” and the
reviewer’s final assessment: “Certainly [Kim’s poetry] is not as witty as Brecht’s
great political satires, but it has its own distinction, and is definitely a revolutionizing force that seeks to change the world.”160 What matters most to Shafik,
in other words, is how much the conditions referred to in Kim’s poems can be
translated to other anti-imperialist Third World locations, and whether or not
his works constitute a “revolutionary force.”
The concerns of the Lotus editors and readers can be readily contrasted
with those of the Western press. Rather than being read as the work of the
exemplary prisoner of conscience wielding the torch of artistic freedom
against a “savage” regime, Kim’s poetry is read for the way it charts the South
Korean experience of neocolonialism—a process perceived to be “universal”
across the decolonizing world. The Lotus coverage effectively replaces concern
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with the sovereignty of the individual’s conscience to a concern with the sovereignty of the Third World nation. Yet despite their interest in postcolonial
sovereignty, the Lotus writers curiously make no mention of the fact of Korea’s
divided peninsula, the conflagration of the Korean War, the U.S. military
occupation in the South, or the triangulation between Japanese economic
hegemony and U.S. military power. While useful for considering South Korea
in a shared, Third World framework, the writers do not recognize that certain
postcolonies cannot be Third Worldist in the sense of being unaligned, for this
is precisely the neocolonial situation they find themselves in.
Just one year later, one of Africa’s most prominent writers (himself famously
imprisoned by the Kenyan state), Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o, would use Kim’s “Five
Bandits” as a representative text to discuss neocolonialism.161 Indeed, Ng ũgı̃
noted the inspiration for his 1980 Devil on the Cross as his encounter with
Kim’s work on a trip to Japan in 1976.162 In his essay “Africa and Asia: The
History That Refuses to Be Silenced,” he writes that the poem
could be talking about many countries in Asia, South America and
Africa. The Bandits, a combination of business tycoons, top bureaucrats, national assembly men, the top military brass and cabinet ministers, all the elements that make up the comprador social stratum,
are compared to the slavemasters of old who drove people to work
harder and harder with the resulting wealth going into the lifestyle of
the few and their foreign connections in the centres of world imperialism. These bandits are reproduced by imperialism in a neo-colonial
system engulfing the peoples of Asia, Africa and South America. So
when he talks about the alliance of the Five Bandits with Japanese
and US imperialism as helping in the plunder and murder of our peoples, he is speaking all our histories.163
For the Kenyan writer, Kim’s poem gives aesthetic form to the latest of three
general stages of Western imperialism—the first two being slavery and “classical colonialism,” and the third stage neocolonial comprador capitalism.164
“That is why,” Ng ũgı̃ reiterates, “the Korean people’s struggle for democracy
and unity is the struggle of all oppressed peoples.”165 Like the Lotus editors, in
claiming Kim’s universality Ng ũgı̃ suggests a South-South solidarity that
provocatively links postcolonial East Asia with Africa. (Kim himself would cite
Frantz Fanon in his 1976 trial in another linking of the two continents.)166 Yet
Ng ũgı̃ is more cognizant of the profound role of the Cold War in shaping
decolonization, a process that had devastating effects on the African continent
as well as in Asia. First, his mention of Japanese imperialism in the above is
not insignificant given that Lotus—like the PEN conferences discussed in the
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preceding chapter—often included Japan and its cultural production as an
unproblematic part of postcolonial Afro-A sia. For Ng ũgı̃, “Japanese and U.S.
imperialism” firmly signals the Cold War capitalist alliance between the two
powers, necessarily complicating a smooth notion of Afro-A sian solidarity
against the West.167 Second is Ng ũgı̃’s insight on the specific use of anti-
communism by the neocolonial native elite. Toward the conclusion of his
essay he notes, “[the native comprador bourgeoisie] kill democracy and they
kill national initiatives. They kill unity of the people under the pretext of fighting the demon they call communism.”168 I suggest, though, that in East and
Southeast Asia, we must go further than merely naming the “pretext” of anti-
communist violence as an opportunistic tool of repressive regimes. As I have
been arguing, Kim’s poetry reveals the necessary relationship between the
expansion of Cold War capitalism and authoritarian rule. That is, Kim’s critique is not simply that South Korea’s regime is repressive, exploitative, and
beholden to foreign powers. It is that these characteristics are normal and necessary in the pursuit of a decolonizing modernity that emerged as part of the
peninsula’s “division system.” As influential literary and cultural critic Paik
Nak-chung explains, the “division system” (pundan ch’eje) is not merely the
bloc confrontation between “two opposing ideologies—capitalism (or liberal
democracy) and socialism (communism),”169 but a radically interdependent
form, a “peninsula-wide structure” that itself forms a subset of the world-
system as a whole.170 That is, the workings of the rightest South Korean security state can only be understood in relation to the North Korean state which
it opposed and competed against but, in many ways, mirrored.
Kim’s 1972 damsi poem “Groundless Rumors” (Pi’ŏ), to which I now turn,
demonstrates precisely the interlocking of Cold War capitalist and illiberal
modes of authority. Divided into three sections, the poem’s imagery manages
to exceed even the monstrous couplings of “Five Bandits”; David McCann
calls it “the best of the long satires.”171 The first section, “Origin of a Sound,”
follows the story of the impoverished An-do, who is charged with “the crime
of standing on his own two feet and spreading groundless rumors [yu’ŏn
pi’ŏ].”172 Satirizing the Park regime’s paranoid response to dissident writers,
An-do is condemned at a sham trial, after which his body parts are cut off one
by one. Only his un-dead torso remains to roll around his cell with an unsilenceable “Kung!”— a sound that “is heard even now, day and night.”173 Part
2, “Ko Kwan,” or “high official,” tells the story of the Daeyunkak Hotel fire of
Christmas Eve 1971 mentioned above. In Kim’s hands, the event is the opportunity to make fun of the sleazy politicians, business elites, Japanese cronies,
and their respective illicit lovers, who flee as a fire engulfs the hotel. The final
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section, “Adoration of a Six-shooter,” descends further into bodily vulgarity
and obscene violence as a king—identified only as ruling “in the year of the
pig”—becomes pregnant and is told by his shaman that he must eat 30 million
human livers, preferably communist ones, in order to abort.
Let us briefly unpack the gruesome fate of An-do in the section “Origin
of a Sound” (“sori naeryŏk”). The lingering “Kung!” emanating from his
torso offers a clear, if macabre, rejoinder to the Park regime’s attempt to
silence all dissent. Yet the poem’s show trial, I contend, satirizes more than
just the regime’s disproportionate violence. The prosecution against An-do
presents a ludicrous litany of crimes, poetically rendered as an enormous
single run-on line of mostly Sino-Korean characters, as opposed to the rest
of the poem which predominantly uses han’gŭl, pure Korean letters. Unlike
the bulk of the poem with its free verse lines, frequent exclamation points
and onomatopoeic vocabulary, the legal charges comprise a torrent of formal, bureaucratic vocabulary, rhythmically united by the repetition of
“crime of—” (—choe) in each phrase. The accusations include “crimes” that
speak to the obvious illiberalism of the regime: speaking out against the
government, disgracing the fatherland, and anti-government conspiracy.
However, several charges explicitly challenge capitalist values and policies
that, on their own, would not be considered particularly “authoritarian.”
These crimes include “the crime of insolently avoiding the national policies
for more production, export, and construction without a moment’s rest”
(ch’onbon muhyu chŭngsan such’ul kŏnsŏljŏk kukka chŏngch’aek kip’ijoe)174
and “Disturbing the environment for capital investment” (t’uja hwan’gyŏng
kyoranjoe).175 Syntactically and poetically, these violations operate at the
same level of ridicule as the crimes in other stanzas, such as “the crime of
possibly organizing an anti-government body through telepathic means.”176
Whether fomenting a supernatural anti-government conspiracy or avoiding
export policies, An-do’s charges receive the same satirical treatment of exaggeration, disproportion, and disfigurement. The equivalence of these outrages is partly what is at stake in Kim’s poems.
We see a similar equivalence between illiberal and capitalist authorities in
his more traditionally lyrical “The Cry of the People” (“minjung ŭi woech’um”),
the title poem of the Autumn Press English translation. Here, lines decrying
the betrayal of democracy by the Park regime are formally commensurate
with the injustices of an export economy and foreign investment. Beginning
with such outrages as “Dictatorship has been established” and “The people’s
leaders thrown in prison / For espousing democratic rights,”177 the poem continues with:
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To improve the investment environment,
Compradors appear;
Tax exemptions, transfer rights,
Offered like ancestral gifts;
But rights of labor brutally suppressed,
Special laws are written;
Industrial zones, export centers,
Create only regional gaps.178
Remarkable here is the attempt to craft a poetics of protest through the very
language of growth-oriented economic policy: “Tax exemptions, transfer
rights,” and “special laws” for taming labor. In formally presenting such policies alongside the more obvious human rights violations of a dictatorship, we
understand that labor disciplining is not an unfortunate by-product of a
generic authoritarianism. Rather, it is the linchpin of the South’s bipolarized
ascension into the free world. Meanwhile, the question of reunification with
the North—the unfinished nature of decolonization on the peninsula—must
take second place to the industrial push: “Economic independence but a distant vision; / Unification a receding dream.”179
For Kim, therefore, at stake is not merely the violation of the classic individual, political, and civil liberties that would, as Joseph Slaughter has argued,
come to “hijack” more capacious, Third Worldist understandings of international human rights.180 Nor is it simply the fact of neocolonial foreign control,
as Shafik’s review stressed, nor even the egregiously rushed nature of development that contributed to the Daeyunkak fire: As one victim of the latter wryly
asks, “Is the lack of an emergency staircase modernization?”181 Many of the
national policies Kim indicts are precisely those that have now been standardized as part of the playbook of successful globalized development: export-
oriented industrialization, courting foreign investment, rapid urbanization,
anti-union and anti-labor laws, and the externalization of environmental
costs.182 Indeed, the shock of reading Kim’s poetry from a twenty-first-century
vantage point is the way these typical “growth” policies were so firmly entwined
with a dictatorial, neocolonialist regime. We can now read the concern with
the normalization of the 1965 Japan–Republic of Korea relations with a doubled lens: What Cold War modernization produces, above all, is the normalization of a certain mode of capitalist development that arises at the
intersection of decolonization and the bipolarization of modernity. The Park
regime scrambles both the time and goals of decolonization such that the
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“postponement (of democracy) becomes a condition for acceleration (of
industrialization).”183
Kim’s delirious, grotesque satires are therefore not only directed at the
bloated cronies of the Park regime. They critique South Korea’s subjection to
militarized, anti-communist capitalist development, which is portrayed poetically at its frenzied and unnatural endpoint: grotesque couplings of commodities and the equally monstrous demands for the creation of capital-friendly
environments. We must, finally, recognize the profound transformation of
imperialism in the decolonizing Asia-Pacific. If bipolarized restructuring was
coeval with decolonization,184 what we see is less an unchanging, durable
form of Euro-A merican imperialism and more the “novel imperial order of
the Cold War era.”185 Anti-communist state tyranny is not a convenient “pretext” for repression; it is the enabling condition for the postwar incorporation
of South Korea and other Asian postcolonies into the promise of Pax
Americana.

Ninotchka Rosca’s Blurred Boundaries of the State
In many ways, Ninotchka Rosca is another exemplary Third World dissident
writer. Born in 1946, and roughly the same generation as Kim Chi-ha, she
attended the University of the Philippines. As Marcos tightened his grip in the
late 1960s and early ’70s, his regime “launched one of the largest government
media operations in Asia.”186 Immediately after Marcos declared martial law
in 1972 (just weeks before Park Chung Hee would dissolve the South Korean
legislature), the arrests of news and television journalists on the grounds of
“communist infiltration” began en masse, with a number of media outlets
closed for good and “4,500 employees of the print media and 3,500 of the
broadcast media” losing their jobs.187 To control the media, Marcos established his own National Media Trust “modelled after a similar body in Indonesia.”188 Rosca was imprisoned for her anti-government writings in 1973, and
spent six months in Camp Crame, where torture was not uncommon. In the
years following her detention, she lived in exile first in Hawai‘i and then in
New York. As mentioned above, she published her scathing novel of the Marcos dictatorship, State of War, in 1988, basing some of her characters on her
1983 short story collection, The Monsoon Collection, conceived during her
imprisonment. Rosca would write another novel more directly indicting the
dictator, Twice Blessed, in 1992, and remain committed to the cause of writerly
free speech in her activist work. While based in New York, she has made a
name as a respected literary and human rights activist, especially in her role
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as founder of the GABRIELA network, a Philippine–U.S. women’s solidarity
group, which works to stop the trafficking of women.189 From 1991 to 1995 she
served on the Board of Trustees of the New York–based PEN America Center,
along with such literary luminaries as Allen Ginsberg, John Irving, E. L. Doctorow, and fellow Filipina Jessica Hagedorn, while Salman Rushdie served as
honorary vice president. A New York Times article of January 24, 1996, even
cites her objection to proposed changes to PEN America’s membership rules
that would have allowed non-writers (read donors) to join.190 Her protest letter,
ironically enough, appears to have been censored by the Center.
Unlike Pramoedya and Kim, who achieved international recognition
because of their imprisonment, Rosca’s case garnered no special media attention, perhaps because of the relatively brief period of incarceration and her
subsequent exile. A 1984 New York Times review of the Monsoon Collection,
nevertheless, opines that its nines stories “seem fringed by barbed wire,”191
confirming the major motifs of the genre of “persecuted literature” discussed
earlier. Rosca’s Anglophone work, however, is recognized as “writing within
the [Philippine] radical-nationalist tradition as a feminist activist,”192 and she
has also been canonized within U.S.-based Asian American studies as an
exemplary exilic writer. Scholars of the latter field have noted that Philippine
writing in the United States departs from the more established Asian American thematics of immigration, assimilation, and the U.S. nation precisely
because of “the vagaries of the (neo)colonial U.S.–Philippines relationship,”193 a topic well explored by Rosca. For these reasons, we can read her
as part of “a literature of exile and emergence rather than a literature of
immigration and settlement.”194 Moreover, in Rosca’s work, “the return to the
homeland is not the return to paradise, utopia, or precolonial purity,”195 and
her writings can be characterized as an ongoing feminist engagement with
the violent legacies of colonialism and neocolonialism in Philippine politics,
history, and identity. In placing Rosca alongside Pramoedya and Kim Chi-ha,
I wish to read her work as part of a larger Asia-Pacific archive of literary critiques of Cold War authorities. In particular, I use her fiction to think about
postcolonial state-formation and literary form in a way that again complicates
tropes of pure artistic opposition against a generic Third World or Soviet
authoritarianism. It is with these questions in mind that I read Rosca’s State
of War, with its action-packed account of the resistance movement opposing
the Marcos state (though he is never named other than as “The Commander”). If the preceding sections sought to complicate historical allegory
and political satire as two dominant genres for reading autocracy, how might
we reread a novel usually understood within the category of resistance
literature?
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The novel’s main story is set on an unnamed island during a religious festival and eventually culminates in an attempted armed uprising against the
regime. The festival—modeled on the Ati-Atihan festival held in the province
of Aklan—provides the background for a dizzying, carnivalesque three-day
intermingling of locals, visitors, tourists, transgender people, revolutionaries,
and soldiers, focalized through the relationship between three young protagonists: the serious revolutionary and widow, Anna Villaverde; the beautiful
and fickle Eliza Hansen; and Adrian Banyaga, the son and heir of a wealthy
Manila industrialist family. Drawing syncretically on native and Catholic elements, Rosca’s festival has been read as an exemplary site of oppositional culture: Myra Mendible notes that the carnivalesque festival functions as both
“literary and political device,” and “hints at the prospect of revolution.”196 In a
similar vein, Rocio G. Davis understands Rosca’s work as reflecting a subversive “literary repossession of homeland and its history.”197 Yet the novel complicates the simple affirmation of resistance culture against the state by
providing a very different kind of narrative as well. It is, in fact, formally composed of three separate books: Books One and Three follow the festival’s political and personal dramas, while Book Two is a self-contained 200-page historical
novel that simultaneously gives us the ancestral genealogies of the three protagonists and the prehistory of the Marcos regime itself.198
Titled “The Book of Numbers,” Book Two’s long historical narrative begins
in the waning years of the Spanish colonial era and carries us through the
short-lived Philippine revolution (1896–98), the subsequent invasion by and
war with the new Yanqui colonizers (1898–1903), the Japanese occupation of
World War II (1942–45), and the Huk Uprising and American-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns of the early post-independence years. Throughout,
Rosca’s controlling literary theme is that of conflict and survival; indeed, four
hundred years of Philippine history appear here as one extended, interminable
“state of war.” While the first and third books—with their biblical-sounding
titles “The Book of Acts” and “The Book of Revelations”—are set over a mere
three-day period of the festival, the middle “Book of Numbers” covers about
one hundred years of history. I am thus interested in how we might read what
Pheng Cheah has called the novel’s “heterotemporality”199—its disjunctive
narrative temporality—as a complex articulation of the formation of the postcolonial present. I suggest that the inextricability of historical and contemporary struggles is formally staged by the structure of the novel itself: It is a
bifurcated or hybrid novel that wants simultaneously to be a tale of revolutionary immediacy and a plodding family saga; a book of anti-dictatorship
political urgency and the historical longue durée of repressive rule. The very
melding of literary genres, with their alternately stretched and compressed
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temporalities, is what I see as one of the main achievements of State of War:
the formal attempt to explain the constitution of the present authoritarian
state by reaching back into history to unveil its complex temporalities and
entanglements. This demands we read the novel in ways other than for its
well-discussed aesthetics of resistance.
As touched upon at the beginning of this chapter, such habits of reading for
resistance are due partly, at least, to the formation of postcolonial studies and
its foundational interest in exemplary anti-colonial struggles, nationalist constructions, and subversive hybrid identities. If the field does not subscribe to a
notion of liberal freedoms along the lines of Amnesty or PEN, it has nevertheless been informed by the long tradition of reading artists in opposition to
states. A deep interest in reading and writing against colonial dictatorships is
exemplified in the large body of work on resistance and prison literatures.
Starkly at odds with Amnesty International’s avowedly liberal, cosmopolitan,
and anti-communist approach, Barbara Harlow’s scholarship on protest literatures has been particularly influential. Perhaps best known for her concept of
“resistance literature” from her influential 1987 study, Harlow’s oeuvre made
visible activist writers from a number of Third World political contexts, including the Kenyan liberation struggle against the British, South Africa’s anti-
apartheid movement, the Palestinian fight for sovereignty, and Latin American
dictatorships. In contrast to Amnesty or PEN’s minimalist conception of the
right to free expression, for Harlow, literature’s purchase on the political is
decidedly “maximal.” Literature is nothing less than “an arena of struggle”200
integral to the larger liberation movements, and possesses the power to indict,
analyze, and combat colonial oppression while “reconstructing . . . the history
of the relation of power between [what have] been variously designated as First
and Third worlds.”201 Poetry and narratives produced within these movements
evidence “their manifold role as historical documents, ideological analyses
and visions of future possibilities produced out of the contemporary struggle
against oppression.”202
We must credit Harlow’s pioneering work for renewed scholarly interest in
what Lazarus calls “the centrality of the category of resistance in anti-colonial
nationalist literature.”203 Nevertheless, despite the radical leanings of Harlow
and the consequential body of work inspired by her, there is a curious alignment between Harlow’s “resistance writer” and the liberal “prisoner of conscience.” In both approaches, the primary adversary remains the
undifferentiated state. In her readings of prison literature in Barred: Women,
Writing, and Political Detention (1992), Harlow collates a number of influential works and genres that “translate protest against torture into a demand
for a collective political accounting.”204 Analyzing the reports produced by
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Amnesty International, Harlow describes torture as the “failure of governments to exercise their legal responsibilities to prevent it.”205 The task of “writing human rights,” then, is to resist “tyranny and oppression” of those
“governments that once signed the [UDHR] declaration.”206 Although figuring literature as maximally endowed with political agency, Harlow’s writing
resistance, akin to Amnesty’s “two-person drama,” presumes a clear moral and
political boundary between the “state machine of terror”207 and the writing
subject of resistance.
As with my discussion of Amnesty and PEN, it is not my aim to deny the
“centrality of resistance” in the literary genres powerfully brought to light by
Harlow, or its important influence on much postcolonial scholarship. I aim to
point out, simply, that in postcolonial studies, literatures of freedom or resistance often turn on the figuring of an unproblematic state sovereignty as the
object against which they constitute themselves, with little theoretical distinction between colonial and postcolonial dictatorships.208 How, I ask, might
such texts interrogate the uneven reproduction of oppressive rule itself and
depict other forms of authority—economic, bipolar, religious, gendered,
racial—that both align with and confound what we are typically quick to recognize as “the state machine of terror”? We can usefully enrich our discussion
of dissident writers and oppressive states through the substantial body of work
on non-Western state-formations from the field of anthropology. Resonating
with David Scott’s work discussed earlier in the book, Akhil Gupta has identified the ways the so-called “backward” nature of postcolonial states is seen
to be eternally deficient.
In many analyses of what was lacking in the postcolonial state . . . [at
fault is] the failure to construct adequately the boundary between state
and society: The state was permeated by society and failed to remain
autonomous and sovereign; or society was dominated by the state and
unable to constitute an environment for civil society to flourish. . . .
By this yardstick, non-Western states would always be deficient.209
In this account, the correct “boundary between state and society” is an ahistorical gauge for reaffirming the transcendent liberal values of autonomy and
sovereignty, a version of which we see in the Western Cold War emphasis on
the noninterference of political ideology into the sphere of art.210 In contrast,
Gupta provocatively theorizes the “blurred boundaries” that characterize
many of the world’s states. Furthermore, he suggests that in order for states
to work they must be actively constructed through symbolic and discursive
representations as well as in everyday practices.211 In that sense, they are akin
to Benedict Anderson’s well-known “imagined communities” of the nation
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(1983).212 However, whereas for Anderson, print culture and notions of homogenous time help us to imagine a “we,” the state most often is figured more
ambiguously, as both us and not us. Following insights from Gupta and others, I suggest we read literature on postcolonial authoritarianism as not merely
concerned with representing and critiquing those given immutable, discrete
structures of state power. With its competing and contested stories of the state,
State of War less depicts a dramatic “fall” into some recognizable state tyranny
to be resisted, and more the uneven reworkings of colonial modes of extraction
and accumulation, reconstituted to serve the new priorities of the Cold War
postcolonial state. The Marcos state is therefore not only to be understood in
vertical relation to its subjects of resistance. Rather, its decentralized and
porous bureaucratic infrastructure, military and militias, landowning and
political elite, and entanglements with foreign powers constitute a complex
and shifting site of struggle as both idea and practical arena.213 In short, if
Rosca presents the violence of the Philippine state as repetition and entanglement, she does so by simultaneously entangling familial, social, state and
interstate authorities. Crystal Parikh has argued that “the family saga is never
simply about the heroics or fortunes of an individual protagonist, not even the
paterfamilias; rather it concerns the reproduction and status of a family line,”
and is a genre that “ intrinsically situates its characters in a social world.”214 I
therefore read State of War less as novel of resistance or work of dissident literature—in which resistance and complicity are clearly demarcated—but as a
literary interrogation into the reproductive capacity of certain state and non-
state arrangements. The family saga is the narrative form for such an
investigation.
Let me work through these claims more closely. At one level, State of War
depicts the straightforward inheritance and longevity of repressive colonial
state forms with an emphasis on military violence and gendered torture. Thus,
we understand scenes of sexual abuse in the Marcos-era narrative “as a continuation of the sexual violence set in motion by the [Spanish] colonizers”215
rather than an innovation of that dictatorship. State of War also vividly reveals
that the brutal techniques of military counterinsurgency go back to the first
Philippine–American war, famously described by Mark Twain as a conflict in
which “thirty thousand killed a million.”216 Yet Book Two’s drawn-out family
saga complicates the notion of inheritance as merely the aftereffects of colonial governance. During the postwar anti-communist suppression of the PKP
(Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas)-led Huk rebellion, U.S. “anticommunism
dovetailed with elites’ efforts to recover power and control over the countryside,”217 laying the ground for Marcos’s vehemently anti-leftist regime. Moreover, “U.S. aid and advisors helped establish the infrastructure for martial
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rule, and it is not unlikely that the CIA recruited and trained Filipino officers
in torture techniques.”218 The results are graphically narrated in scenes of the
torture of Anna Villaverde by the repulsive Colonel Amor. Such scenes alert
us to the very limits of a liberal model of reading that would condemn the
human rights abuses of the Marcos regime without understanding its conditions of possibility within both colonial and bipolar histories. The novel thus
places the time of the autocratic postcolonial state within a larger historical
and transnational frame, squarely acknowledging “the role of former empires
in what a nation [and I would add, a state] can become.”219
The plot of Book Two revolves around Maya, first introduced as “a dark,
Malayan girl with an acacia tree’s sturdiness,”220 who becomes the mistress of
a Capuchin friar and later matriarch of an industrialist family in Manila. In
contrast to the explicit binaries of the Marcos-era narrative—state violence versus the festival’s oppositional politics—the middle book’s extended historical
narrative offers a less clear-cut model of both political agency and the boundaries of the state. In the long chronicle of colonization, abuse, and repression
that characterizes the archipelago, we are unable to name who is complicit and
who represents resistance. Moreover, we see that sexual unions and unconventional kinship structures result in reconfigurations of state or state-like authority, which often blend official, religious, gendered and economic power. This
is largely narrated through character and family lineage. Maya’s elevation to
the ambiguous position of “priest’s whore,” for example, effects such a shift.
Being “both in the center of and yet outside the half-pagan, half-Catholic
society,”221 she attains a certain degree of independence and autonomy:
Perched on the driver’s seat of her caleche, her tiny hands with wrists
of iron controlling the palpable power of her black horse, her small,
hard body with its mahogany skin costumed in an extravagant embroidered blouse of woven pineapple fiber . . . her lips clasped about the
lighted end of a brown cigarillo, she drew in her wake men, women,
and children who stared at, ran after, and hailed her passing, calling
her witch, whore, saint, patroness, insane. She would stop at intersections and accept rolled-up petitions from peasants, petitions which, for
a coin or two, she promised to bring to the attention of the proper
saint, prodding the statue with whip lashes every twilight until the
request was granted.222
It is precisely Maya’s uncertain status as “witch, whore, saint, patroness” that
allows her to mediate between the peasants and the colonial authority of the
Catholic Church. Her function is neither simply collaborative nor straight
forwardly oppositional. While she clearly defies gendered and racialized
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norms, the narrative goes on to reveal that “the peasants somehow inverted
her idea of coercing the holy powers and began flagellating themselves
instead”—a practice that her descendant Anna Villaverde will later witness at
a “festival confused by time and history.”223
After the friar’s death, Maya rises to middle-class respectability in early
twentieth-century Manila by negotiating both Spanish legacies and the new
American occupation. Her son Carlos Lucas, a successful gin distiller, ponders joining the American-installed political system with the rationale, “I’m
rich. . . . That’s the only requirement.”224 We eventually follow the next generation of the family now focalized through a renewed mother-son dyad of
Mayang (Carlos Lucas’s Chinese-Malay wife) and her son Luis Carlos, who
makes his name as a composer and musician entertaining Manila’s American
and Americanized elite. After the rapid retreat of the U.S. in the face of Japanese imperial aggression, Luis Carlos will spend the war as a guerrilla soldier
fighting the occupation; he survives, but his mother Mayang is killed after she
follows him into the jungle. Finally, and despite his own experience as a guerrilla fighter, Luis Carlos is recruited by the murderous American colonel
“Mad Uncle Ed” and works for the postwar U.S. counterinsurgency operation
against the communist-led Hukbalahap peasant movement.225
Luis Carlos’s status thus echoes the ambivalent agency of his grandmother,
Maya. As the only product of his mother’s illicit affair with the German chemist Hans Zangroniz (later rechristened Chris Hansen, and ancestor of Eliza
Hansen), he is presented as Book Two’s most sympathetic and sensitive character: earnest, rational, and preternaturally mature for his age. His artistic
passion and disinterest in worldly gain is significant, I suggest, in that it borrows from the trope of the autonomous artist who stands outside, or in opposition to, official power structures. And yet Luis Carlos’s allegiances are as hard
to define as his bloodline—a mix of native, Spanish, Chinese, and German.
His subsequent success—culminating in a grand performance for Manila’s
elite—is aided by his romantic connection to a beautiful “Eurasian chanteuse,”226 mistress of the American military governor. A similarly ambivalent
character appears in the figure of the Banyaga patriarch, whose name means
“foreigner” or “stranger” in Tagalog. Another descendant of the friar who collaborates with the Spanish and the Americans in putting down the Philippine
resistance, he eventually becomes a powerful business magnate and the patriarch of Adrian Banyaga’s family line. Nevertheless, in a nostalgic gesture of
anti-imperialist nationalism, the patriarch “goes up and down the archipelago buying all this relicary”227 and memorabilia from the 1896 Philippine
Revolution. We also have Anna’s friend Eliza Hansen who, due to her relationship with a powerful general, sets up “office” in the coffee shop of the
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Intercontinental Hotel and playfully undertakes an array of state functions,
including the whimsical, if disastrous, mismatching of personnel to government posts.228 In all these figures, Rosca complicates “the traditional figure of
resistance as a subject who stands outside the state and refuses its demands.”229
The lines demarcating the state’s inside and outside, (artistic) autonomy and
complicity, are simply too difficult to map. If we are determined to find it, pure
revolutionary subjectivity is attributed only to the peasants who fight instinctively against expropriating forces at every turn, but whose consciousness
largely lies at the edges of the novel. Thus, rather than offer a lineage of the
authentic Philippine national resistance that opposes the state (and which a
number of other Marcos-era novels do, especially in vernacular languages),230
the tripartite structure of State of War serves as the literary genre that links the
contemporary Cold War state apparatus to various historically produced subject positions, whose interests are neither exclusively collaborative nor inherently resistant. As Nerferti Tadiar has pointed out, Marcos’s “emergent crony
capitalist state” depended on a social basis that was “comprised of practices of
living and modes of subjectivity forged under conditions of post-and neocolonialism that are not easily categorized in terms of outright resistance or
domination.”231
A rethinking of the state in Rosca’s novel helps us address the stubborn
interpretive problem I have been grappling with throughout this chapter: the
figuring of Third World authoritarianism beyond the monolithic, tyrannical
police state and its human rights abuses. In this regard, and echoing Kim’s
satire of developmentalist logic, State of War reveals the less spectacular but
more pervasive—perhaps even more “democratic”— violence effected for the
reproduction of another Cold War transpacific capitalism. In a strikingly satirical scene during Book One’s depiction of the festival, the town hall is temporarily converted into a conference center with a gathering of “businessmen,
industrialists, intellectuals from all regions of the country” who come to
debate national interests and development.232 One of Eliza’s mismatched government employees summarizes the state’s economic logic in flawless bureaucratese: “The strategic intervention of authoritarian democratic bureaucratism
. . . could hasten the trajectory of the critical path of implementation of development plans.”233 When a local resident points out the lack of available land,
complaining that “there’s barely enough space to bury a corpse,”234 the bureaucrat promptly offers a solution: “The roots of our quandary lie in the tradition
of encrypting remains horizontally. Astute re-education of our populace on
the desirability of vertical burial can be a major step toward resolution of the
problem.”235 What emerges as both authoritarian and ridiculous is the discourse of capitalist development as an unquestioned good.236
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Indeed, as we’ve seen with other regional leaders, Marcos strenuously
affirmed the link between development and authoritarian rule, even defining
development as a “weapon” in meeting “internal subversion—the main
threat.’”237 Like Indonesia and South Korea and other “Asian Tigers,” the Marcos economy was funded by huge flows of foreign investment and U.S. military loans. The country’s historically weak bureaucracy, its reliance on
agricultural exports, as well as Marcos’s channeling of profits to his patronage
network would, however, stymie its ability to grow on the model of the other
export-oriented Tigers. Turning on its head the usual cause and result relation, Robert Stauffer has argued that the implementation of such a “transnational accumulation strategy” in the Philippines effectively required an
authoritarian state.238 Indeed, one “New Society” slogan would be “For the
development of the Nation, discipline is necessary.”239 Explicitly enacted
under the logic of national progress, Marcos’s “New Society” poured money
into those shiny signifiers of modernization—“dams” and “hydroelectric stations,”240—even as workers and peasants became poorer. Rosca’s scenes of daring revolutionary resistance thus jockey with a canny satirical narrative mode
to present a fuller picture of the state and the way it authorizes itself through
both repression and the everyday discourse of development. She pokes fun at
the Commander’s men “who together and singly have decided to speak in
four-syllable words . . . so that a new troop of servants had to be created to tote
dictionaries.”241 In this way, the novel mocks bureaucratic developmentalism
in order to portray the diffuse forms of violence that occur in its name. State
of War goes beyond the depiction of the illiberal state apparatus overstepping its boundaries to figure the mutually enabling authorities of state and
capital.
Such a figuring of the state as an ongoing and uneven process of accumulation strategies is precisely the “state of war” that the novel depicts. As we’ve
seen, such entanglements are narrated via elements of the family saga, focusing on blood lines, racial mixing, inheritances, and progeny. In the final section of the novel, the revelry of the festival culminates in a bomb attack aimed
at the Commander’s entourage—“the Festival flung itself at the bus”242—inciting a brutal counterattack in which two of the three young protagonists are
casualties: Eliza is killed, and Adrian seriously wounded.243 Managing to
escape, Anna Villaverde alone retreats to a peaceful and remote village, where
she teaches the village children and listens to tape recordings of the rebel
leader, the aptly named Guevarra. In the last pages of the novel, she prepares
to give birth to her son, “the first of the Capuchin monks to be born innocent, without fate,”244 presumably conceived during the festival with Adrian
Banyaga. The narrative thus gestures to a future allegorized by Anna’s unborn
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baby, who will “be nurtured as much by her milk as by the archipelago’s legends.”245 Despite the cycle of atrocities the novel has narrated, State of War
concludes by offering a profound figure of a biological reproduction that has
the potential to disrupt political reproduction.
In Rosca’s telling, then, the authoritarian state is both genealogical—it
bears the imprint of colonial and kinship power structures—and generative,
that is, it is constantly reproduced anew in novel combinations of power. The
Marcos state is thus a “new configuration of both long-established rules and
recent innovations of practice.”246 And although certain characterizations conform to the binaries of ruthless state power (Mad Uncle Ed) and the committed hero of resistance (Anna Villaverde), in between these two extremes—and
taking up much more narrative space—are more typical and compromised
modes of agency. Echoing Pramoedya’s narrative logic, Rosca’s formal experimentation with temporality and historiography locates authoritarianism
firmly in the processes of reproduction of certain state and non-state authorities. The porous boundaries of the state precipitate uneven material, religious,
and genetic forms of authority. Via the historicizing and formalist reading it
demands, Rosca’s bifurcated novel demonstrates how the expropriative logic
of the colonial state is reformed and recomposed in the Cold War–decolonizing conjuncture. Most profoundly, the novel reveals how the state cannot be
narrated without reproduction—of biological life, of bureaucracy, and of capitalism—at its center. In opening up the question of writing the state from one
of self-evident “resistance” against an already constituted tyranny, the critical
task has shifted from identifying scenes of imprisonment, torture, or state surveillance to the ways in which reproduction, inheritance, and genealogy
become active sites of struggle.

Conclusion
The Cold War literary imagination has often used the monolithic construct
of the repressive communist or Third World state against which to figure free
speech, individual rights, and tutelary democracy as its antidotes. “Solzhenitsyn” was the easiest shorthand for this model of reading. For all three exemplary Cold War dissident writers examined in this chapter, the postcolonial
capitalist-developmental state demands a different representational logic,
moving us beyond the “two-person drama” of transcendent artist versus
police state. In a nonfiction piece, Ninotchka Rosca has written of the twin
justifications “constantly used by [the Philippine] government”: “economic
recovery and counterinsurgency. The two are both goal and process.”247
Indeed, State of War prompts a new reckoning of postcolonial autocracy by
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showing us the longue durée of these intertwined processes, and how they are
reproduced anew by different historical regimes. Through his scandalous satires, Kim’s poetry breaks open the way colonial rule is resuscitated and revived
by forced Cold War alliances; that is, while Korean sovereignty is indefinitely
deferred, a U.S.-and Japanese-brokered transpacific capitalism is massively
expanded. Pramoedya, meanwhile, deploys a tale of police surveillance not to
lionize the dissident figure it targeted, but to retrieve as many possible political
alternatives to Suharto’s regime as can be imagined. We are thus reminded
that authoritarianism is not the political antonym of the liberal capitalist
state (embodied, of course, in the U.S.), but is eminently capable of pulling
various kinds of authority—military, economic, religious, patriarchal—into its
service.248
My aim in such readings has been twofold. First is to better understand
how our reading practices around dissident literature and the state have been
forged, and subsequently congealed, by the long Cold War. Second, if we
“perceive the state less as art’s habitual antagonist—the sovereign that censors
and bans, imprisons and exiles,”249 my wager is that we can better make visible
the specific conditions and possibilities that obtain at the crossroads of decolonizing desires, Cold War securitization, and domestic dictatorship. Closer
comparative attention to such literary forms and genres may help us move
beyond the undifferentiated Cold War notion of a totalitarian state and its
“dissident literature,” as well as a postcolonial longing for pure resistance.
I now leave the cultural works and debates of the Cold War period proper
and turn, in the following three chapters, to the ways the period’s conflicts and
struggles remain embedded in our neoliberal, post–Cold War present. If “the
Cold War is the afterlife of colonialism,”250 what are the afterlives of Cold War
decolonization?
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Separate Futures
Other Times of Southeast Asian Decolonization

Decolonization, Separation, Time
In the previous two chapters, we saw how tensions over Asia-Pacific decolonization were inexorably entangled with Cold War bipolarities, precipitating
vexed debates during the 1960s and ’70s around the role of literature in relation
to freedom, revolution, authoritarianism, sovereignty, and solidarity. In moving to Part 2 of the book, we shift our attention to retrospective accounts of the
decolonizing–Cold War conjuncture produced between the late 1990s and
2017. In each of the next three chapters, I explore the way writers and filmmakers cast their eye back to authoritarian regimes of an earlier era in order to
critique sedimented—often triumphant—narratives of material progress, as
well as to work through the relationship of such pasts to our ostensibly post–
Cold War present.
There are various contexts and motivations for such a looking back. Authors
of an older generation such as Mohamed Latiff Mohamed (born 1950, examined in this chapter) and Hwang Sŏk-yŏng (born 1943, addressed in Chapter
4) witnessed decolonization and the violence of Cold War fracturing firsthand. While their accounts are often informed by their personal experiences,
they write with a backward interpretive glance that seeks to make sense of this
complex era after the official end of the Cold War. By contrast, a younger
generation of cultural producers, such as Singaporean novelist Jeremy Tiang,
came of age after the years of decolonization and are “looking back at the past
and questioning where we’ve come from, and maybe questioning the official
narrative.”1 Even though topics such as Singapore’s political repression and
use of indefinite detention have had prior representation, those were “often
103
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couched in the language of victimhood,” while there was little “investigation
of the systemic oppression [and] . . . how this might be a continuation of colonial oppression.”2 The works I examine by Tiang and Sonny Liew (in this
chapter), Tan Pin Pin, Joshua Oppenheimer, and Han Kang (in Chapters 4
and 5) constitute a retrospective accounting of “free world” authoritarianism
by this younger generation of post–Cold War artists.
Whereas writers’ conferences and dissident literature of a bipolarizing
world were the focus of the first two chapters, this chapter considers novels
loosely structured as Bildungsromane, or “novels of formation,” to probe one
of the major historical motifs of decolonization: separation. In postcolonial
studies, the bloody 1947 Partition which produced India and Pakistan is probably the best-known (and most studied) of these fractures, exemplifying the
contradictions inherent in the transition from multiethnic empires to post
colonial nation-states. Other divisions in Asia—especially North and South
Korea; North and South Vietnam; the PRC on the Mainland and KMT-held
Taiwan—would soon come to embody new kinds of contradictions, echoing
both the partitioned subcontinent and divided Germany. While a large number of studies (especially in Area Studies) have examined these more visible
geopolitical divisions, in this chapter I read three retrospective fictional narratives that look back at how the global Cold War intersected with decolonization in the case of the complex fracturing and suturing of Singapore and
Malaya/Malaysia.3 Beginning with Mohamed Latiff Mohamed’s 1997 fictionalized memoir centered on the Singaporean Malay community, Confrontation (Batas Langit, or The sky’s the limit, 1997), the chapter then examines
Jeremy Tiang’s State of Emergency (2017), which recounts the drama of decolonization through a multigenerational family story against the background of
the Malayan Emergency. Finally, I turn to Sonny Liew’s graphic novel The Art
of Charlie Chan Hock Chye (2016), a metafictional critique of Singapore’s
transformation from colonial port city to gleaming “first world oasis.”
The chapter is primarily interested in how Mohamed Latiff’s, Tiang’s, and
Liew’s novels reveal decolonization, as it unfolded under the emerging pressures of the Cold War, to be less a neutral historical marker of territorial separation and more a complex spatial and temporal opening. My thinking is
influenced by Gary Wilder’s exploration of the conjoined “problem of freedom and the politics of time” in his study of anti-colonial thought and the end
of the French empire. In his book Freedom Time, Wilder argues against the
typical “understanding of time as a neutral medium within which history
takes place” and instead treats it as a “productive historical force of its own.”4
In her theorization of political transformation, which Wilder draws on, Hannah Arendt has stressed the “hiatus . . . between liberation from the old order
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and the new freedom . . . between a no-more and a not-yet.”5 Bhakti Shringarpure has also forwarded a careful rethinking of time and Cold War decolonization in her book Cold War Assemblages. There she argues for the “triple
bind of time” that formerly colonized populations face: first, the “pre-historic,
anterior” time of colonial rule; then the “urgent, emergent” time of decolonization; and finally the Cold War’s “temporal ruptures, meant to stymie the
birth of independent nations.”6
I suggest that the three texts examined in this chapter open up this time of
the “no-more,” the “not-yet,” and the “triple bind” to critical scrutiny. Together,
they recover a range of anticipated, liberatory futures—Malay, communist,
and liberal—that would soon be overshadowed by Singapore’s capitalist
authoritarian path under the People’s Action Party (PAP). The texts are of
interest precisely because of their sustained backward glances from after the
apparent conclusion of the Cold War, aesthetic gazes that reappraise and
reinspect those multiple times of decolonization that have been disavowed in
the nation’s march to progress. Rather than present decolonization as merely
the “exit narrative” of the colonizer,7 these works address the time between the
“no-longer” of colonization and the “not-yet” of independence. Such time is
enlarged, stretched out, and held open to alternative significance. I read Confrontation, State of Emergency, and Charlie Chan as offering accounts of
decolonization as a multilayered struggle over the terms of separation and the
possible futures thereby made possible or impossible. Narratives of postcolonial separation and independence thus offer revised accounts of postcolonial
state-formation not simply by critiquing the afterlives of colonial epistemes,
but as processes in which once-imaginable futures were actively fought for
against bipolar realignment and reincorporation.
To be sure, these are very different novels. They emerge from a complex
milieu of multilingual and multigeneric cultural production, and are certainly not the first representations of the trials of Singapore’s and Malaya’s
decolonization.8 Mohamed Latiff Mohamed, born in 1950 and educated in
Singapore, is one of the country’s most established and respected Malay-
language poets, novelists, and educators. A three-time winner of the Singapore Literature Prize (for poetry and short fiction), he has actively promoted
Malay literature and culture during his long career. In addition to numerous
works of poetry, he is the author of other works centered on the Malay experience in Singapore, including The Widower (Ziarah Cinta, 1998), and the short
story collection Lost Nostalgia (Nostalgia yang hilang, 2004). Our two other
authors, also winners of the prestigious Singapore Literature Prize, are Anglophone authors and of a younger generation, as mentioned above. Prior to his
debut novel State of Emergency of 2017, Jeremy Tiang, born in 1977 and of

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 105

5/18/21 3:13 PM

106

GENRES OF COLD WAR RECKONING, 1997–2017

mixed Chinese and Sri Lankan background, published short fiction and
worked extensively as a translator of Chinese literature, translating novels by
Wong Yoon Wah, Zhang Yueran, Yeng Pway Ngon, and Su Wei-chen. Sonny
Liew, born in 1974, grew up in Malaysia, studied in Singapore, the UK, and
in the U.S., and (like Tiang) had Singapore government arts funding for The
Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye withdrawn due to its sensitive political content. The graphic novel went on to win the Singapore Literature Prize in 2016
as well as several Eisner Awards. Despite their differences, I argue that all
three texts uproot sedimented historical narratives by exploring the dialectics
of separation that attend liberation. At the literary level, they do this by foregrounding the conjuncture of youth, decolonization, and futurity. By offering
greater complexity both to the Bildungsroman narrative form and to post
colonial renderings of the dependent/independent nation, these texts figure
the temporal stakes of bipolar decolonization and show how the latter reactivates colonial “genres of rule.”9 In this chapter, therefore, I continue to think
about how the Cold War was not just an ideological standoff between superpowers but a (Third) world-making project, and to consider literature’s role in
complicating existing representations of such worldings.

Nusantara, or Wholeness
In one of the most memorable scenes of Mohamed Latiff’s Confrontation,
members of a Malay political party meet to discuss strategies for the upcoming
General Elections of 1959, which would allow Singapore its own elected parliament for the first time (ahead of formal independence with the merger with
Malaysia in 1963). The party leader, Pak Ariff, expresses his vision of an
expanded Malay state that would supersede the humiliating fragmentation of
the colonial era and find its rightful place at the UN:
We want a bigger state for the entire Malay archipelago, the Nusantara. We have been divided for too long, chopped to pieces. We have
been slashed off like a tree branch. We want to join our biological siblings again. We oppose the separation imposed on us by the colonisers.
We want the Nusantara flag to flutter all over the world. We want our
language, the language that is spoken by hundreds of millions of
people, to be recognised and respected, to be spoken at the UN. That
is our manifesto.10
Using the traditional Malay word for the archipelago, Nusantara, Pak Ariff
expresses his desires through the metaphor of a tree that has been unnaturally
severed. The choice of figure confirms Pheng Cheah’s observations on the
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way postcolonial national imaginaries frequently assume an organicized concept of culture (the “tree branch”) as that which can best overcome individual
finitude and project society into the future.11 Separation and unification are
thus dialectical terms at decolonization. If independence is typically sought
through the detachment or separation from the colonizers—the very process
that transforms the colony into a sovereign nation—it is simultaneously conceived as a suturing force that will make the hitherto fragmented colonized
polity whole once more. On closer inspection, this suturing has two dimensions: that of territorial/ethnic restoration after the departure of the colonizers,
and that of the organic realignment between a people and a state.
In terms of the first, we can bear in mind that for most of the colonial
period Singapore and Malaya were administered by the British through a variety of legal and territorial entities—Singapore as part of the Straits Settlements, along with Malacca, Penang, and Dindings—and the rest of Malaya
though the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch
treaty ensured the enduring formation of two separate colonial states: British
Malaya and the Dutch Indies. Large-scale immigration from China and the
Indian subcontinent, encouraged by the British, resulted in a multiethnic
colonial landscape. As in other former colonial territories, the resulting complexities and lack of ethnic-territorial isomorphism were legacies left for the
postcolonial state to resolve. Timothy Brennan has argued for a constitutive
asymmetry between modern European nationalisms and those of the post
colonial world: “If European nationalism was a project of unity on the basis of
conquest and economic expediency, insurgent or popular nationalism [of the
Third World] . . . is for the most part a project of consolidation following an
act of separation from Europe. It is a task of reclaiming community from within
boundaries defined by the very power whose presence denied community.”12
In terms of the second dimension—the suturing of the gap between the state
and the people—Odd Arne Westad has noted that
the colonial state was always the representative of the imperial center
and of the colonists, never of any indigenous group, however collaborationist such a group may be. As such, the state therefore emerges as
something extraneous to indigenous peoples, even at the elite level.
The “foreignness” of the state led to a constant need for policing at
all levels.13
These observations underscore the contradictory pushes and pulls of decolonization; at once an “act of separation” from Europe, it is also a process that
must reconcile and enfranchise divided multiethnic polities within the new
boundaries of the nation-state. Put otherwise, decolonization is tasked with
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indigenizing the state and reconciling it to its hitherto alienated citizens. We
must also recall how crucial separation was to the everyday governance of the
colony, especially the division of racial and ethnic groups through labor.
Under British colonial rule, Singapore and Malaya were governed as “racialized populations [who] were given cultural autonomy in religious and customary spheres, were assigned to different occupational roles and social spaces,
and were encouraged to meet only in the market place.”14 In Singapore, “the
lowest colonial jobs, such as postmen and rank and file policemen, went to
some Malays.”15 On the peninsula, where the Chinese had long been merchants and traders, Chinese and Indian laborers worked as rubber tappers and
miners in the lucrative imperial industries of rubber and tin mining, especially in the Kinta Valley; Malays, largely in kampungs, were entitled to some
protected land on reservations and low-level government jobs.16 The backward
glance of Confrontation, I suggest, demonstrates how these dialectics of separation, reconciliation, and wholeness are profoundly complicated by the shift
from a colonial to a bipolar power structure. Its portrayal of decolonization is
one that crosshatches anti-imperial and bipolar struggles waged over territories, ethnic communities, ideologies, and—most importantly—futures.
But what would these futures look like? By the late 1950s and early ’60s, and
with a rising sense of the worldwide inevitability of decolonization, most
believed that Singapore’s and Malaya’s independent futures would be closely
tied. It is to this uncertain moment of separation and incorporation that
Mohamed Latiff’s Confrontation firmly returns us. A fictionalized memoir of
childhood, the novel presents a social landscape undergoing radical transformation, elements of which are beyond the young protagonist’s understanding
but all too clear for the reader. Told through the naïve eyes of young Adi,
Confrontation opens with an unflinching account of the hardships and personal tragedies that fill his working-class neighborhood of Kampung Pak
Buyung in the 1950s at the end of British colonial rule. In assessing Mohamed
Latiff’s poignant rendering of this crucial moment in Singapore’s history,
Angelia Poon Mui Cheng has read the novel as offering contemporary readers
“the fleeting glimpse of a different future in which Malays in Singapore would
have been part of a majority in a larger country rather than a minority in a
small nation-state.”17 Confrontation may be therefore read as a critical reflection on nationalist historiography and the contingent means by which majorities and minorities were decided.
Another way to read the novel’s attention to localized violence and social
decay is to understand it less as a childhood memoir of an authentic ethnic
community—indeed Kampung Pak Buyung is ethnically mixed—than as an
indictment of the colonial state, which is more or less absent for Adi and his
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neighbors. While Adi finds comfort climbing the old banyan tree at the village
center, he and his community are continually beset by poverty and social dysfunction: alcoholism, opium addiction, gang violence, unwanted pregnancies,
child abuse, incest, and madness. The state, indeed, is only present when
police and ambulances arrive to arrest people or clean up the bodies after
gang violence or murder. In other words, the novel quietly depicts the state’s
absence in any terms other than its disciplinary mode; local authorities provide little or no basic infrastructure, housing, health care, or personal security.
In Gramscian terms, it may be understood as a version of the “night watchman” state, “whose functions are limited to the safeguarding of public order
and respect for the laws.”18 The latter is usually thought of in opposition to
Hegel’s notion of the “ethical state,” the “autonomous, educative and moral
activity of the secular state.”19 Rather than a presentation of Malay culture as
a discrete community undergoing the vicissitudes of decolonization, at stake
in Confrontation is the portrayal of the minimalist colonial state and the
alternative futures it incites. That is, the emphasis on poverty and social dysfunction instructs us on how to read the contrasting vectors of the novel: Adi’s
gradual political awakening and the contours of a possible decolonized Malay
state imagined against both colonial rule and the escalating pressures of the
Cold War.
In the social world of the novel, the project of reclaiming independence is
largely articulated by Abang Dolah, Adi’s politically active, educated neighbor
and friend who refuses to work for the colonial state but teaches the Quran,
plays music, and is a bomoh (witch doctor) on the side. Abang Dolah pins his
hopes on a pro-Malay political party in the coming general elections, and it is
through his hopes for decolonization that the growing tensions of the time
are focalized. As we saw in the scene of the Malay political party, for Abang
Dolah, Adi, and other Malays, the future postcolonial state is imagined as
much more than the formal achievement of independence. The creation of
an unalienated state based on territorial recovery is also the concrete means
by which to redeem the specific social injustices experienced under negligent
colonial rule. The political discussions incorporated into the novel disclose
how anti-colonialism was expressed in collective desires for a state no longer
“extraneous to” the people, as Westad puts it, but organically connected to
them. For Malays especially, a recuperated Nusantara is what will restore the
ethno-territorial wholeness destroyed by the colonizers. It is therefore not
insignificant that a central pillar of Abang Dolah’s resistance to the colonial
state is his refusal to work for it despite his education level, as his autonomy
over his labor marks him as relatively less alienated by colonial society. The
obvious comparison is with Adi’s own father, who embodies all the tragedies
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of colonial life: He works for a colonial shipyard painting boats but ensures the
continued poverty of his family by gambling away most of his income. When
he is rendered unable to work due to diabetes, his family is too poor to afford
medical care and can only look on as he slowly dies. Abang Dolah, therefore,
seems to be the one who is poised to lead Adi into a liberated, redeemed postcolonial future.
Adi’s political interest, nurtured by Abang Dolah and Singapore’s expected
merger with Malaya (the latter which had gained independence in 1957), is
awakened in part by the prospect of a new Malay-language secondary school
in which he may move beyond the usual expectation of a seventh-grade education. Attending the school, his world opens as he reads Malay and Indonesian writers for the first time. As Siti Nuraishah Ahmad notes, “Adi’s star rises
with that of Malaysia—he is among the first batch of students to attend a
Malay-medium secondary school, learning Malay language and literature,
English, mathematics and science instead of the colonially-prescribed gardening and basket-weaving of the recent past.”20 Adi’s expanded educational
opportunities directly parallel the expanded horizons of greater postcolonial
Malaysia. David Lloyd and Paul Thomas have noted the privileged role of the
classroom for the reconciliation of culture and state, where “the teacher prefigures the role of the state as ultimate representative of ethical subjectivity.”21
Adi’s new Malay-language high school exemplifies this function and constitutes the novel’s clearest expression of a utopian, redemptive future as it will
be actualized through a reconstituted Nusantara state. Where before he was,
at best, indifferent to school, he now thrives in his new literature class and
spends his spare time reading classics of Malay and Indonesian literature.
Abang Dolah remarks, “How lucky for you Adi, to live in the Malaysian era.”22
Adi’s expectations rise accordingly:
Adi had heard that Singapore would become the “New York of
Malaysia.” It was planned that a national mosque would be erected
at the Padang as a symbol of Islam and a united Malaysia. Adi was
delighted. The grandest mosque ever built. It was all like a dream. He
felt very fortunate, and as though he was in the midst of a great carnival. New campaigns and events such as “Malay Language Week” and
“Malay Language Month” turned out to be fascinating. From trishaw
pedallers to ministers, everyone raced to learn the language.23
Not only will Adi’s future take place in a realignment of culture and state, but
he imagines a remarkably syncretic future: A modern, cosmopolitan, Malay-
speaking, Islamic Singapore will center a “united Malaysia.” While less than
the full recovery of Nusantara, the hitherto foreign colonial state is now the
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site of an ethical restoration of Malay wholeness, where linguistic and Islamic
pride conjugates with capitalist modernity (“the New York of Malaysia”).
Importantly, while a restored ethno-nationalism is here overlaid with a gleaming urban modernity, it is not the only political imaginary the novel alludes to.
At the Malay political party meeting already mentioned, Pak Ariff, a representative of a leftist party, refuses the suggestions of an alliance with another party
in part because “we want the working class to hold power; we want to distribute
wealth equally. . . . They, on the other hand, worship capitalists.”24 He specifically blames the Malay feudal class for colluding with the British and selling
out their brethren. What we see in these contestations is the range of competing, possible paths by which the postcolony will overcome the “foreignness” of
the state via an imagined “ethical state.” These various nations or states “of
intent” include socialist desires for a restructuring of the colonial economy,
territorial unification across the archipelago, participation in global governance and the UN, and expressions of Malay and Islamic nationalism.25
We may further scrutinize the question of a redemptive, decolonized state
through the coming-of-age form, or Bildungsroman, of Mohamed Latiff’s
novel. In Franco Moretti’s classic study of the European Bildungsroman, there
are several salient aspects of the genre he calls the “ ‘symbolic form’ of modernity.”26 If, for Moretti, the European Bildungsroman arises because of the
“hitherto unknown mobility” of subjects brought about by the “destabilizing
forces of capitalism”27 on traditional life forms, it would seem that the reorganization of societies at decolonization renders this genre more appropriate.28
The genre’s well-known “conflict between the ideal of self-determination and
the equally imperious demands of socialization”29 may take on an unavoidable
geopolitical dimension of national allegory à la Jameson’s famous essay: The
trials of youthful protagonists stand in for nationalist struggles in tension with
the demands of postwar global restructuring.30 Or, more straightforwardly, the
genre centers “postcolonial adolescents [who] occupy a new role not only as
disillusioned rebels but also as embryonic citizens insisting on a [social] voice
and a presence.”31 Most salient for my reading of Confrontation is the question of future reconciliation within the state. Interestingly, Moretti claims
that the European version of the genre is particularly hostile or indifferent
to questions of the state:32 “The state,” he explains, “embodies a ‘mechanical’
and ‘abstract’ form of social cohesion, intrinsically remote and foreign to the
countless articulations of everyday life: this is why its exercise of power appears
of necessity to be an outside coercion, a force inclined by its very nature to be
arbitrary, violent.”33
Moretti goes on to discuss the way (European) civil society possesses
another kind of authority that “merges with everyday activities and relationships,
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exercising itself in ways that are natural and unnoticeable.”34 In other words,
when the ethical state is doing its job correctly, the very boundary through
which civil society articulates with it—and does some of its work—is unnoticeable. Conversely, we might argue that it is precisely the original lack of isomorphism between civil society and the colonial state that allows decolonizing
imaginaries to question and experiment with the very boundary separating
them.35 Thus, the future Malay state imagined in Confrontation is a contested
but potentially emancipatory force. Its founding involves the redrawing of
state territory, as well as the state’s own boundaries vis-à-vis society through the
reorganization of the colonial economy, the re-centering of religion and
Malay culture (“Malay Language Week”), and the overturning of colonial
education policies. I argue that in the postcolonial Bildungsroman, contra
Moretti, the protagonist’s growth involves reimagining the state-society
boundary itself as part of the movement from alienation to liberation.36 As a
consequence, in Confrontation, the state and its vicissitudes are the central
organizers of plot and character development: The characters’ fortunes literally rise and fall with the fate of the merger of the two former colonies. As we
saw in Chapter 2, the postcolonial state is both “us” and “not us”; it is the foreign prosthesis and a potentially redeemable site of reconciliation. In emphasizing this ambiguity, the novel reveals the way the upheavals of bipolar
decolonization prolong the “night watchman” function of the state as it
responds to the Malayan Emergency and Indonesia’s Konfrontasi (or low-level
war) with anti-communist surveillance and repression.
Despite being a Malay nationalist and complaining of “wicked” communist instigators,37 Abang Dolah is arrested during a purge of leftists, which we
can assume to be Operation Cold Store of 1963, a crackdown Chua Beng Huat
has called “the darkest episode in the history of Singapore’s road to independence.”38 Abang Dolah is detained by the government’s Special Forces, who
repurposed the notorious colonial-era Internal Security Act (ISA) to allow for
indefinite detention for suspected communists and radical nationalists. After
being held without trial for months, he is forced to postpone his wedding with
longtime partner Kak Habsah; when released, he is weakened, disillusioned,
and newly religious. As Abang Dolah’s health deteriorates due to cancer, the
narrative follows a parallel trajectory in which the merger with Malaysia falls
apart, Indonesia launches its Konfrontasi against the new state (perceived by
Sukarno as a Western neocolonial construct), and race riots and instability
result in the eventual separation of Singapore from the Union in 1965. Adi’s
world has already come tumbling down following the race riots of 1964, forcing him, his mother, and young adopted sister to move out of multiethnic
Kampung Pak Buyung into an ethnically homogenous Malay neighborhood.
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The shrinking of his world into a sterile block of concrete barrack houses
echoes the population management tactics of New Villages (to be discussed
shortly), as well as indexes the larger, geopolitical shrinkage that Singaporean
Malays experienced. Fittingly, Abang Dolah dies along with the dream of a
unified Malaysia.
The complex political turmoil of Singapore’s and Malaya’s decolonization—the Emergency, merger, anti-left purges, race riots, Konfrontasi, separation—are narrated partially and with great confusion by the young Adi. Even
the usually politically savvy Abang Dolah finds it inexplicable that his anti-
colonial hero Sukarno and their Indonesian “siblings”39 would attack Malaysia, and no reason for his own arrest and detention is ever determined, although
we might surmise that his refusal to work renders him suspicious. But it is not,
I contend, merely the limited communal tragedy or the misapplication of the
ISA that is at stake. More important, the novel discloses the emergence of a
political rationality based on the postcolonial state’s pragmatic survival, rather
than its radical transformation, in this new geopolitical matrix. For Singapore’s PAP government, led for three decades by Lee Kuan Yew, the anti-
communist purges would be equated to a “ ‘life and death’ struggle for the
survival of the nascent island-nation.”40 In its view, the risk of a socialist
future—or any future which did not see the nation-state as the articulation
point with the global economic order—was no future at all. Abang Dolah’s
political desires and Adi’s bright future in a recovered, unalienated lifeworld
are all but foreclosed.
The result is that the continued “foreignness” of the colonial state is
reproduced not only in terms of ethnic identity—the city-state will now be
majority Chinese—but in terms of the state’s very relationship to its citizens:
Other social futures of Singapore are written out, whether communist or
not, in the PAP’s single-minded attempt to defend the nation’s economic
viability in a hostile region. Accordingly, by the end of the novel Adi’s only
option is to resume his place at the bottom of the racial division of labor.
Confrontation’s postcolonial Bildungsroman thus implies that there were not
just communal winners and losers in the outcome of decolonization: the
Chinese majority versus the Malay minority, or vice versa. It brings to light
how the colonial state’s disciplinary, or night watchman, functions are not
overcome but deliberately reactivated by the postcolonial state to foreclose
the possibility of alternative futures. As pragmatic state-led capitalist development emerges as the only way to inoculate Singapore against ethnic tensions and the regional communist threat, the state’s priorities will be to
control trade unions, mobilize bodies productively, and facilitate profitable
transnational investments.41
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At one level, we might read the novel’s melancholy resolution as indicative
of the durability of imperial governance. In Ann Laura Stoler’s account,
“degrees of imperial sovereignty”42 are those in which “colonial infrastructure
and arrangement, be they legal, pedagogic, military or territorial, have continued to exert their force”43 beyond the moment of the colonizers’ departure. But
these infrastructures continue to “exert their force” not merely through the
powerful half-life of European colonial modernity, but via their reworking in
terms of a “particular power structure of domination invented and realized
along the bipolarization of modernity.”44 This structure bears down with special intensity to control the temporal openings of decolonization. At the narrative level, such an arrangement confirms—albeit via a different political
genealogy—a more fundamental paradox that Moretti notices of the Bildungsroman form: “the disturbing symbiosis of homeland and prison.”45 In the following analysis of Tiang’s State of Emergency, we will see how separation and
detention become the state’s twin weapons of temporality. In the process, the
formerly foreign, prosthetic state is reproduced anew.

Arrested Futures of the Ma Gong
Whereas Confrontation provided us with a window in which a restored,
redeemed Malay world could briefly be imagined, Jeremy Tiang’s State of
Emergency weaves together a story of different anticipations that attended the
same historical transformation. Its emphasis is not those once-possible Malay
futures in Singapore, but foreclosed leftist ones, specifically those of the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), known colloquially as the Ma Gong. To
be sure, the geopolitical shifts and contexts that led to the repression of the Ma
Gong were complex and many. Briefly, the end of the Pacific War and the
departure of the Japanese from Southeast Asia saw the prompt return of the
British to Malaya, the French to Indochina, and the Dutch to Indonesia, all
intent on a second colonial conquest. The MCP’s armed wing, the Malayan
National Liberation Army (MNLA), was a guerrilla force born as the Malayan
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and supported during the war by the
British; it now turned its efforts on the returning British to fight for independence. The British, who had limited negotiations on the postwar restructuring
of Malaya to Malays only, “alienated the non-Malays and effectively drove
them toward supporting the cause of the leftist anti-colonial movement.”46
Meanwhile, the revenues from Malayan tin and rubber had gained in importance as the British lost other colonial resources in India and Burma. Tensions
over reviving the colonial economy while preventing the spread of communism further intensified when British planters tried to remove wartime
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squatters to reinstate rubber crops. Such acts increased hardships while adding
fuel to the emerging tensions between Kuomintang-backed triads, or organized gangs, and Mao-inspired communists in the region, following Mao’s
1949 victory and the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan. These tensions would erupt in
the armed communist insurgency that the British termed the Malayan Emergency (1948–60).47 An attempted colonial reprisal turned anti-communist
repression, the Emergency both sped up and slowed down decolonization.
Even though the British were forced to abandon their fantasy of a long-term
reconquest after their return in 1945, the Emergency delayed their own departure as “Britain would not leave Malaya until the insurrection was defeated.”48
One of the long-term effects of the Emergency was the production of a lingering anti-leftist episteme.49 Anti-communism would become the entry price for
postcolonial elites who wanted to remain within the sphere of Western security and markets, while the struggles of the Ma Gong, some of whom were still
fighting in the jungle as late as 1989, have largely been forgotten.
It is perhaps not surprising that the Ma Gong’s controversial role at decolonization has been repeatedly sidelined by official nationalist histories in
Singapore and Malaysia. As Theophilus Kwek has noted of State of Emergency, “the author’s task is to re-imagine and re-instate those whose lives have
been erased from public memory.”50 Consisting of six chapters, each narrated
by a different member of an extended family, Tiang’s novel spans the years
from 1948 and the beginning of the Malayan Emergency, through 1955 and
Singapore’s Hock Lee Bus Drivers’ Strike, the merger of the two countries in
1963, separation in 1965, independence, Operation Spectrum in 1987, to
around 2015. The different chapters function as something of a jigsaw puzzle
at the levels of both character and politics. While connected in the larger
tapestry of historical events, a number of family members are lost or separated from each other, and vast periods of time are omitted from the narrative. Likewise, the development of the postcolonial state—the focus is
Singapore, not Malaysia—is narrated through selected historical moments
rather than in a linear fashion.
A brief overview of the chapters is warranted. In the first, “Jason,” narrated
analeptically by the elderly Jason Low from around 2015, we learn of a life
marked by the early loss of his sister Mollie to the random violence of Konfrontasi, and his wife Siew Li, to the Ma Gong. Siew Li, who had already been
detained as a teenager by the British in the 1950s, is forced to flee Singapore
and the PAP mop-up of leftists following 1963’s Operation Cold Store; she
reluctantly leaves behind the young couple’s baby twins, Janet and Henry. In
her own chapter which follows Jason’s, we witness Siew Li’s emerging socialist
consciousness as a girl in a Chinese middle school; the chapter follows her life
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until the moment she is warned of her impending arrest and escapes to Malaysia. She will later end up in the jungle near the Thai border with the guerrilla
Ma Gong forces. In the next chapter, “Nam Teck,” a youth of the same generation as Jason and Siew Li, grows up in a New Village in Malaya, loses his
father to counterinsurgency violence, and eventually also “goes inside” to join
the underground communist movement in the 1960s. “Revathi” jumps ahead
to 1970 and is told through the lens of a Malayan-born journalist who breaks
the story of the 1948 Batang Kali massacre in the British press. Revathi’s narrative retrospectively gives details to the harrowing story of Nam Teck’s family
and the hardships brought by the Emergency. “Stella,” meanwhile, is focalized through Mollie’s daughter (and Henry and Janet’s cousin) and is set in
Singapore in 1987 against the backdrop of the supposed “Marxist Conspiracy.” This chapter tells of the months of detention and interrogations the
young schoolteacher undergoes as part of the state’s attempt to flush out leftist
conspirators it believes are attempting to overthrow the state. Finally, “Henry”
narrates the return of Jason’s middle-aged son who has lived his adult life in
the UK. Journeying back to Singapore to attend his father’s funeral, he
decides to retrace the life (and death) of his mother, Siew Li, among the Ma
Gong. He eventually reaches the border area between southern Thailand
and Malaysia and meets her aging partner Nam Teck, and a previously
unknown half-sister.51 With extraordinary precision and economy, Tiang uses
this limited cast to sketch a fragmented, but powerful, portrait of leftist and
anti-leftist energies during Singapore’s and Malaysia’s untidy decolonization.
More so than Mohamed Latiff, Tiang also presents the years of Emergency,
independence, merger, and separation as a necessarily transnational and
multiply intercepted story. It includes intrusions, separations, and attachments that cut across the mixed ethnic populations of Singapore and Malay(si)
a, as well as Indonesia, Thailand, the UK, and the Philippines. If State of
Emergency is structured as a jigsaw puzzle, it is a sprawling and compelling
one.
Although formally not a Bildungsroman, the three chapters I shall focus on
here—“Siew Li,” “Nam Teck,” and “Stella”—arguably take the form of mini
coming-of-age stories. Like Confrontation’s Adi, the characters in these narratives refract the historical problem of decolonization through the prism of
youth, but their stories examine questions of geopolitical transformation
through communist futures rather than Malay ones. Siew Li, to begin with, is
a schoolgirl in Singapore when she first hears a speech by Lim Chin Siong,
“so stirring and strong.”52 Lim is the charismatic young labor leader who will
eventually lead the breakaway party Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) after the
PAP’s purge of leftists.
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Now she was listening for it, she could hear there was also something
in the air, the possibility that this was a crucible, and everything the
nation could become was here in this moment. Lina was right. War
had levelled everything, and here was a chance to blaze through the
world and make it fair again.53
Siew Li’s sense of anticipation and temporal acceleration is overpowering: The
struggles of World War II have sped up the time of decolonization and opened
up “everything the nation could become.” Shortly after, while detained by the
British (“the state of emergency justified anything”),54 she ponders fellow
detainee and student leader Lay Kuan: “So many ways to be a person, thought
Siew Li. She felt unformed, as if she could be any shape at all.”55 By the time
of the merger with Malaysia in 1963, Siew Li is a mother and married to Jason,
a straitlaced, English-educated civil servant; she works first for a union and
then for Lay Kuan, who is now a Barisan Sosialis candidate up for election to
the Legislative Assembly.56 But entering the union with Malaysia exacerbates
the tensions between the PAP and the pro-British Malay leader, the Tunku
Abdul Rahman, bringing accusations that the Barisan is a subversive, anti-
national force.
The election took place five days after merger, their first as part of
another country. The night before, the main party warned that Malaysia would send in troops and renew the state of emergency if Barisan
were to win. This was scarily plausible—Emergency had only ended
three years previously, why wouldn’t it start again? They also claimed,
spuriously, that every vote for Barisan was a vote for Sukarno, that Barisan was conspiring with the Indonesians to bring Singapore down
through Konfrontasi. Perhaps that’s why people voted the way they did,
out of fear. Lay Kuan thought so. She won her seat, as did a dozen others from Barisan. Not enough to claim power, but something.57
Siew Li tries to remain optimistic after Lay Kuan wins a place in the assembly:
“Could the system be changed from within, after all? The leftists could no
longer be ignored. This would be a new era, she was sure of it.”58 The just-
opening future, however, is rudely cut short as three weeks later Siew Li and
other leftists are forced to flee to avoid arrest and indefinite detention. The
left and its visions of a remade world are effectively removed from Singapore’s future, precipitating new separations; Siew Li never returns to see her
family again. As her friend Lina puts it years later in an interview with journalist Revathi, “What kind of government would separate a mother from her
children?”59
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Nam Teck is the other character who envisions a new future via communism. In both “Siew Li” and “Nam Teck,” Tiang provides us with rich and
sympathetic portrayals of everyday men and women who joined the Malayan
communists, a representation that echoes Han Suyin’s classic And the Rain
My Drink (1956).60 But reversing the chronology of communism and detention
in Siew Li’s narrative, Nam Teck has already spent most of his youth in confinement. He grows up in Seminyih, one of the so-called New Villages that
were created as part of the British counterinsurgency strategy during the
Malayan Emergency. Nam Teck’s father, as will be fully revealed in Revathi’s
chapter, is one of approximately twenty-five plantation laborers who is shot
dead in a mass killing at the beginning of the Emergency in 1948. The bloodbath at Batang Kali arises when the British suspect the villagers of sneaking
supplies to the Ma Gong; the men are killed, the village razed, and the women
and children dumped at the next village. Nam Teck’s childlike narrative
echoes Adi’s incomprehension of the larger geopolitical events that buffet his
family’s life: “When they were alone, Auntie Poh told him Baba was dead, shot
by bad people, the government men who always made trouble.”61 A few years
later, the British come and tell them they must again move villages.
In the meantime, the bad men put up a fence around the new village,
then another one farther away. These were made of barbed wire, two
and a half metres high, topped with three-cornered spikes. There was
only one entrance, and anyone going in and out was searched. His
mother was no longer allowed to bring any food with her when she
went out to work, in case she gave it to the people in the jungle. She
was often pale with hunger when she came back from the plantation.62
These resettlement camps—literal concentration camps—have previously been
rendered into powerful poetic form by Wong Yoon Wah in his bilingual 2012
collection The New Village. Wong, who grew up in a New Village, describes the
daily surveillance of the villages and the way village men were often forced to
work with police, as this stanza from “Inspection Post of the Concentration
Camp” reveals:
since “Operation Starvation”
my papa and the policemen
jointly guard the New Village exits
with rifles and carbines they stop
each grain of rice from slipping out
making sure that within a year
all forest shadows shall starve to death63
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As in Wong’s poems, the Ma Gong of Nam Teck’s childhood are spectral presences at the edge of plantations and forests, who brought fear to the peasants
and plantation workers. Nam Teck’s mother tells him later, after he has grown
up and moved to Kuala Lumpur, “If you were tapping rubber, and a man
came up to you and said, Bring me rice tomorrow—well, then, you found a way,
or you were dead.”64 And yet in his aunt’s narrative, it is the British who are the
“bad men.” While the ruthlessness of the Ma Gong has been sedimented into
British, Singaporean, and Malaysian national histories of the Emergency—
and the movement was certainly not without its excesses—Tiang uncovers the
broader conditions of violence that resulted from both the insurgency and its
suppression. Significant here is the way the British counterinsurgency mobilized a specific infrastructure of space and time—the segregation of the New
Villages and the waiting game of “Operation Starvation”—to combat the communist threat.
In their account of the Malayan Emergency, historians Christopher Bayly
and Tim Harper describe the New Village program, which largely took place
during the years 1950–52 under direction of General Harold Briggs and High
Commissioner Gerald Templar. A “key component” of British counterinsurgency strategy, it involved the removal and resettlement of approximately one
million mostly Chinese workers and peasants—since most of the Ma Gong
were ethnically Chinese, other racial groups were less targeted—and constituted a reign of counter-terror by the British security forces. These often poorly
trained forces, drawing on manpower from across the crumbling Empire,
retaliated against communist attacks by razing entire villages and often mistook “couriers, helpers and bystanders, villagers, students and . . . young
women” for communist “bandits.”65 Complementing the New Villages was
the extraordinarily high rate of detention of suspected communists. Fiona Lee
has further shown how an Orientalist discourse was repurposed for “the
Emergency’s bipolar logic of war”: “The containment of the ‘red threat’ ”—
now figured as a racial problem—is therefore “a means of integrating the Chinese into the emergent postcolonial nation.”66 What Heonik Kwon has called
the “bipolarization of modernity,” in this rendering, might best be understood
as a hermeneutic which allows the state to “sort” the population in ways most
advantageous to the reproduction of capitalist futures. Nevertheless, the
unqualified “success” of the British in putting down the insurgency has rarely
been questioned, and the New Village strategy would soon be taken up in
another decolonizing-turned-Cold War conflict and renamed “strategic hamlets” by the U.S. in Vietnam.67
In retrospect, we can see how British counterinsurgency tactics construct
a multilayered racial and spatiotemporal infrastructure that bridges colonial
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and bipolar modes of governance. That is, the New Village program had the
effect of re-spatializing and re-racializing colonial settlement and labor patterns in order to preserve colonial-capitalist social relations over all others.
That rural Chinese were made further economically vulnerable by separating
them from their previous means of subsistence has been an overlooked component of this process. We can here recall the importance of the Marxist
notion of the separation of workers from the means of production as the central logic of primitive accumulation. Famously, “the capitalist relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the
conditions of the realization of their labour,”68 resulting in the double bind of
“free workers” who are “free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.”69 Such a separation is violently enforced on the Malayan
rubber tappers and prefigures the effect of the 1965–66 anti-communist massacres in Indonesia, which have been described as “one specific, epochal
moment in the history of capitalism.”70 As we’ll see in more detail in Chapter
5, widespread violence there not only killed hundreds of thousands of suspected communists (and also targeted the ethnic Chinese minority), but
“destroyed the economic livelihood of millions of families” and provided the
“freedom for capital to implement work schemes that disadvantage workers.”71
The strict policing of New Villages can be viewed, similarly, as the weaponization of space and time with the goal of eliminating non-capitalist post
colonial futures. Moreover, “What Templar achieved was co-ordination of
Emergency work with the everyday business of government,”72 an alignment
that would prove remarkably resilient. By imaginatively reaching back into the
personal histories shaped by the Emergency, Tiang depicts the enduring
effects of everyday anti-communist governance that emerged at Singapore’s
and Malaya’s bipolar decolonization. “Emergency,” then, is not a temporary
measure; rather, anti-communist securitization becomes the foundation for
the postcolonial state’s most durable economic and political rationalities. The
novel’s epigraph from Walter Benjamin’s well-known “Theses on Philosophy”
thus refers equally to the Malayan Emergency that officially ended in 1960,
and to the ensuing decades of PAP governmentality: “The tradition of the
oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the
exception but the rule.”73
Nam Teck, significantly, is not initially inspired to join the communists,
although the government’s rough policies and massive incarceration rates
during the Emergency did fuel MCP membership. The Emergency is officially over by the time he moves to Kuala Lumpur where, as a mechanically-
minded seventeen-year-old, he finds work in a repair garage. Initially content
to earn his living and explore the new temptations of the city, he experiences
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the looming geopolitical shifts—especially the coming merger with Singapore—with a mixture of curiosity, excitement, trepidation, and pragmatic concerns. Noting that 1962 was “turning out to be a very strange year” since the
“British were supposed to have left, but lingered awkwardly like bad guests at
a party,”74 he wonders about the new country he will soon be living in:
What did it mean, to carve a new thing out of chunks of land like this?
Who would be in it? Would Brunei, Sarawak, Singapore? . . .
Nam Teck wondered what language they would speak in this new
world. He had Cantonese and Mandarin, but only passable Malay and
no English at all.75
A new worker at the garage, Ah Lam, recently arrived from China, introduces
Nam Teck to the heady, underground world of Malaya’s leftists. Thinking he
is attending a “cultural night,” Nam Teck is both fascinated and troubled
when the evening turns out to be one of revolutionary plays and party songs:
“And it was thrilling, the ideas he’d heard, the thought of a new world full of
youthful energy, the past swept away. Without even realising, he’d started
singing too, his face as bright as if he believed.”76 His recruitment to the
MCP—he will eventually go underground in the jungle and have a child there
with Siew Li—is achieved less by a rational political decision than by an affective experience in which another future, “a new world full of youthful energy,”
is made tangible. In Tiang’s rendering, the agency of the communists lies
precisely in their ability to seize a new future from out of the old colonial system of divisions and inequities, the latter now bubbling to the surface in the
form of race riots and political tensions. Nam Teck is critical of those simply
struggling to get ahead within the existing system: “These people had no
thoughts in their head except survival, which meant only chasing after the
next bit of money, the next promotion.”77 His diagnosis of the scrabble for a
“promotion” echoes the temporal logic I discussed in the introductory chapter, in which developmental states chase advancement within the existing,
hierarchical world system. In contrast, Nam Teck’s conversion to the Ma
Gong is predicated on the possible creation of a different and unalienated
futurity. As he reminds himself when he is in the jungle: “He tried not to think
of his old life. Look forward, he chided himself, think of the world to come.”78
And it is in the jungle that he experiences the intimations of an ethical,
division-less state to come. Recalling the experience of Adi’s Malay literature
class in Confrontation, Nam Teck wonders “if this is what university would
have been like . . . the camaraderie, the joy and energy of youth.”79
In Futures Past, historian Reinhart Koselleck traces the profound conceptual shifts in notions of past, present, and future from the ancient to modern
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periods (in European thought). One of the defining characteristics of modernity—defined here largely by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution—is the acceleration of time, which for the first time becomes a “human
task” rather than a providential aspect of God’s will.80 Koselleck further notes
that a characteristic of absolutist states is the “struggle against all manner of
religious and political predictions,” thus enforcing “a monopoly on the control
of the future.”81 Both observations, I suggest, can be transposed to the context
of Cold War decolonization. The sense of acceleration—the “urgent, emergent”82 time of a new, ethical society—is perhaps the central temporal thrust
of Nam Teck and Siew Li’s experiences. The state, in turn, may be understood
as what put the brakes on this temporal hastening or, more accurately, it seeks
a “monopoly on the control of the future.” It restricts and forecloses the futures
that can be imagined not just by the Ma Gong, who go into hiding, but even
those imagined by moderates.
The narrative of “Stella,” to which I now turn, set in 1987, brings into dramatic relief how the continued state repression of leftists effectively forecloses
a whole range of possible—even liberal—“worlds to come.” The novel’s focus
on Stella’s detention is an obvious indictment of Singapore’s authoritarian
rule; but more important, I suggest, is the way this chapter reveals the creative
reappropriation of colonial counterinsurgency techniques for the postcolonial
period. It is also the chapter in which we hear the state “state” at length: The
extended interrogation scenes allow for the full exposition of the government’s
anti-communist, developmentalist logic. Like Abang Dolah’s detention in
Confrontation, it is at first unclear why Stella, a quiet Catholic schoolteacher
who volunteers with her church group on weekends, would be a target of the
state. In a grueling interrogation, her interviewers throw ice water on her and
force her, shivering, under an air conditioning vent. They relentlessly ask her
about her volunteer church group, which offers support and resources for
abused and underpaid Filipina domestic workers. In a third person narration
of her motivations, Stella recalls that her actions were inspired by witnessing
how Singapore’s “rush towards prosperity” ignored both local homeless people
and the thousands of impoverished workers from Indonesia and the Philippines who arrived to work “in people’s homes for insultingly low wages.”83 Her
interrogators, dismissing her thinking in a caricature of socialism, espouse the
cold calculation of development logic:
“Do you want us all to be the same? You think everyone in society
should earn the same money? That’s not possible. Some people work
harder than others, some people are cleverer. If we did what you people
want, then our society will never progress, and soon our women will
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have to go and be maids in other people’s countries. Stella, we know
who you are, you don’t have to pretend any more. . . . You want to
destroy our society. You want to bring us all down to your level. Stella,
we know that you are a Communist.”84
“Progress” here, of course, means exactly the “getting ahead” or surviving
within the system that Nam Teck had already critiqued. Instead of an ethics
of solidarity, mutual care, or equality, the state offers only the promise of rising
prosperity based on the uneven, but “fair,” distribution of goods via the principle of meritocracy. Any act outside this logic, such as helping foreign workers, is necessarily read as an attack on the state’s very sovereignty. This extends
to sexuality, where Stella’s same-sex relationship during college is taken as
further evidence of her non-normative, anti-government stance.85 What Stella
has so grievously committed is a contradiction of the state’s understanding of
futurity, both political and reproductive. Later, the interrogators will point to
Singapore’s leap in material wealth as irrefutable evidence of the state’s wisdom: “We used to be poor. . . . Look at our airport. Look at our housing. . . .
Why are you attacking our progress? Why do you want to throw all this
away?”86 After months of detention, Stella realizes that she will not be released
until she confesses. She eventually does so, partly because of her ailing father’s
health, and returns home to find she has been stripped of her job, her friends,
her church community, her reputation. When some of her fellow former
detainees attempt to sue the government for wrongful detention and mistreatment, they are promptly rounded up again and detained as proof they were
communists all along.87 Stella recognizes the risks and reluctantly signs a declaration that denounces the allegations of mistreatment: “There was so little
left of herself, she couldn’t afford to lose any more.”88 Tiang’s poignant narrative shows not only the PAP government’s cynical repurposing of the British
ISA detention apparatus for its own purposes; it discloses how the practices of
everyday emergency governance work to sustain a monological view of the
nation’s future as one of promotion, prosperity and heteronormativity.
In an interview I conducted with Tiang, the author spoke of what Singapore’s triumphant leap into modernity has occluded:
When a lot of people, including critics of the PAP, talk about Singapore
history, it’s presented as a kind of inevitability: that of course it worked
out this way, but actually, there were a couple of moments when it very
much could have gone quite differently. . . . We can’t be sure what a
leftist Singapore would have looked like, but I think it’s worth imagining, bearing in mind the PAP government for the first couple of
decades called itself a socialist government. . . . They played both sides,
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claiming to be Socialist while saying “but these Communists will destabilize us.”89
Tiang’s comments align with his novel’s attempts to restore a temporal complexity to decolonization, challenging the unfolding of official postcolonial
history as “a kind of inevitability.” Not simply the “event” of the colonizers’
departure, the separating-suturing process of decolonization is a complex historical opening that—albeit briefly—holds within it multiple and contested
potential futures. If the vision of future wholeness we saw in Mohamed Latiff’s
novel was one of a redeemed Malay polity and territory, State of Emergency
provides imaginative access to the tenacious communist struggles for a world
liberated from both colonial rule and capitalist pragmatism. Whether the Ma
Gong would have been able to achieve that truly ethical, proletarian state
which would, in Gramsci’s words, “put an end to the internal divisions of the
ruled . . . and create a technically and morally unitary social organism,”90 is a
point of historical speculation. What the novel does reveal is how the elimination of leftist futures during the Malayan Emergency was reworked into an
indispensable infrastructure of illiberal rule for the postcolonial state. We also
see the forging of a key conceptual circuit breaker of the global Cold War, in
which anti-colonial struggles for new, liberated futures are recast into an intolerable red threat.

Comics and Counter-histories
In turning to Liew’s graphic novel, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, we
must begin by noting how difficult it is to describe its genre. Ostensibly a biography of “Singapore’s greatest comic book artist”—the fictional Charlie Chan
Hock Chye, as “presented” by Sonny Liew—the novel switches between a
dizzying array of illustrative and narrative modes. Alternating between an
artist’s retrospective, a biographical documentary, a private scrapbook, and a
counter-history of the nation, it is largely composed of Chan’s own oeuvre of
comics, sketches, studies, and scrapbooks, as well as “documentary” strips that
present Chan’s life story and personal interviews conducted by his “biographer” Liew. As a whole, to quote Philip Holden, the work makes “questions of
multiple layers of authorship, partiality and perspective”91 its essential textual
logic. At the same time, it plays with the ability of the graphic novel to move
creatively between image and word, panel and page, especially in its incorporation of Chan’s own artworks in a metafictional biographical mode.
Despite the many generic differences from the previous two texts,
Liew’s novel also returns to the question of youth during the decades of
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Singapore’s decolonization and early post-independence years; it thus shares
the formal narrative concern for intertwined national and individual Bildung.
Like Confrontation, it features a sidelined, peripheral protagonist. Charlie
Chan, the antihero of Liew’s fictional biography, grows up in unremarkable
conditions in colonial Singapore, the son of Hokkien-speaking owners of a
provisions store. Like Adi, Siew Li, and Nam Teck, Chan is a youth at the end
of the colonial period, his maturation coinciding with that of Singapore’s,
such that the major political events of the era become the subject of his early
comics. In “Ah Huat’s Giant Robot” of 1956, for example, Chan uses the genre
of a children’s adventure comic to present us with a robot and schoolboy duo
who support the anti-British riots and the Hock Lee Bus Drivers’ Strike.
Indeed, throughout the novel, Liew’s multi-genred mode skillfully and playfully interweaves Chan’s life story with that of Singapore. However, in direct
contrast to the triumphant story of Singapore’s post-independent rise to economic success—with which the novel frequently takes issue—Chan’s own life
story is defined by failure and disappointment: His cartoons never make it big;
he doesn’t marry, leave home, or ever make a decent income from his art.
Echoing the central themes of family loss in both Confrontation and State of
Emergency, Chan is unable to pay for expensive overseas medical treatment
for his father, who dies after an unsuccessful heart operation.92
While not involved directly in the politics of the day, Chan produces artwork that is highly critical of the authoritarian path the PAP takes. A strip
resembling a Mad comic pokes fun at the PAP’s white-washed nationalist
histories, while in other strips “founding father” Lee Kuan Yew himself
appears variously as mouse-deer, a domineering company boss, an alien, and
a destructive specter. One of the book’s central narrative threads is the consideration of alternative versions of Singapore’s history rendered through the contrast between the two main political figures at decolonization. First is Lee
Kwan Yew, the Cambridge-educated anti-colonial lawyer who became the
pragmatic and autocratic leader of the People’s Action Party, leading the country for three decades and widely known as the “Father of Singapore.” His
antagonist is the Chinese-educated trade unionist Lim Chin Siong, the radical leader originally affiliated with the PAP (who had a cameo appearance in
the “Siew Li” chapter of State of Emergency). Lim led the leftist party Barisan
Socialis after many members were forced to leave the PAP; he was detained
for six years under the PAP’s anti-leftist purge, Operation Cold Store—alluded
to in both previous texts—and was ultimately forced out of politics and into
exile in England. As Holden points out, Liew juxtaposes the personal with the
political in terms of two sets of relationships that the novel formally stages “as
a contrast between idealism and pragmatism”93: Lim and Lee, on the one
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hand, and Chan and his early comics business partner, Bertrand Wong, on the
other. Thus “Lee and Lim’s story is frequently placed alongside that of Charlie
and Bertrand, and readers are encouraged to make associations between the
two.”94 The juxtaposition is used less to draw a one-to-one causal correspondence between national histories and personal lives, than to raise questions
about how such historical and social transformations are made sense of as
retrospective objects.
Two sections of Liew’s novel can again help us parse the relationship
between Cold War decolonization, separation, and the competing logics of
futurity; both assume an understanding of the Lee/Lim dichotomy. In Chapter 6, “Sang Kucing and the Ants,” Liew presents us with a series of unpublished comics that Charlie Chan created in his “Bukit Chapalang” series of
1963–65. As Liew’s introductory notes to the chapter tell us,95 “Bukit Chapalang” (Malay for “Hodgepodge-of-things Hill”) is a retelling of a series of
popular Malayan folktales known as the Sang Kancil stories about a clever
mouse-deer or kancil. The strip’s conventional appearance seems appropriate
for a mass or juvenile audience where regular-sized panels frame animal characters and their adventures against a simple jungle landscape. In Chan’s version, however, the strip becomes a witty, damning political allegory: Sang
Kancil is the wily and quick-witted avatar of Lee Kuan Yew, while Sang Kucing—the cat—is Lim Chin Siong, whose left-leaning followers are represented
by the ants. Chan’s “Bukit Chapalang” strip narrates the story of Singapore’s
merger with Malaya, the imprisonment of Lim Chin Siong and other leftists
in 1963, and the race riots of 1964, all with deceptive levity. The British colonial era is referred to as “the time of the Crocodiles”; Malaysia is coyly represented as the theme park “Hinterland,” and the purpose of entry (read territorial
merger) for Sang Kancil is “entertainments.”
As with Mohamed Latiff ’s and Tiang’s novels, Chan’s account of the
merger and separation raises difficult questions around multiethnic populations, the use of anti-communist violence to suppress political opposition, and
beliefs about the economic viability of postcolonial nation-states. Liew is similarly critical of the egregious abuses of individual rights that occurred under
Operation Cold Store of 1963. Yet where in Confrontation the repression of
leftists was an inexplicable personal tragedy that befell Abang Dolah and in
State of Emergency becomes the linchpin of the narrative action, Charlie
Chan focuses on the elite political machinations behind the scenes, which
ultimately result in the PAP’s arrest of Lim or, as the strip puts it, “putting him
in the locker.”96 In the scene in Figure 3, we see the orangutan (Malayan
leader Tunku Abdul Rahman) complaining to Sang Kancil (Lee Kuan Yew)
about Sang Kucing (Lim Chin Siong) and his ants (communists): “I certainly

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 126

5/18/21 3:13 PM

SEPARATE FUTURES: OTHER TIMES OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN DECOLONIZATION

127

Figure 3. Strip from “Bukit Chapalang,” in The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye.

don’t want them at my doorstep.” As the strip explains, the merger was motivated in part by Malaya’s fear of having an independent communist outpost
“at its doorstep,” and required the simultaneous annexation of Sarawak and
Sabah (the Squirrelteers and Hamsteers) to ensure Malay demographic dominance in the union. “Bukit Chapalang” thus presents a revisionist—and still
PAP-proscribed—account of the blunt geopolitical realities of the merger and
separation, whereby state-formation is a wager that balances population arithmetic, economic survival, and fear of the “catchy chorus” of communism. We
derive pleasure from this narrative precisely because it distills a set of complex
historical actions into a visual allegorical register, heightened all the more by
the incongruous form of its genre.
Yet “Bukit Chapalang,” I want to argue, is more than an irreverent counter-
narrative to a well-known piece of national history. The strip itself must be
read at several levels, as both a private and a public enunciation. In its 2015
“presentation” by Sonny Liew, it enters public discourse as a historical counter-
narrative, and Liew’s own clarifying captions ensure that the reader does not
miss the message. But in terms of the novel’s own internal narrative logic, it is
a strip that was unpublishable during the actual merger of 1963–65, as the
museum-like cataloguing of each of Chan’s artworks indicates: the strip is
labeled, “Bukit Chapalang, c. 1963–1965. Chan Hock Chye. Unpublished.”97 As
already noted, much of the biographical trajectory of Chan’s life concerns his
failure to find an audience for his work. In this sense, the future that is foreclosed for Charlie Chan is a politically and culturally liberal one, in which
dissent, freedom of expression, and artistic criticism of the state would be
welcomed in the marketplace of ideas. The biographical narrative, then,
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portrays Chan’s ideological and aesthetic commitments as wasted energies.
While his former partner Bertrand—the pragmatist whose life evokes the
“Singapore Story” writ small—goes on to become a successful businessman
and patriarch of a large family, Chan refuses to accept artistic compromise.
He chooses a low-paid, low-prestige job as a night watchman (ironically
enough) in order to have space and uninterrupted time to continue his art.98
His aging parents, meanwhile, continue to nag him about marriage and taking over their store, neither of which he does. Over the course of the novel, we
see Chan transformed from an optimistic, talented young comic artist to
something of a recluse who refuses to take on commercial work because of its
“stupid clients”99 and lack of artistic autonomy. In the end, as Liew himself
tells us in the small first-person strip placed along the bottom gutter of Chan’s
virulently anti-PAP comic “Sinkapor Inks,” Chan decides to “sever all links
with the public sphere and patronage” to ensure “true freedom of expression.”100 Lacking an audience or market, Chan’s artistic and political liberalism thus remain impossible to articulate within the novel’s own world.
If one dominant visual rhythm of the text is the interspersing of Chan’s
(largely unpublished) works with strips narrating his personal and artistic disappointments, each failed comic thus demands to be read in two ways: in its
own right as revisionist political commentary on the events of the time and as
evidence of those foreclosed liberal futures, in which Chan could have flourished. Chan’s life story is one more melancholic response to the alienating
developmental state: He detaches from the social and economic worlds it has
created and commits ever more firmly to private artistic representations of the
PAP’s democratic failures.101 Eschewing the pragmatism of his former partner
Bertrand who comes to recognize “how important economic stability is to the
bottom line,”102 Chan labors his whole life, but never finds a home in the productive, efficient, and investment-friendly First World “oasis” that Singapore
becomes. Charlie Chan’s failed Bildung, therefore, results from the inability
to reconcile individual artistic expression with the state but not, of course, in
the ways validated by free speech organizations like PEN or Amnesty. The
ethical state, once again, is elusive.
The second and final section I want to examine occurs toward the end of
the novel. Whereas Confrontation and State of Emergency offered us “glimpses”
of alternative futures that never were, the graphic novel genre allows Liew to
go further in alternative history-making. In the strip “Days of August,” we are
presented with an explicit counter-history of modern Singapore in which Lim
Chin Siong, the imprisoned and exiled leader of the Barisan Socialis, has
become the prime minister instead of Lee Kuan Yew. Beginning in the mode
of a banal TV interview with its small, TV-shaped panels (Figure 4), a reporter
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Figure 4. Television-shaped panels of “Days of August,” from The Art of Charlie Chan
Hock Chye.

nonchalantly reviews a national history in which the Barisan Socialis party
won the 1963 elections, the Singapore-Malaya merger never happened, and
Lim Chin Siong is the “father of Singapore.”103
Complicating the established political contrasts between the two leaders—
Lee Kuan Yew as the authoritarian pragmatist and Lim Chin Siong as the
radical labor leader of the masses—the TV report reveals the latter to have
been a moderate all along whose leadership barely differs from Lee Kuan
Yew’s. Although he avoids the failed merger with Malaya, Lim’s achievements
include taming the trade unions, leading with a “mild cult of personality,” and
achieving “progress and stability”104 for the country. It is even hinted that he
exiled his political opponent, Lew Kuan Yew. The result is a prosperous Singapore apparently identical to the actual one.105
Liew’s graphic tale, I suggest, knowingly plays on the fact that it is almost
impossible to imagine the future of Singapore otherwise, even had its political
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history turned out differently. The comic’s value is not merely to offer a case
of “what could have been,” but to provide a more radical insight about Cold
War decolonization: The very task of imagining, from the present, the post
colonial state as vehicle of emancipative, redemptive futurity is at once absolutely necessary and almost impossible. We are given pause by the familiar,
gleaming image of Singapore’s skyline placed within a fictional counter-history,
itself framed within the biography of an artist who never existed. As Ann Cvetkovich has noted of the graphic novel’s form, its interplay of words, texts, and
panel sequences disrupts “standard modes of public discourse”106 while it plays
with our expectations of the visual and its privileged relationship to “evidentiary truth.”107 “Days of August” ups the ante on its own metafictiveness in the
final section when the news broadcast is interrupted by reports of terrorist
attacks and a mysterious vigilante figure in white; the format also changes
from neat television-shaped panels to irregular-shaped frames that use the
former comic as content, employing yellow bubbles in a separate meta-
narrative. A convoluted story line takes over, revealing the mysterious man in
white to be a monstrous, time-and-space-rending Lee Kuan Yew. But the alternative future of “Days of August” is also a world in which Chan himself has
found success. He is a prominent artist whose “contributions to the nation
have been remarkable,” according to the prime minister.108 We then learn that
the “Days of August” Chan had actually been working on is a speculative fiction
comic inspired by Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High Castle, in which it is
Lee Kuan Yew and not Lim Chin Siong who won the 1963 election. Chan’s
attempt to “placate or stave off the forces threatening to destroy their present
world” by depicting this “alternative” world fails, and a giant specter of Lee
Kwan Yew declares himself “merely the force that returns the world to how it
has to be.”109 The two possible worlds—the one in which Lee is prime minister, and the one in which Lim is—thus become impossibly entangled, pushing
the time-bending narrative to its limit. In another authorial sleight of hand,
“Days of August” ends by rewinding time altogether and dropping Chan and
Lim Chin Siong back into the 1950s Singapore of the book’s beginning—and
the novel’s earlier black and white graphic style—ready to start their (failed)
lives and careers all over again.110 Liew’s melancholy point, we might surmise,
is that even the unsuccessful artist’s life is worth living for itself.
Ultimately, such intricate narrative and visual folding evidence the graphic
novel’s potential to reimagine those other futures of decolonization that were
discarded in the nation’s race to success and prosperity—at the same time that
it gestures toward the very difficulty of doing so. Liew’s heterogeneous, unclassifiable graphic novel dislodges the historical certainty of Singapore’s authoritarian rise to success. It ruminates on success, failure, and historical destiny
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by playfully and subversively giving expression to those “what ifs” of other
temporalities.

Conclusion
In reflecting on the long shadow of repressive state instruments wielded at
decolonization, Bayly and Harper note the way “the continuing threat of communism and communalism” has profoundly affected the postcolonial era.
In the aftermath of its revolutionary hour, and scale of the violence it
unleashed, not only was communism all but obliterated, but in the
process so too were a panoply of other alternatives. Liberalism never
recovered from the shocking blows to civil society during these years
of upheaval. The post-independence elites saw it as a dangerous
thing: it was, in Lee Kuan Yew’s striking phrase, “anti-national.” In
this new atmosphere many of the great figures of the popular movements faced long periods of imprisonment, exile or exclusion. But the
vanquished also were struck out of national narratives, and almost
vanished from historical memory itself.111
In this chapter, I have considered the way that fictional reappraisals of Singapore’s and Malaya’s decolonization restore those “other alternatives”—and
other futures—to our historical understanding of the past. We have seen how
decolonizing struggles become refracted through the tectonic fault lines of
the global Cold War in ways that foreclosed alternative futures for postcolonial
societies. Through its infrastructures of surveillance and detention—the
everyday policing of futurity itself—the PAP forcibly rerouted anti-imperialist
world-making into anti-communist nationalism, while excising those alternative imaginaries “from historical memory.” Mohamed Latiff, Tiang, and Liew,
through exploring the twinned problem of youth for both protagonists and
nations, offer fine-grained critiques of the way Cold War and nationalist epistemes have worked to contain and re-signify certain problems of decolonization, showing how anti-liberal and anti-leftist epistemes remain congealed in
the postcolonial state’s political rationality. These works are provocative fictional returns to what could have been during the “no-more” and “not-yet”
time of decolonization.
Together, the novels’ depictions of postcolonial future-making remind us
that “the world-historical transformation known as ‘decolonization’ was
simultaneously an emancipatory awakening of peoples and a heteronomous
process of imperial restructuring.”112 If different strains of anti-colonial
nationalism imagined and anticipated the ethical suturing of people and
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state, the complications and intrusions of the global Cold War reined in such
desires. Against teleological mappings of this region which celebrate their
developmental achievements, these texts excavate the violent legacies of decolonization’s separations and re-incorporations. The result for their protagonists
is a kind of homelessness specific to the postcolonial genre of Bildung: The
state remains, to all extents and purposes, a foreign one. In place of the imagined unity and restoration of community and state, of labor with self, of aesthetics and life, Cold War decolonization results in their melancholy
separation. In the next chapter, we will further investigate the fate of those
other futures by turning to stories of “imprisonment, exile and exclusion” that
have lingered into the present.
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The Wrong Side of History
Anachronism and Authoritarianism

The Meritorious Dictator
In her film from 2013, To Singapore, with Love, documentary filmmaker Tan
Pin Pin tackles the question of Singaporean political exiles living outside the
exceptionally well managed but famously still authoritarian city-state. Hwang
Sŏk-yŏng’s 2000 novel The Old Garden (Oraedoen chŏngwŏn) chronicles the
aftermath of the South Korean military’s crushing of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising. Both texts raise questions about these countries’ periods of simultaneous
political repression and remarkable economic growth, allowing us to dwell on
the ambivalent social memory of regimes that are so often viewed with admiration for their economic achievements. They further complicate the story of
“model minority” Asian postcolonial modernity that this book has been concerned to refute, instead underscoring the complex imbrication of decolonization, development, and the global Cold War. In the preceding chapter, I
examined the multiple “futures past” that attended decolonization, and the
ways they were arrested and foreclosed by national developmentalist priorities.
Whereas there I reckoned with the entanglements of Cold War anti-
communist authoritarianism via the question of youth and narratives of Bildung, this chapter does so through questions of age, specifically via aesthetic
genres that worry over history, teleology, and anachronism. And whereas Chapter 3 explored texts that excavated those competing emergent futures that were
cut short, this chapter chooses cultural texts for the way they present overlooked conflicts of the global Cold War as repressed elements of the present.
Anticipating the following chapter’s emphasis on transitional justice, it seeks
to think through the legacies of authoritarian capitalism in ways that do not
133
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adhere to usual teleologies of “miracle” development, the transition to democracy, or post–Cold War liberalization. It therefore troubles the usual historical
turning point of 1989 or 1991 that supposedly demarcates the Cold War period
from our “one world” of uninhibited globalization, in which the high-growth
development of Singapore and South Korea retrospectively confirms the folly
of alternative modes of development.
First, some brief introductions to the texts and the conceptual questions
guiding this chapter. Tan Pin Pin is an acclaimed documentary filmmaker
from Singapore. Her films—such as the award-winning Singapore Gaga
(2005), Invisible City (2007), and, more recently, In Time to Come (2017)—have
explored the city’s soundscapes, stories and spaces that lie beyond official histories. In To Singapore, with Love, Tan returns to several foundational moments
in Singapore’s postcolonial history. Her film’s subjects—a variety of political
activists, trade-unionists, and former Malayan Communist Party members—
were forced to leave Singapore as a result of intense state repression during
Operation Cold Store, the 1963 elimination of leftist political forces (a period
fictionalized in all three of the novels discussed in the preceding chapter), as
well as subsequent government crackdowns directed at suspected communist
student leaders and activists. At these moments, the state employed the indefinite detention powers of its notorious Internal Security Act (ISA), in place
since the end of the colonial era. The film profiles the former student leader
and successful human rights lawyer Tan Wah Piow; the surgeon Ang Swee
Chai, who was exiled with her late husband, the democracy activist Francis
Khoo; Ho Juan Thai, a former Chinese-language proponent; the journalist
Said Zahari, who was imprisoned for seventeen years; and a number of former
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) members living in Thailand. Intercutting
scenes and interviews of the exiles in their various locations—London, Southern Thailand, and Malaysia—the film is less a documentary investigation into
the repressive mechanisms of the People’s Action Party (or PAP, Singapore’s
only ruling party since independence) and more a reflection on the personal
struggles, memories, and experiences of Singaporeans who have lived much
of their lives in exile as a result of state repression. The film opens, for example, with Ho Juan Thai at his home in London, cooking Singaporean-style
noodles and prawns and explaining, “You still try to cook your own Singapore
food” in order “not to feel defeated.”
In a fictional narrative mode, Hwang Sŏk-yŏng’s The Old Garden brings to
life the repression of the radical left under South Korea’s long years of military
dictatorship (1961–87). A generation older than Tan, Hwang himself is perhaps
South Korea’s best-known contemporary dissident writer. Born in colonial
Manchuria in 1943, he made his name writing workers’ literature in the 1970s
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as well as an extended allegory, Chang Kil-san, of the Park Chung Hee dictatorship. In 1985, he published a scathing account of South Korea’s role in the
Vietnam War,1 and in 1989 took an unauthorized visit to North Korea for
which he spent five years in prison upon his return to the South. Influenced
by Hwang’s own experiences of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, The Old Garden is narrated by two voices: The first is that of political activist Oh Hyun
Woo (O Hyŏn-wu), who has just been released after eighteen years’ imprisonment for his involvement in a left-wing anti-government organization. The
other, in the form of her posthumous diaries and letters, is that of his former
lover Han Yoon Hee (Han Yun-hŭi), who dies two years prior to Hyun Woo’s
release. Hwang’s novel is especially interested in reconstructing the complex
political climate of 1979–80 when the South Korean military regime saw the
transfer of power from Park—whose two-decade rule ended with his assassination in 1979—to General Chun Doo Hwan (Chŏn Tu-hwan). Told from the
novel’s diegetic present of 1997, Hyun Woo and Yoon Hee’s story addresses the
afterlives of political repression and Cold War authoritarian rule through a
reflection on extended imprisonment as a kind of internal exile. Through the
twin motifs of exile and anachronism, both Tan’s and Hwang’s texts explicitly
grapple with the problem of thinking about the past violence of anti-
communist capitalist states that has often been occluded by their ability to
maintain remarkable growth rates. In that sense, the dissenting subjects of
Tan’s and Hwang’s works are anachronistic remnants from the “wrong side of
history”: from the side that appears to have been mistaken about the alternatives to capitalist development in the former Third World, or the Global
South. In “looking back” at authoritarianism through the tropes of exile,
homelessness, and anachronism, Tan and Hwang offer powerful critiques not
just of authoritarianism, but of the very space and time of model postcolonial
development.
Let us recall that these two countries have long held anomalous status in
comparative studies of the postcolonial or developing world. In the three
decades following decolonization, Singapore and South Korea were two of the
most lauded of Asian Tiger success stories, boasting unparalleled average
GDP growth rates of 6–7 percent, with some years close to 15 percent (compared to 2–3 percent typical for OECD countries); they confounded the trend
of Global South underdevelopment and became models of successful export-
led industrialization. The World Bank’s 1993 publication The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy consolidated the narrative of their
“miraculous” growth and exemplary status. In answering the basic question:
“What caused East Asia’s success?” the authors cite a series of sound “market-
friendly” development policies alongside qualities such as “pragmatism and
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flexibility.”2 With a more critical lens, Andre Gunder Frank and other dependency theorists also early identified the Tigers as models for a (then) new kind
of industrial development that replaced the emphasis on import-substitution
with export-led growth and anti-communist “political stability.”3 The model
of “free production zones” and “world market factories” would be widely imitated around the Global South.4 In writing of the powerful “example” set by
South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Caroline Hau notes that
Marcos sought to legitimize his own martial law by citing “the example set by
experiences of authoritarian neighbors” and “the developmental state’s promise of ‘efficiency.’ ”5 In just a few decades, Singapore “model” development
would allow it to become a global expert in urban-economic management
recipes, selling know-how and advice to hundreds of cities in the Global South
through the Singapore Cooperation Enterprise and the “World Bank–Singapore Urban Hub.” Despite its high levels of labor precarity, South Korea has
moved rapidly from the Asian Tiger manufacturing model to a high-tech,
neoliberalized flexible market; it now boasts the world’s eleventh largest economy, a huge cultural export industry, and is a major investor in China, Southeast Asia, and beyond.6
Such overdetermined narratives of “success” and “model” have made it
difficult to think about the relationship between repressive authoritarian governments and economic development. The critic Paik Nak-chung clarifies the
conceptual problem at hand in his essay “How to Think about the Park Chung
Hee Era”:
It has by now become a platitude to say that, while Park must be condemned as a dictator and gross violator of human rights, he deserves
praise for leading the country out of poverty and building a strong,
industrialized nation. How do we go beyond this all too facile “striking
of [a] balance” and particularize the manner in which the two contrasting appraisals are to be combined, specify the precise weight to
be given to each, and determine the actual relationship between the
two aspects?7
Paik goes on to describe General Park’s regime as “meritorious service in
unsustainable development”—unsustainable both in terms of its “unabashed
environmental destruction” and because Park’s militaristic rule “could not go
for long.”8 He concludes by warning against the “Park Chung Hee nostalgia
of our day.”9 Writing in 2011, his comments anticipate the reappearance of the
Park dynasty in the form of Park’s daughter, Park Geun-hye (Pak Kŭn-hye),
president from 2013 until her ouster in 2017. Lee Kuan Yew, we must note, while
wielding enormous personal and political power through the remarkably
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resilient People’s Action Party, did not come to power in a military coup. And
unlike South Korea’s years of brutal military dictatorship, Singapore has had
regular elections, despite the fact that opposition parties are often forced out
of the playing field by other means. Nevertheless, the lack of democratic freedoms in Singapore—famously justified by Lee’s invocation of “Asian Values”—has often been seen as a fair “trade-off” for the city-state’s efficiency and
prosperity. Indeed, throughout his career, Lee frequently pointed to other
“messy, chaotic” postcolonial democracies as Singapore’s “negative Other”10
to shore up the PAP’s authoritarian tendencies. That his son Lee Hsien Loong
is the current prime minister confirms the successful recipes of his father.
In what follows, I attempt to move beyond “striking a balance” with regard
to the specific problem of “meritorious dictatorship” in Singapore and South
Korea. I do this by engaging with two texts that invite us to reckon with state
violence and repression from “the wrong side of history,” that is, from the perspectives of political dissidents, communists, and student leaders whom (neoliberal) history can only view as misguided, anachronistic, or superfluous to
the triumphant narrative of capitalist modernity. I thus view both Singapore
and South Korea as emphatically Cold War–postcolonial formations: I
describe how a triumphalist neoliberal episteme has occluded those other
stories of the region, while a postcolonial critical lens has paid too little attention to the new forms of bipolarized authority structuring the region. Tan’s
and Hwang’s texts are valuable precisely because they necessitate a conceptual
return to, and reassessment of, a particular configuration of decolonization,
authoritarianism, and development at a moment when other futures were
imaginable; this chapter thus builds on the preceding chapter’s investigation
into the multiple times of decolonization. How do these texts open up conceptual space for imagining other forms of postcolonial liberation beyond the
advantageous insertion of the nation into circuits of global capitalism?11 And
how, I ask, do Tan’s film and Hwang’s novel map the unresolved continuities
between an apparently “past” moment of contested decolonization and today’s
economically successful, post–Cold War states?

Exiles of Modernity: Tan Pin Pin’s To Singapore, with Love
All of the documentary subjects in To Singapore, with Love, in differing ways,
attest to the heartbreak of exile in terms of a fierce nationalist identity and
tenacious love for Singapore—hence the film’s title. In accordance with
Edward Said’s poignant 1984 essay on exile, the “essential sadness” of exile
emerges as a set of paradoxes:12 Most distinctly, it is dialectically entwined with
nationalism, “like Hegel’s dialectic of servant and master, opposites informing
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and constituting each other.”13 Such nationalist devotion seems at odds with
both the peripatetic, cosmopolitan lives these exiles have been forced to live,
and the deep criticisms they have leveled at the Singaporean state. Yet Ho
Juan Thai, who fled the country in 1977 after he was accused of inciting violence as a “Chinese chauvinist,” dreams of nothing more than giving his two
young sons Singaporean citizenship so that (somewhat surprisingly) they can
fight in the Singapore Armed Forces. The surgeon Ang Swee Chai, who fled
around the same time, describes how her life in the UK has been one of incessant struggle due to the hardships she and her husband faced as refugees and
her own homesickness. She recalls, in an interview with the offscreen filmmaker, desperately wishing to be working as a doctor back in Singapore: “Oh
how I wish[ed] I was operating on Singapore patients!” The exiled democracy
activist and lawyer Tan Wah Piow explains that now that his livelihood in
England is secure, “the real problem is how to get back to Singapore.” Even
the former militant Malayan Communist Party members speak fondly of their
ties to Singapore. The married couple Tan Hee Kim and Yap Wan Pin, who
now run a small noodle factory in Thailand, refuse to give up their communist beliefs, a condition that the Singaporean state insists upon if they want to
return. Nevertheless, as Tan Hee Kim says, “We long to go back to Singapore.”
This sentiment is confirmed by their pile of Chinese-language newspapers
from Malaysia and Shanghai through which they keep abreast of all things
Singaporean.14
At a superficial level, the film is staged around the binary of what Ang Swee
Chai says in her interview, “see[ing] things in terms of Singapore/non-
Singapore.” Notably, there is only one scene in the entire film that is recognizably shot in Singapore, which is the moment Ho Juan Thai’s wife and sons
arrive at Changi Airport for a family celebration. Ho himself is stuck in a hotel
in Johor Bahru on the other side of the causeway that connects peninsula
Malaysia to the island-nation, where he participates in his mother’s ninety-
fourth birthday party via Skype. Shots of him looking wistfully over the narrow passage of water toward Singapore’s shore are the film’s purest visual
expression of the aesthetics of exile and, not surprisingly, this scene is used as
the film’s publicity still: the lone figure defined by his longing for homeland
and loved ones (Figure 5).
Said notes that exilic nationalism is, on the one hand, precisely the ideology that “affirms the home created by a community of language, culture and
customs; and by so doing, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its ravages.”15 On
the other, as Sophia McClennen points out, “the exile’s nationalism is constructive of an alternative: it is active.”16 What deserves attention, then, is the
fact that the film’s exilic subjects continue to desire Singapore, but do so in
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Figure 5. Ho Juan Thai looks toward Singapore from Malaysia in To Singapore, with Love.
Image courtesy of Tan Pin Pin.

terms of radically competing versions of the postcolonial nation: of its national
culture(s), its political and economic orientations, and its very borders. Ho
Juan Thai, for example, was persecuted for his advocacy of the Chinese language—the linguistic heritage of many Singaporeans—at a time when affiliation with China was dangerously equated with communism and ethnic
communalism. Among other activities, Francis Khoo (Ang’s husband) protested against the Vietnam War and, by extension, Singapore’s complicity with
U.S. imperialism; Tan Wah Piow fought against worker exploitation at the
massive Jurong Industrial Estate. At an earlier moment, the MCP members
resisted the PAP suppression of the Barisan Sosialis, or Socialist Front, the
party that emerged after the PAP expelled its left-wing members in 1961. Such
contestations thus range from workers’ rights, cultural and linguistic policy,
foreign relations, and Cold War alignments.
Presented collectively in the film, these dissident figures form their own
alternative territorial figuring and political imagining of Singapore, offering
national, regional, and global imaginaries far more complex and multilayered
than the binary of Singapore/non-Singapore. Indeed, Tan’s curating of these
disparate exilic lives constitutes something like an archipelago of other Singapores, a political and spatial alternative to the Singaporean state’s monological
and insular narratives of success. Such a logic is reinforced at the formal level.
In the film, similar scenes or cities are occasionally juxtaposed with a slight
delay in identifying titles, leaving the viewer momentarily disoriented as to
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whether or not we have left one location for another. For example, the film
cuts suddenly from a scene of Tan Wah Piow walking down a London street
to Yap Wan Pin negotiating with a taxi driver on a road in Hat Yai, Thailand.
These simultaneous filmic and geospatial disjunctures produce a concatenation of spaces, a series of discontinuous but interpenetrating islands of exilic
space.
The film not only challenges the unitary spatial imaginary of Singapore
but also emphatically questions its temporal underpinnings. The progressivist,
teleological account of Singapore’s success has been well captured by longtime prime minister and founding father Lee Kuan Yew in his best-selling
memoirs, The Singapore Story (1998) and From Third World to First (2000). His
writings helped legitimize the national myth of the tiny colonial trading port
that made the incredible leap to become Asia’s model “world-class” city and
oasis of First World modernity. In contrast, in To Singapore, with Love, London, Hat Yai and Betong in Thailand, and Johor Bahru and Shah Alam in
Malaysia function as multiple external vantage points through which to contest Singapore’s smooth temporal narrative of postcolonial development. The
London office of the lawyer Tan Wah Piow holds a veritable library of Singapore’s (authoritarian) political history, just as Yap Wan Pin and Tan Hee Kim’s
unassuming noodle shop in Yat Hai doubles as a reading room for contemporary Singaporean affairs. He Jin and Shu Shihua’s house in Bangkok holds a
photographic archive of the MCP’s long and forgotten struggle in the Thai-
Malaysian jungles. Such personal archives—comprising photos, memories,
newspaper clippings, and musical recordings—function as anachronistic
counter-archives to Singapore’s official histories. One way to read the film’s
aesthetics of exile, then, is to see these anachronistic lives and memories as
challenging the PAP’s hegemonic spatial-temporal logic, which has claimed
its own path of development as the only possible form of decolonization for
the vulnerable city-state.17 It is for these reasons, I would argue, that the film
was banned in Singapore, earning a “Not Allowed for All Ratings” classification in 2014. As Tan noted, this has caused To Singapore, with Love to also “be
in exile.”
In part, the difficulty of examining other histories—and their futurities—
beyond the overriding “Singapore Story” is due to the prevalence of what I
alluded to in the Introduction as “Three-Worlds ideology.”18 Sharad Chari and
Katherine Verdery critique this viewpoint by calling for a more “integrated
analytical field [that] ought to explore intertwined histories of capital and
empire . . . and the ongoing effects of the Cold War’s Three-Worlds ideology.”19 They note two particular effects of the Cold War era: first, the “domination of modernization theory in western social sciences” epitomized by
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W. W. Rostow’s stagist theory of economic growth from 196020 and, second,
“decades of censorship (including self-censorship) of a Marxist intellectual
tradition,” especially pronounced in the United States and those aligned with
it.21 The goal of Tan’s film, I suggest, is not merely to recuperate the personal
costs of political activism, nor to “strike a balance” in acknowledging the less
savory side of the Singaporean miracle.22 Rather, it opens a space for us to
reflect on the way the now celebrated “Singapore Story” was predicated on a
number of irreducibly Cold War political, economic, and temporal assumptions that often wrote out the struggles of Marxists and leftists.23 Methodologically, we find that the decades following formal independence are structured
less by the familiar postcolonial idioms of resistance to metropolitan colonial
power and its cultural hierarchies. Rather, a bipolarized power structure and
its abiding logic of anti-communist national development authorized certain
forms and ideologies of modernization, and not others. In one memorable
scene in Bangkok, for example, former members of the MCP, He Jin and Shu
Shihua, reminisce over photos taken in the jungle in Betong, near the Malaysian border, where the movement maintained a guerrilla force until 1989.
They hold up a photo of a smiling couple in outdated military fatigues against
a jungle backdrop (Figure 6). The average viewer cannot but be slightly temporally unmoored when He Jin remarks that the photo was taken “just
before” they left the jungle, probably in the late 1980s, a period when Singapore was already gaining worldwide attention as a “first world oasis” in
Southeast Asia, while Malaysia was ascending the ranks as a second-tier

Figure 6. He Jin and Shu Shihua reminisce about their time in the jungle in To Singapore, with
Love. Image courtesy of Tan Pin Pin.
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“Newly Industrializing Economy,” in the language of the World Bank. Such
a scene destabilizes Singapore as a paragon of uncontested capitalism as frequently read through the linear timeline of modernization theory. Rather,
Singapore’s (and Malaysia’s) modernity must be understood both in terms of
the foundational role of regional communist movements at decolonization
and the prolonged socialist ideologies with which the state aggressively competed until 1989.
In another of the film’s memorable scenes, Chan Sun Wing, a former MCP
member, sits in a small, neat, but slightly dingy courtyard in Hat Yai, Thailand
(Figure 7). Framed by overflowing potted plants and a washing line, the elderly
man sits down on a plastic chair in the center of the frame, unhurriedly takes
out a piece of paper, and reads the following poem in Mandarin Chinese:
Thoughts on Changing Citizenship: 17th May 2006
I changed my citizenship!
Born and bred a Singaporean
Who would’ve thought I’d leave home for half a century
And spend 12 years stateless in Thailand, despite being a nation
builder
Today, I became an IC-carrying24 Thai citizen
Reluctantly, yet gratefully
Reluctant, for it is not that I don’t love Singapore
Grateful, for the generosity of the Thais
My smallpox vaccination from the colonial times is still on my left arm
Kretya Ayer, Cross Street, Ang Siang Hill, Tanjong Pagar, Pasir
Panjang, Clifford Pier
Our youthful stomping grounds
How can we forget?
In Upper Cross St where the Japanese drop the first bomb
Of both sides of Temple Street lay bodies to be collected, along with
their stench
The white flags raised, we surrendered
The Japanese dogs leave, the British monkeys return
The Union Jack rises once again
In the old Kallang airport, thousands cry “Merdeka!”
Amidst the wind and rain we surged
from self-governed to Independence
All these things I have seen
The History that I have witnessed
I still have so much to tell you
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Figure 7. Chan Sun Wing reads a poem to Singapore in To Singapore, with Love. Image courtesy of Tan Pin Pin.

Singapore, oh Singapore
If only you knew
How your present and your future still preoccupy me every day.
Written on 25th May, 2006, South Thailand, Hat Yai
—Chan Sun Wing
It is, of course, another iteration of the poetics of exile, specifically framed by
the anguish of taking another country’s citizenship. When I asked the filmmaker about how this striking scene came about, Tan explained,
He wrote the poem in 2006. When I read it, I had to find a way to have
it in the film. It explained his life story and his decisions in a succinct
and moving way, better than any interview could have done. I had conceived of To Singapore, with Love as love letters to Singapore by the
exiles. I saw the poem as a letter by a lover to his ex-love on why he had
to take on a new lover. So it made sense for Chan Sun Wing to read his
apologia to camera, to us, he whom we are unlikely to ever meet.25
In Chan’s poem, the anguish of exile is indeed figured as betraying a loved
one: “It’s not that I don’t love Singapore.” Notably, his poetic recitation is the
only time in the film when a subject directly addresses the camera rather than
the filmmaker offscreen; that we learn no more details of his life beyond the
poem makes Chan’s reading all the more affecting. The poem tacks vividly
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between quotidian personal memories and the larger sweep of twentieth-
century history. Starting with “My smallpox vaccination from the colonial
times,” Chan reminisces about the spaces of his childhood in British Singapore: “Kretya Ayer, Cross Street, Ang Siang Hill, Tanjong Pagar . . . .” He then
provides an abridged version of World War II and the struggle for decolonization: “The Japanese dogs leave, the British monkeys return.”26 The moment of
liberation—signaled by the Malay word for independence, “Merdeka”—resonates across the archipelago, and is an event poetically attuned with the forces
of the natural world: “Amidst the wind and rain we surged / from self-governed
to Independence.” The poem reaches a crescendo in the last few lines: “All
these things I have seen / The History I have witnessed / I still have so much to
tell.” The poem’s poignancy is produced in the gap between the speaker and
an unwilling, absent, or lost interlocutor: “I still have so much to tell you [jiang
bu wan, literally: the telling cannot be completed].” It is not simply that Singapore is spatially absent or removed, but that the Singapore that could have
heard and assimilated Chan’s version of nationalist attachment—his time in
the jungle, the MCP experience, his twelve years of statelessness—no longer
exists. It must be summoned via Chan’s memory and the poetic figure of apostrophe, “Singapore, oh Singapore,” while the memory of this future continues
to exert psychic and physical pressure on the present: “How your present and
your future still preoccupy me [guadu qianchang, literally: anxiety hangs in
my belly] every day.” 27
Chan’s memory of national independence remains squarely at odds with
that of the “Singapore Story” narrative and prompts unanswered questions:
What should independence have meant for this aging, exiled MCP fighter?
Anachronistically, how can we remember the future of Singapore he imagined in 1963? Chan’s alternative poetic rendering of Singapore’s decolonization and its possible futures thus indexes the suppression of an entire political
imaginary that nevertheless persists into the present. Syed Aljunied notes, “In
Singapore, as in Malaya (later Malaysia), leftist activists were cast as ‘fanatics,’
‘extremists,’ ‘communists’ and ‘radicals’ who sought to challenge the moral
economy of the ruling regime. They were construed as wishing to stunt ‘progress’ and ‘development’ through their outright refusal to submit to the rule of
capital that colonialism set in place.”28 Telling a very different story of these
leftists, Chan’s melancholy poetry recitation forces us to recast Singapore’s
independent development as a complex and contested product of Cold War
decolonization rather than the unproblematic start date of the always anticipated “Singapore Story.” The scene works, moreover, by foregrounding its
unusual aesthetic mode: Chan’s recitation departs from the usual documentary
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genres of interviews, archives, and “slice of life” scenes, yet it conveys the specific sensibility of exile “better than any interview would have.” Rubbing up
against teleological state narratives, Chan’s scene works to return the island-
nation—so often extracted and abstracted by its exceptionality—to its regional
archipelagic location and its Cold War formation, opening up room for alternative, unrepentant historical perspectives.
Said suggests that the exile-nationalism dialectic requires a “working
through” of attachment and rejection, and on its other side lies a kind of ethical cosmopolitanism.29 In the film, this is the journey taken by surgeon Ang
Swee Chai. In an interview toward the end of the film, she describes her outrage and sadness at learning about the plight of the Palestinians, and her
epiphany in realizing that, like herself, “the whole nation of Palestine is in
exile—none of them can go home.” She recounts how, with her husband Francis, she established a medical humanitarian organization, Medical Aid for
Palestinians. Accompanying her narrative are photos of a slightly younger Ang
with survivors amid the rubble of Palestinian towns. In her clipped British-
inflected accent, she speaks movingly at a televised rally describing the suffering of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. Palestinians outside their
homeland, as she puts it, not only have to face death but face death as refugees
with those profound uncertainties, “Where are you going to be buried? . . . .
How are you going to meet up with your family?” That she has worked through
her own nationalist attachments seems confirmed by her ethical care for those
whose collective plight is overdetermined by the very problem of homelessness. I want to consider this scene in relation to the one it precedes in the film,
in which Chan recites his poem. Tan’s very deliberate juxtaposition of these
two emotional, and explicitly transnational, epiphanies—Ang’s identification
with Palestinians as a nation in exile, and Chan’s poetic declaration of love for
Singapore at the moment of taking Thai citizenship—at first seem to offer
another contrast of success versus failure. Ang’s story, in this light, seems the
legible, successful model of Said’s cosmopolitan “working through,” which
“transcend[s] national and provincial limits.”30 Chan’s poem, meanwhile,
expresses an unapologetic and almost jealous attachment to the country
he cannot forget; he is precisely the one who has failed to work through his
exilic predicament. Yet their very contrast—the eloquent, Anglophone
humanitarian doctor, and the unrepentant, unapologetic Chinese-speaking
communist—do more than invite us to ponder the diversity of Singapore’s
exilic experiences. At the affective and aesthetic level, they prove to be equally
compelling responses to exile. Moreover, they complicate our assumptions
around the radical excesses that had to be removed from Singapore for its
pursuit of success: Ang is the model well-educated, hardworking Singaporean
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doctor now acting in solidarity with Palestinians in the occupied territories;
Chan, who fought a literal guerrilla war as a communist, becomes a poet of
homesickness after being given a new home.
We might say that Tan’s documentary subjects and her remarkable film
archive the potentialities of other futures of Singapore beyond the pragmatist,
hypermodern city-state we know today. Her exploration of the dialectics of
inside/outside, exile/nationalism, Third World/Cold War, island/archipelago,
and decolonizing history/globalizing present raises crucial questions around
the politics of remembering postcolonial state repression, via untimely memories that emerge from the “wrong side of history.” As Gary Wilder has written
of anti-colonial thinkers Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor, to look back on
unrealized projects for emancipation beyond the event of independence
involves “remembering futures that might have been.”31 But such reflections
do so not only in the name of a liberal effort to offer a “balanced” assessment
of the meritorious dictator. Rather, they offer up such imaginaries in the name
of alternative visions of collective life that persist in the multiple and competing desires for a homeland.

Dictatorship and Homelessness:
Hwang Sŏk-yŏng’s The Old Garden
In turning to Hwang Sŏk-yŏng’s novel The Old Garden (Oraedoen chŏngwŏn),
we must reckon with significant differences between its context and that of
Tan’s film. To start, the PAP’s targeted anti-leftist purges of the 1960s and ’70s
must be contrasted with the generalized violence that followed the Chun Doo
Hwan military coup of 1980, as well as the different landscapes of public memory in contemporary Singapore and South Korea.32 Unlike the prompt 2014
banning of Tan’s film in Singapore, representations of the 1980 Gwangju
Uprising and the broader 1980s democracy movement that followed it have, by
now, become mainstream in South Korea. By the 1990s, citizens’ eyewitness
accounts and official investigations into the massacre brought the southwestern capital of Chŏlla Province to national attention, and much subsequent
political and historical analysis has attempted to fully determine the causes
and events of the government’s brutal repression of the Uprising. (The Uprising’s significance for the country’s 1990s “transition to democracy” is further
discussed in the next chapter.) Multiple studies have revealed the event was a
complex, ten-day affair that initially began as a student protest against General
Chun and in particular his arrest of the Chŏlla opposition politician, and later
president, Kim Dae-Jung. The violence escalated after elite paratroopers—
apparently specially trained for anti-communist combat in North Korea—were
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sent in to restore order, waging indiscriminate violence on the demonstrators.
The citizens retaliated: They staged mass street protests of 20,000–30,000
people, began arming themselves, and managed to hold the city for five days
before the military entered the city with a heavy arsenal of tanks to crush the
Uprising. The most conservative estimates put the death toll at around 500,
with another 3,000 injured.33 As Jang Jip Choi puts it, “Not since the Korean
War had the civilian population been so brutally victimized by the military.”34
The Gwangju 5.18 People’s Uprising (o-il-p’a minjung hangjaeng), or the
Gwangju 5.18 Democratization Movement (o-il-p’a minjuhwa undong) as it is
officially known, is now memorialized by public monuments, a museum, and
a yearly memorial service in Korea. In the process, however, the multivalent
struggles of workers, farmers, and students of which it was composed—like the
larger 1980s anti-government movement—have tended to be conscripted by
the liberal, linear narrative of the “democratization movement.”35
Whereas Singapore’s dominant narrative has been the “Singapore Story”
of postcolonial pragmatism and miraculous development, South Korea’s self-
narrative is somewhat more complicated. On the one hand, it shares Singapore’s bootstrapping exit from colonial subordination and wartime poverty,
albeit with Japan as its former colonial master and the United States as direct
neocolonial power. Yet unlike Singapore, on the other hand, it is one site in
the larger so-called “transition to democracy” political map of Asia in the
1980s and ’90s alongside the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
which all saw the end of martial law or dictatorship between 1986 and 1998.
Largely figured in the West as a political zero-sum game between a receding
authoritarianism and an awakening popular democracy movement (with the
United States as paradoxical guide and hindrance), the democracy “transition” story tends to privilege the moment of free elections (1986 for the Philippines, 1987 for South Korea, 1991 for Taiwan, and so on), occluding a myriad
of historical complexities and persisting injustices.36 In South Korea’s case, it
especially misses the Cold War episteme whereby the peninsula’s Cold War
division and U.S. military presence in the South persist beyond the official
end of the superpower contest; the two Koreas are, in fact, technically still at
war following the 1953 armistice.37 Some of these convoluted temporal effects
come into focus as we “look back” at South Korea’s authoritarianism of the
1970s and ’80s.
Hwang’s novel sets out in a different direction from much 5.18 scholarship
and collective memorializing that, while filling in the historical record and
honoring its victims, has attempted to recast peripheral Gwangju as a “Mecca”
of democracy activism and central to the “transition to democracy” narrative.38 His layered and polyvalent account of 5.18 prevents the Uprising’s
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assimilation into an evolutionary narrative focused on the arrival of electoral
democracy.39 The Old Garden does this by pushing the direct experience and
events of the 5.18 event to the background and presenting a wider account of
the period focalized through his two main protagonists, Hyun Woo (Hyŏn-wu)
and Yoon Hee (Yun-hŭi), both eccentric to the massacre itself. Indicating that
5.18 both is and isn’t the focus of the novel, the center of narrative gravity
becomes the tiny hamlet of Kalmae (Kalmoe) in the mountains of Chŏlla
Province where Hyun Woo is forced to go underground during the anti-leftist
crackdown that followed the Uprising. Yoon Hee—always ambivalent regarding radical politics—is a local schoolteacher who is drawn into helping him;
they eventually fall in love and spend a secluded, blissful summer in their
mountain retreat. Kalmae, I suggest, operates as a kind of space of internal
exile, a space both inside and outside the nation, a retreat from politics, but
also its place of reimagining. In this sense The Old Garden might be read as
the spatial inverse of To Singapore, with Love. Where the latter takes place
outside the formal territory of the nation, Garden unfolds both from the nonplace of prison, the black hole at the center of the South Korean military
regime where Hyun Woo will be detained for almost two decades, and from
the politically insignificant village of Kalmae.40
The novel’s supple rendering of 5.18 is partly achieved through the formally
complex arrangement of different perspectives and voices. One plot strand
involves Hyun Woo’s anti-government radicalism, his organization’s clandestine work around Seoul, his meeting Yoon Hee in Chŏlla Province, and his
eventual arrest and eighteen years of imprisonment. Told through Hyun
Woo’s first person narrative, this arc consists of a series of flashbacks from the
novel’s diegetic present of 1997—the year, not insignificantly, of the Asian
Financial Crisis and South Korea’s humiliating IMF bailout.41 Yoon Hee, who
dies of cancer two years prior to Hyun Woo’s release, tells her own intersecting, meandering story through the letters, diaries, and notebooks that Hyun
Woo finds when he returns to their former residence in Kalmae. Despite sharing narrative space on the page, the two lives are adjacent and asynchronous,
rather than connected. One effect of Hwang’s temporally disjunctive narrative
is that the novel refuses to present the 1980s in terms of a unified political
character; in a sort of double vision, “we see the 1980s not only through the
eyes of political activists but of ordinary citizens [p’yŏngbŏmhan sosimin] distanced from them.”42 Hwang’s fragmented narrative form has the further
advantage of incorporating multiple voices beyond the main protagonists43
and disrupting the typically gendered hierarchy of “political actor” versus
“love interest.” During Hyun Woo’s long years in prison, his world narrows to
the slow-moving microdramas of prison life, while it is Yoon Hee who goes on
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to live a life inflected by all the contradictions of Cold War South Korea.
Unmarried, she bears their daughter Eun Gyul (whom Hyun Woo is unaware
of until his release), returns to graduate study, runs her own art school in
Seoul, and is swept up in the 1980s anti-government student movement. She
eventually moves to Berlin to study art, the latter episode suggesting another
comparative Cold War lens through which to read the Korean peninsula.
Let’s look more closely at Hwang’s intricate staging of narrative voices and
its temporal effects. In a much commented upon passage in the novel, Hyun
Woo and Yoon Hee look down from Kalmae over the city of Gwangju, one
year after the massacre, and hold an impromptu memorial service for its victims. In this scene, I argue, the present can be perceived only as a moment out
of time. Yoon Hee records the episode in her diary, addressed in the second
person to Hyun Woo.
We opened a bottle of soju and poured some into the lid of the rice
bowl, and we knelt down to each other. I was a little embarrassed—
your somber silence made me feel uneasy. . . . You took out a piece of
paper and began reading out loud. You started with a year and month
and date, some long sentences that I can no longer remember. But I do
remember the last sentence, about longing for a new, different world.44
In a melancholic tone, Yoon Hee goes on to observe that “the classic revolutionary age [kojŏnjŏgin hyŏngmyŏng ŭi segi] was already finished.”45 The scene
is nevertheless imbued with a “longing for a new, different world,” and an
invocation of a united peninsula: In Hyun Woo’s transcribed words, “From
Baekdoo [in the North] to Halla [in the South], I can see the beautiful land of
Korea as one. But you are all gone now. What kind of world did you picture in
your mind? [dangsin dŭrŭn ŏtdŏn sesangŭl kŭrida kasyotnayo, literally: What
kind of world had you been drawing when you left?].”46 The “longing for a
new, different world” is circumscribed both by geopolitical boundaries and a
sense of postcolonial belatedness: The age of “classic” revolutions has been
foreclosed by a bipolar world order. Note that at the formal level, the scene is
marked by an unusually convoluted narrative temporality. Yoon Hee’s diary
entry is narrated in the second person (“You [dangsini] took out a piece of
paper. . . . You started with . . .”) while its addressee, Hyun Woo, is himself
addressing the absent victims of Gwangju. Furthermore, he is privy to Yoon
Hee’s written account only some years after she has died. The point of such a
layered narrative construction with its multiple addressees and temporalities,
we might surmise, is that the significance of 5.18 cannot be wholly relegated
to any one historical moment: It resides neither in Hyun Woo’s flashbacks of
the anti-government struggle nor in the novel’s diegetic present of the late
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1990s. Rather, the out-of-sync, second person address of Yoon Hee’s belated
diary entry is an attempt to collate the discrepant desires and temporalities
that point both forward and backward to a “new, different world.”
The past and present are conjugated slightly differently in one of Yoon
Hee’s earlier notebook passages, in which she meditates on her father’s life.
Yoon Hee knew him only as an alcoholic, broken man who was cared for
begrudgingly by Yoon Hee’s hardworking and thrifty mother. Only when he
is close to death does she come to understand his past political passions and
unrealized dreams, as well as the lifelong persecution he suffered in the South
as a result of his leftist commitments. She relates his story of returning from
his studies in Japan (the colonial metropole) and joining both the Preparation
Committee for Founding the Nation (Chosŏn kŏn’guk chunbi wiwŏnhoe) and
the Communist Party in the heady postliberation milieu where youth and
political groups of all stripes flourished.47 The next few years, however, saw the
hardening of political ideologies in the lead-up to the Korean War, particularly through events like the Taegu uprising of 1946 and the mass violence on
Cheju Island in 1948 (the latter is discussed in the following chapter).48 Her
father eventually fights for the North in the civil war, is taken prisoner, and
very narrowly escapes death.
Yoon Hee’s father’s story attests to the nonlinear historicity of the peninsula’s
tumultuous decolonization, division, and subsequent authoritarianism. The
year 1972—the year of Park Chung Hee’s notorious Yusin (“Revitalizing”)
reforms—is usually known as the beginning of the state’s more repressive and
overtly military rule;49 correspondingly, it is the year of radicalization for many
of Hyun Woo’s generation. But as Yoon Hee’s narrative reveals, it is also the year
that a new “Law of Society’s Safety” (sahoe anjŏn pŏb) mandates that “anyone
who once infringed on the Anti-Communist Law . . . be reinvestigated,”50
imperiling Yoon Hee’s father and the family anew. To secure a sponsor and
avoid imprisonment he must beg for the support of his powerful but despised
brother-in-law, a conservative lawyer. In another section of her posthumously
read diary, Yoon Hee imagines what her father would have gone through:
Ah, I can picture that day, my father meeting my mother at the market
and together going to my uncle’s law office to beg for clemency. I can
imagine my father’s return home. After sending my mom back to the
market, he walks down the busy, unheeding street in the middle of the
day, in the world where no one believes in his future. On the grand
avenues full of government buildings, where the whole street would
freeze during the daily ceremony of lowering the national flag, my
father tries to breathe and wander around the dark corridors of foreign
bookstores and used bookstores. And he buys the book on Goya for
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me, feeling the same way he did when he first saw the Goyas in Tokyo
as a young man from a colony. Those black-and-white images are like
fearful groans issuing from war and oppression [chŏnjaeng’gwa apje ŭi
kongp’oro kadŭk ch’an sinŭm kat’ŭn hŭkbaek hyŏngsangdŭrŭl].51
Yoon Hee’s father, a former colonial subject, nationalist, and communist, walks
the streets of Seoul as an outsider, “in the world where no one believes his future
[i sahoe esŏnŭn amudo chasin ŭi changnaerŭl midŏjuji annŭn . . . kŏri].” He is
spatially and temporally at odds with the symbols and aspirations of the rapidly
rising and militarized nation, with its “grand avenues full of government buildings” and flag ceremonies. Reprising his existence as a colonial subject in Tokyo,
he is the anachronistic remnant of a decolonizing desire that has been eliminated for the smooth functioning of the capitalist developmental state. In this
scene of intense alienation, vividly reimagined by his artist daughter, the only
legacy her father passes on is the intensity of aesthetic engagement.
The couple’s impromptu memorial service in Kalmae and Yoon Hee’s
imaginative reconstruction of her father’s experience in downtown Seoul
share several features. Both point to the way that responses to authoritarian
political repression demand a critique of Cold War decolonization as much as
opposition to politically repressive state forms. In other words, the development rationality of postcolonial South Korea simultaneously represses and
reactivates anti-colonial liberationist desires. Like To Singapore, with Love, the
novel deploys a temporal layering through the use of anachronistic subjects
and their memories. But unlike Tan Pin Pin’s literal examination of exile, The
Old Garden proceeds through a series of affiliated moments when the post
colonial nation itself becomes estranged territory, blurring the boundaries
between colonial, decolonizing, and postcolonial time.
There is one more important parallel with Tan’s film. This is the pronounced role of the aesthetic, specifically, the rhetorical figure of ekphrasis,
usually understood as the verbal description of a work of visual art. It is no
coincidence that the character of Yoon Hee is an artist; as she writes in one
diary entry, “A painting is a way of seeing.”52 As already mentioned, Hwang
mobilizes a multiperspectival and analeptic narrative structure that incorporates Hyun Woo’s and Yoon Hee’s consciousnesses in overlapping but discrepant fashion. The novel’s most striking expression of discrepant subjectivities is
surely the portrait Yoon Hee paints of Hyun Woo during their brief summer
together—at the very moment, he only later realizes, when she was newly
pregnant with their child.
Although she originally paints the portrait of Hyun Woo during their summer in Kalmae, in the last years of her life Yoon Hee inserts her own self-
portrait onto the canvas to create an impossible, asynchronous representation
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of the couple. Having come across it after her death, Hyun Woo attempts to
decipher its meaning through this extended ekphrastic description:
Her high cheekbones, the little lines under her eyes and the gray in
her hair, her cheeks painted with overlapping colors, together they
betrayed her withering youth and her solitude. But her eyes were calm
and collected, and there was that mysteriously tender smile. Here were
a thirty-t wo-year-old man and a woman in her forties, depicted in different colors and distinctive tones, standing side by side and watching
the world beyond the canvas. She was right behind me, not looking at
what was right in front of her but staring at something far away, over
my shoulder. Where was I looking, so nervous and pained? And where
was she looking years later, with the hindsight of her age? Which way
in the world were we going [segye ŭi ŏnŭ panghyangŭro kanŭn
kiriŏssŭlkka]?
In our garden, asters and cosmos began to bloom. Yoon Hee’s
school was about to start again. Our friends in Kwangju, those who
had somehow survived and gone through humiliating trials, were
released from prison on the thirty-sixth anniversary of the liberation
[August 1981], some pardoned, others paroled. . . . Around that time,
Yoon Hee was almost done with my portrait. It became all that was
left of my youth.53
The painting, with its intimate connection to the political events of 1980,
stands as a figure for what the novel seeks to perform in its looking back at 5.18.
Yoon Hee’s portrait poignantly refracts political time through biological time,
as the “hindsight of her age” (chagi sidae ŭi nunŭro, literally, “[looking]
through the eyes of her era) promises insight into the meaning of both Hyun
Woo’s long years in prison, as well as the meaning of the country’s anniversary
of liberation from Japan. It stands in not only for the tragedy of broken lives
and sundered families, but also the discomfiting temporal legacy of those who
fought for another kind of future, made unavailable by the time of the novel’s
present. The portrait indexes the disjunctural temporality of Cold War postcoloniality against the simple arithmetic of the “thirty-sixth anniversary of the
liberation.”
If the overthrowing of dictatorships in the postcolonial world is often told
as a narrative of “political liberalization” and “transitions” disconnected from
decolonizing formations, The Old Garden defiantly refuses such neat evolutionary trajectories. It shows, instead, how the energies and sacrifices that
brought the military government to an end were simultaneous critiques of
a Cold War logic that produced the “division system” and authoritarian
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structures on both sides of the 38th parallel.54 Like Chan Sun Wing’s poetry
recitation in To Singapore, with Love, the moment of explicit aestheticization
plays with the strictures of narrative time. Yoon Hee’s portrait is irreconcilable
with dominant redemptive histories of the liberalizing nation, although neither does it allow for an “unreflecting identification with these protagonists.”55
It redeems neither the couple’s love nor the political radicalism of the era.
Rather, it poignantly raises the problem of the hindsight of age—of looking
back at dictatorships—as a profound object of intellectual and aesthetic
inquiry, demanding new and revised ways to answer the enduring question,
“Which way in the world were we going?”

Untimely Postcolonialism
Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola have noted that postcolonial studies is
not beholden to “an absolute persistence” of colonial power. On the one hand,
the field is interested in the persistence of “vertical” threads of domination and
exploitation and, on the other, “the ambivalent role played by the failure of a
set of real, historically enacted projects of liberation from those very forms of
domination and exploitation.”56 Put otherwise, the failures of liberation projects have produced their own regimes of repressive power. What does this
equation look like, however, if the “historically enacted projects of liberation”
have been beset not by failure but—in a certain measure—by developmentalist successes? By interrogating their governments’ repression of radical nationalist and anti-imperialist energies, Tan’s film and Hwang’s novel once again
reject the notion of authoritarianism as a preparatory stage to be passed
through on the way to a fully developed capitalist democracy. Instead, their
figures of anachronism and exile trouble the Cold War logics of time and
space and reveal these states to be complex products of decolonizing desires,
colonial reactivations, and bipolar geopolitics.
This chapter has thus worked toward unsettling the temporality of the
“post” itself as a prefix that supposedly separates distinct epochs: postauthoritarian, postcolonial, post–Cold War. For Singapore—keeping in mind it has
not had a transition to the “postauthoritarian” moment—the exemplary postcolonial narrative of national independence and development yields to an
alternative, nonlinear temporality produced by unrepentant exiles beyond
the illiberal city-state. In South Korea, despite the violent intersections of
decolonization, division, and U.S. militarization, residues of other imagined
futures remain as untimely and unresolved components of the present. In
different ways, South Korea and Singapore invite a reckoning with our
assumed post–Cold War epistemology: first on the question of successful but
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authoritarian development, and second on the ongoing proscription of leftist
historiographies.
I conclude by returning to the opening of The Old Garden, in which we
find Hyun Woo recently released from prison and struggling with unfamiliar
modern technology. He is confounded by cell phones—the “small object that
looked like a transistor”57—as well as elevators and new high-rise architecture.
In so many ways, he functions in the narrative as a living anachronism, a
fairy-tale character who has awoken with astonishment to find the world
changed, and whose role is precisely to allow us to see this world anew.
Through their respective techniques of disjunctive narratives and the aestheticization of memory, Tan’s and Hwang’s works stage and archive the incompatible temporalities of liberation that subtend postcolonial development and
modernity. In their formal attentiveness to experiences of exile and dislocation, they present us with subjects of suffering and sacrifice from the wrong
side of history, who emerge unredeemed, unvindicated, and unassimilated by
a neoliberal historical reckoning. These anachronistic figures carry with
them energies and demands not just for another world that was never realized, but for the ongoing right to help define our political futures. In the next
and final chapter, I extend my examination of postcolonial untimeliness by
probing the temporalities of postauthoritarian transitional justice and the
still-open wounds of translocal anti-communist violence. Is it possible to render a notion of justice through the aesthetic inspection of pain, suffering, and
culpability? How can we do so in a way that does not reproduce either the
neoliberal triumphalism of the “end of history” or the civilizational binary of
Western-bestowed human rights and an illiberal Asia?
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Killing Communists, Transitional Justice,
and the Making of the Post–Cold War

September 30, May 18, and Transitional Justice
Toward the end of Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012 documentary, The Act of Killing (Jagal), we are presented with a scene of young women in gorgeous costumes dancing against the lush background of a waterfall. In the center is
Anwar Congo, a former death squad member who killed hundreds in the
1965–66 anti-communist, or September 30, massacres in Indonesia, and his
sidekick Herman Koto. Against the stunning backdrop and the uplifting
soundtrack of Matt Monro’s 1966 hit “Born Free,” two bedraggled communists who have miraculously returned from the dead remove their neck
wires—the efficient killing method Anwar claims to have developed and
which features in almost every scene of the film (Figure 8).
Oppenheimer’s film follows the production of a film-w ithin-a-fi lm,
whereby Anwar and several of his friends were asked to write and reenact the
1965–66 killings in any way they wanted. These perpetrators—who acted with
the support of the Indonesian military and helped kill between 500,000 and
2 million communists and suspected leftists—choose to reenact the massacres by way of a generic mash-up of Hollywood westerns, detective thrillers,
and musical numbers, an appropriate choice since for Anwar, an American
movie buff, “killing is acting.”1 Oppenheimer has called The Act of Killing a
film less interested in producing facticity than in documenting “the imagination of the killers,”2 and much scholarship has rightly focused on the way
the film brilliantly tacks between documentary and cinematic fantasy, the
real and the imaginary.3 As a result, “the film renders the distinction between
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Figure 8. “Dead” communists remove the wires that killed them in the film-within-a-film of
The Act of Killing.

authentic/fake, performance/re-enactment, reality/fantasy to be ultimately
undecidable.”4
Notably, the waterfall scene is a repetition of the one that began the film.
But whereas the opening scene presented the number in rehearsal mode, the
second time we are viewing its final, post-production version such that, diegetically, the “film-within-the-film” blends into Oppenheimer’s film itself.5 After
removing his neck-wire, one communist forces a smile, pulls out a medal and
places it around Anwar’s neck, thanking him “for executing me and sending
me to heaven.” The scene pushes the killers’ heroic self-image to the point of
absurdity, and would be ludicrous if we did not know by now that Anwar and
his accomplices are actually still treated as national heroes for wiping out the
communist threat. A previous scene has shown Anwar and his friends from
the paramilitary group Pemuda Pancasila appearing on TV to promote their
film-in-progress. In the interview, they are enthusiastically praised by an
attractive young talk-show host and the studio audience for their national service of exterminating the enemy. The aesthetic treatment seen in the waterfall
scene is, therefore, less fantastical than we might suppose.
In what version of our post–Cold War world can this lingering imaginary
of the communist enemy be possible? If the preceding chapter sought to interrogate the use of anachronism as a narrative structuring device that complicates
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nationalist teleologies of success, this chapter thinks more directly about the
constitution of the post–Cold War era itself, a period typically signaled by the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and
the People’s Republic of China’s transformation to a hybridized form of state
capitalism. In what ways, I ask, does the mass killing of communists and suspected communists in certain Third World countries complicate the story of
communism’s ideological death in which, as Thatcher famously stated in her
eulogy of Reagan, the Cold War was won “without firing a shot”?6 This chapter suggests that the uncomfortable “living on” of communist specters in
places such as Indonesia and South Korea demands a rethinking of the
assumptions of the bloodless victory of liberal capitalism. It also posits, as
Hwang Su-Kyoung has put it, “the rationale and legacy of anti-communist
violence . . . as a distinct phenomenon . . . [that] deserves attention in its own
right.”7 The texts that will help us with such a rethinking are Joshua Oppenheimer’s diptych of documentaries on the 1965–66 mass killings in Indonesia,
The Act of Killing (2012), already briefly introduced, and its sequel The Look of
Silence (Senyap) (2014). Alongside these, I examine Han Kang’s novel Human
Acts (Sonyŏni onda [Here comes the boy]) (2014), a lyrical exploration of the
Gwangju Uprising that tells of the 1980 military crackdown against anti-
dictatorship protests in that South Korean city (also the subject of Hwang Sŏk-
yŏng’s The Old Garden discussed in the preceding chapter). Both Oppenheimer
(born 1974) and Han (born 1970) are of a younger generation of artists who did
not personally experience the violence of these atrocities, with Oppenheimer
approaching his subject from a non-Indonesian perspective. Like others of
their generation, they critically look back on the violence of the Cold War
from a post-socialist moment. Han is an acclaimed South Korean author best
known for her Booker Prize–winning 2007 novel, The Vegetarian (Chaesikju’ŭija),8 while Oppenheimer, an American, began research into these two
films through work on his 2003 film, The Globalisation Tapes, a coproduction
with the Independent Plantation Workers’ Union of Sumatra. We should note
that The Act of Killing—which won numerous documentary film awards
around the world—and the Look of Silence were co-directed with an anonymous Indonesian director.
I choose these texts not as representative or authoritative cultural pronouncements on these events; there is by now a large corpus of works on both
September 30 and May 18.9 Rather, Oppenheimer’s and Han’s texts stand out
for their complex engagement with the narrative and temporal conventions
of transitional justice and its most common legal genre, the truth commission; I suspect this has contributed to the fact that both have circulated widely
beyond their local context. I frame my analysis in terms of the borrowing across
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legal and aesthetic genres for several reasons. First, as powerful cultural texts
that look back from our near-present to inspect atrocities of past decades, it is
difficult not to read Oppenheimer’s and Han’s works in terms of truth commissions and the documentation of human rights abuses more generally, or as
part of what Julie Stone Peters has called the late-t wentieth-century “culture
of testimony.”10 The films and novel include testimonial-like narratives and
interviews, witness statements, reenactments, and the cataloguing of perpetrators’ acts and victims’ suffering, although both do so in highly mediated ways
that are anything but a straightforward presentation of evidentiary truth.11
Nevertheless, these works critically reflect on the violence of past “free world”
authoritarianism by participating in a “normative human rights narrative of
atrocity, suffering, testimony and redress.”12
Beyond the obvious human rights aspects of these texts, I am also interested in the specific temporality that transitional justice and its imaginative
renderings traffic in. If the very idea of a truth commission is to produce the
“authoritative account of dictatorship,”13 such tribunals have been necessary
to the production of the broader historical notion of “transition” as well as to
a post–Cold War, post-socialist common sense. In Priscilla B. Hayner’s influential study of transitional justice, Unspeakable Truths, she writes on the
nature and goals of those “official bodies set up to investigate and report on a
pattern of past human rights abuses.”14 Arising in the 1980s and 1990s to
address human rights abuses in newly post-conflict societies, truth commissions are distinct from the legal inquiries of criminal cases because of their
broader intent “to address the past in order to change policies, practices, and
even relationships to the future, and to do so in a manner that respects and
honors those who were affected by the abuses.”15 By definition, “transitional
justice” is directional. The technologies of inquiries and commissions are possible only after the “transition” from a civil war, major conflict, or authoritarian regime, thereby allowing a country to reckon with past violence in its
journey toward liberal democracy. The goals and forms of transitional justice
therefore say as much about a post-conflict or post-authoritarian periodization as they do about the nature of the atrocity. As Hayner points out, what is
at stake in transitional justice is precisely the futurity of the collective. Notwithstanding the struggles of individual survivors, “society as a whole must
find a way to move on, to recreate a liveable space of national peace, build
some form of reconciliation between former enemies, and secure these events
in the past.”16
But how does a society “secure these events in the past”? In one sense, the
notion of transitional justice relies on an evolutionary narrative whereby
repression recedes as a more liberal and open democracy emerges, allowing
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silenced voices from the past to speak. Yet as a phenomenon deeply tied to
the collapse of the Soviet Union and dictatorships in Latin America and
Africa, the concept is also a reinscription of the way global Cold War conflicts
were resolved or “managed” in terms that could “secure the globalized system
of liberal economy.”17 Writing on the failed Grenada Revolution of 1979–83
and the trials that followed it, David Scott avers that transitional justice, above
all, “aims to draw a line between an illiberal past and the liberalizing present.”18 Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock concur that, contra the
linear evolution of nation-states toward “liberal and constitutional forms of
government,” truth commissions “indexed the shift from the global crisis of
the 1970s—where escalating cycles of conflict and polarization often led to
either repressive dictatorships or deadlocked civil wars—to the post–Cold War
would-be pax neoliberal.”19 Building on work by these scholars, I explore the
way that the narrative, moral and temporal forms of truth commissions, as they
are taken up by film and literature, grapple with the task of producing the
“now” as “the time not possible before.”20
This chapter is especially interested in how we reckon with the mass killings of suspected communists in a liberal narrative logic that at once testifies
to, and reconfirms the necessity of, the death of communism. In thinking carefully about how the figure of the communist is rendered in the work of both
Oppenheimer and Han, I want to ask what forms of justice can and cannot be
imagined by these texts. At the same time, I probe the genres of human rights
in ways that exceed the “postideological international” ethos of transitional
justice that legitimizes liberal universalism.21 Crystal Parikh has fruitfully suggested that we can think of the intersection of human rights and literature (or
film) in terms of how the imaginative text “shap[es] the notions of human
personhood, good life, moral responsibility, and forms of freedom that rights
claims seek to address.”22 By paying close attention to the aesthetic forms that
represent abuses and atrocities, such as novels and life-writing, she suggests,
we can also ask questions about “the social and political norms by which suffering and violence . . . and the distribution of social goods (e.g. security, pleasure, comfort) are imagined and justified.”23 Accordingly, I am interested in
how, during the Cold War anti-communist regimes of Indonesia and South
Korea, the distribution of suffering and social goods is organized around the
figure of the communist. Furthermore, we will see how the communist is
the transit point for mediating the gap, as Ariel Heryanto puts it, between “the
somewhat ‘abstract’ global and structural context (the cold war) that created
the conditions for the series of events in 1965 and . . . the ‘concrete’ lived
experiences of individuals within their immediate social environment and
relationships.”24 This figure is also, however, what sutures ongoing problems
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of decolonization with our contemporary moment of uneven neoliberal capitalism in ways that frustrate the truth commission’s role of drawing a clear line
between past and present. In other words, I’m interested in showing how the
specificity of anti-communist violence subtends narratives of transitional justice in ways that trouble the periodization of “post–Cold War” and “post-
authoritarian.” What makes Oppenheimer’s and Han’s texts so intriguing is
precisely the way they each render a particular aesthetic of killing communists
in our post-socialist present.
Before moving to the analysis of the texts, let’s again recall the historical
events that they reference. Oppenheimer’s two films revolve around one of the
deadliest—but still little understood—conflicts of the Cold War, when up to
two million communists or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) members, suspected communists, sympathizers, family members, and ethnic Chinese were
slaughtered across the archipelago following the still-debated events of September 30, 1965. On this date, six high-ranking military leaders were assassinated in what was supposedly an attempted coup by the PKI. The military
quickly took over in the ensuing national crisis, effectively clearing the way for
Major General Suharto (who mysteriously avoided assassination) to step in
and replace an ailing and politically discredited President Sukarno. Sukarno,
of course, had been a key figure of the Bandung Conference in 1955 and one-
time leader of the Third Worldist, non-aligned movement. By the early 1960s,
however, Sukarno himself had shifted both to the left and to more autocratic
methods, as he precariously balanced his two largest power bases, the military
and the PKI. With the latter constituting the largest non-bloc Communist
Party in the world at the time,25 U.S. strategists feared a communist Indonesia
would tip “the balance toward communism in Malaysia and then on through
mainland Southeast Asia.”26 Recent scholarship has shown the extent to which
these Cold War tensions precipitated interference from foreign governments,
especially the U.S.’s support for Indonesia’s military as an anti-communist
bulwark.27 The massive bloodletting of 1965–66 effectively destroyed the
country’s left, and fervent anti-communism would underwrite the next three
decades of Suharto’s New Order regime. Since the post-Suharto, Reformasi
era of the late 1990s, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM, established in 1993) has made ongoing efforts to push the government
into holding official investigations into 1965, without success.28 As yet no
killers have ever been brought to justice. Moreover, as we saw in Anwar’s TV
appearance, the PKI and leftists remain demonized as the nation’s number
one enemies in official histories and mainstream public perception.
The subject of Han’s novel Human Acts, the 1980 5.18 Gwangju Uprising (5.18
Gwangju hangjaeng), or Gwangju 5.18 Democritization Movement (Gwangju
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5.18 minjuhwa undong), as it is now known, resembles the Indonesian killings
in certain ways. As described in the previous chapter, the Uprising was also
preceded by a military coup—a successful one—in early 1980, which followed
the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in December 1979, the dictator
who had ruled South Korea with increasing repression for almost two decades.
In the chaotic months following Park’s death, mass protests were staged
around the country in expectation of a loosening of the military regime.
Instead, one of Park’s top generals, General Chun Doo Hwan (Chŏn Tu-
hwan), staged his own coup; martial law and the dissolving of the national
assembly quickly followed. On May 18, 1980, students and citizens in the
southwestern provincial capital of Gwangju rose up in mass protest only to be
viciously attacked by the military. Popular outrage manifested in even larger
demonstrations across the city such that the military retreated and the citizens
took over control of the city, arming themselves by raiding local armories and
police stations. After citizens had held the city for almost a week, special
troops reentered with tanks to brutally put down the Uprising, indiscriminately
killing hundreds and injuring thousands. While the Gwangju Uprising was
the subject of a high-profile inquiry and trial of military and political leaders
during the 1990s (more on this later), the trial focused on the Seoul command
and excluded prosecution of the soldiers involved. Anthropologist Linda S.
Lewis notes that despite the mid-1990s investigations, “it has never been made
clear who gave the order to open fire on civilian protestors, nor has anyone
been held specifically responsible for that decision.”29 In Han Kang’s poignant
epilogue to Human Acts, she describes the months of research she did in the
5.18 archives and the frustrating lack of justice for such brutal acts: “When I
first started poring over the documents, what had proved most incomprehensible was that this bloodshed had been committed again and again, and with
no attempt to bring the perpetrators [choe’in] before the authorities. Acts of
violence committed in broad daylight, without hesitation and without regret
[choeŭisikdo mangsŏrimdo ŏmnŭn hannaj ŭi p’ongnyŏk].”30
The preceding accounts do not, of course, deny or condone the violence
and excesses of various communist regimes in Asia, epitomized by the brutal
policies of the PRC’s Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 and the Khmer
Rouge’s mass killings of 1975–79 in Cambodia.31 Instead, my goal is to draw
attention to the way that killing communists—with “killing” deployed as a
transitive verb—has been subordinated in the dominant Cold War episteme
to killing in its adjectival form—that is, murderous—communists.32 Further,
in both the September 30 events and the 5.18 Uprising, we must also note the
murky role of the United States. In Indonesia, it is fairly certain the CIA played
a role in encouraging the purge, which followed years of domestic interference
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by the U.S.,33 while in South Korea the vast U.S. military forces based there
were—as they still are—controlled through a power-sharing agreement
between the U.S. and South Korea, unavoidably raising the question of American complicity or at least tolerance of the civilian massacre. And we cannot
ignore the decades-long military and economic support provided by the U.S.
for both the Indonesian and South Korean dictatorships, in a pattern all too
familiar across the Third World.

Narrating Atrocity
In this brief section, I examine some of the ways that our cultural texts intersect with, borrow from, and trouble the narrative conventions of truth commissions and transitional justice. In his work on the relationship between
literature and truth commissions in the context of South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Paul Gready observes the efflorescence of literary and cultural production both during the commission’s hearings and following the 1998 publication of its first five-volume report. Examining novels
by J. M. Coetzee, Zoë Wicomb, and others, Gready shows how “culture has
meditated upon the meanings of its keywords (truth, justice, reconciliation),
retold its stories and reinvented its meta-narrative and metaphors . . . suggesting ongoing processes of reworking and the presence of the past in the present.”34 Literature and culture are able to address “the uncomfortable truths”
and “unfinished business” of the commission.35 In this sense, literature has
more than a supplementary relationship to truth commissions. In his study of
the same commission, Mark Sanders has elegantly theorized the “interdependence” of law and literature,36 arguing that the “ambiguity in all languages
that . . . designates the literary, abides at the very nub of forensic procedure.”37
Grandin, meanwhile, in an overview of decades of counterrevolutionary violence in Latin America, has described Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1968) as a kind of “gypsy’s prophecy” or “anticipatory
truth commission, a revelation of terror yet to come.”38 In different ways,
Gready, Sanders, and Grandin point to the way that literature and culture
might help constitute, and challenge, the forms and assumptions of transitional justice.
We can begin a comparison between Oppenheimer’s and Han’s works by
looking at the ways they each draw from the temporal arc implicit to truth
commissions, whereby we ideally move from suffering and truth-telling to
reconciliation, justice and healing. The Act of Killing is partly driven by a narrative progression that moves toward the moral redemption of Anwar Congo,
the movie-ticket scalper and former death squad member, who is initially

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 162

5/18/21 3:13 PM

KILLING COMMUNISTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AND THE POST-COLD WAR

163

completely remorseless. In the process of planning out and acting in the film-
within-a-film on the killings, he gradually becomes aware of the enormity of
his crimes. After shooting a particularly violent scene of the burning of a communist village, children and extras are visibly shaken and traumatized by the
reenactment. Observing the way the reenactment has merged with the atrocity itself—evidenced by the crying children, exhausted extras, and smoldering
wreckage of the village—Anwar begins to see his actions from a different
perspective and confesses to the filmmaker, “Honestly what I regret is . . . I
never thought it would look this awful.”39 The “awful” truth of the past seems,
finally, to emerge after decades of political impunity. The heroic aesthetic of
killing communists that Anwar and his colleagues have enjoyed creating for
the big screen turns on itself and, by the end of the filming, their actions are
revealed to be no more than murder, torture, and cruelty. It is precisely this
self-doubt, this dawning remorse, that begins to redeem Anwar and the other
killers toward a moral trajectory of reconciliation.40
In contrast, The Look of Silence may perhaps be described as taking the
form of a frustrated truth commission. Rather than focus on the perpetrators,
the sequel film revolves around the victims of 1965, in particular, Adi, an optician who performs eye exams as he surreptitiously interviews the men responsible for his own brother’s death. In interview after painful interview, Adi tells
his clients of his brother’s gruesome death, which occurred as part of a three-
month-long orgy of killing at Snake River, Medan. Leading with questions like
“How do you see these events?” he is continually rebuffed by the perpetrators
who dismiss him with comments like “the past is the past” and justifications
that communists were known to be irreligious and sleep with each other’s
wives.41 As the details of the horrific violence pile up in these interviews, it is
the killers’ remorse—rather than official punishment—that Adi yearns for, and
which equally structures the viewer’s response. As Adi tells his mother when
she implores him to drop his inquiries, reconciliation is the goal: “If they felt
regret, we could forgive them.”42 If anything, the failures of The Look of Silence
only confirm the logic of transitional justice by underscoring the impossibility
of individual justice when the larger political conditions for truth-telling and
“moving on” are not there.
Similarly focused almost solely on victims rather than perpetrators, Han’s
Human Acts is structured by the moral arc of truth-telling and mourning. The
novel is an exquisitely crafted, complex text made up of six intersecting chapters, each told from the perspective of a different character caught up in the
events of 5.18 and lingering on the painful experiences and reverberations of
the event. These include the central protagonist/victim Dong-ho, a middle-
school student who joins the protests; the victim’s friend; the victim’s fellow
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protestors; the victim’s mother; and so on. In one chapter, the narrative even
goes beyond the many gruesome details of death and torture to provide an
account of the victims’ bodies after death. The following is narrated by Jeong-
dae (Jŏng-dae), friend of Dong-ho, whose spirit witnesses his own body’s
decomposition after the soldiers remove the dead.
Following the gestured instructions of one who looked to be in charge,
they [the soldiers] stacked the bodies in the neat shape of a cross [yŏlsipja ro ch’agok ch’agok momdŭrŭl ssaha’ollyŏssŏ]. Mine was second
from the bottom, jammed in tight and crushed still flatter by every
body that was piled on top. Even this pressure didn’t squeeze any more
blood from my wounds, which could only mean that it had all leaked
out already. With my head tipped backwards, the shade of the wood
turned my face into a pallid ghost of itself, eyes closed and mouth
hanging half open.43
Part of an entire chapter narrated by Jeong-dae’s spirit, this description mediates between the dead and the living; the spirit can sense the moment of others’ deaths, but not ascertain the details. Yet formally, it is presented as simply
another eyewitness account of the killings, another partial testimony among
others, albeit one from beyond the grave.44 Deborah Smith’s translation, which
takes some liberties with the Korean, tends to emphasize the novel’s human
rights framing even further; Han’s poetic chapter titles in Korean—“The
Young Bird” (orin sae), “Black Breath” (kŏmŭn sum), and “Metal and Blood”
(soe wa p’i)—are replaced by something like dated witness statements: “The
Boy. 1980”; “The Boy’s Friend. 1980”; and “The Prisoner. 1990.” Such titling
certifies Han’s novel as, above all else, a work of testimony and mourning in a
form that could not take place for almost two decades after the Uprising.45
The novel’s movement from truth-telling to mourning and healing is most
explicitly narrated in the chapter-length author’s epilogue. Titled “The Writer.
2013” in the English translation, but the more evocative “nun dŏp’in lampŭ”
(“The Snow-covered Lamp”) in Korean, the chapter recounts Han’s motivations for writing the novel. Raised in Gwangju until the age of nine but living
in Seoul by the time of the Uprising, Han first hears of the massacre by eavesdropping on the whispered conversation of adults and sneaking a look at a
clandestine photo book of the victims, whose bloody images are seared in her
memory. A personal connection drives the novel’s shape: A boy, Dong-ho, on
whom the central character of the novel is based, had lived in her family’s
former house in Gwangju, and his story becomes the connective tissue of the
book. The epilogue narrates Han’s return to Gwangju in winter 2013 in order
to research the event at the 5.18 archives at Chonnam National University. Her
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“initial intention was to read each and every document I could get my hands
on,” but the nightmares soon become intolerable.46 She also searches for
Dong-ho’s photos and records at the middle school he attended, visits the site
of the old house (now torn down) and interviews anyone who knew the family.
Most poignant is her interview with Dong-ho’s brother who relates not only
the tragedy of the boy’s death, but the painful process of having the body
exhumed in 1997 for reburial in the official May 18 National Cemetery. He
describes the harrowing experience of exhumation and reburial, which
involves cleaning his brother’s bones with his elderly mother: “I was worried
that the skull would be too much for our mother, so I hurriedly picked it up myself
and polished the teeth one by one. Even so, the whole experience clearly shook
her to the core [kŭ irŭl igigiga himdŭsyŏtdŏnkabonda].”47 Following Dong-ho’s
personal story to its last possible moment, the epilogue concludes with the
author visiting the snow-covered cemetery and lighting three candles next to
Dong-ho’s grave. The author’s own journey from childhood rumors and half-
knowledge to full knowledge and moral accounting thus constitutes its own
transitional justice narrative in miniature, the aesthetic result of which the
reader finds holding in her hands. Yet it also operates at the level of national
allegory, whereby the suffering of the Gwangju people must be investigated,
remembered, redeemed, and properly mourned by the citizenry at large.
Read thus, Oppenheimer’s and Han’s works function as filmic or literary
truth commissions: They are instances of aestheticized truth-telling in the
absence of full knowledge and official justice. The events of 1965–66 and 1980
are brought to ethical scrutiny by showing how the atrocities of the past continue to exert pressure on the present in the ongoing demands for truth, justice, reconciliation, and proper mourning. Beyond these striking narrative
conventions, however, how might Oppenheimer’s and Han’s works grapple
with reconciliation not just between victims and perpetrators, but between the
nation’s authoritarian past and its apparently democratic, post–Cold War present? How do these texts narrate the temporal “from” and “to” of transitional
justice, and in what ways can cultural texts offer an “alternative grammar of
transition” in which truth-telling follows an “unpredictable calendar”?48

Killing Communists
Let us return to the scene with which we began: the fantasy of the smiling dead
communist. We have already noted the generalized impunity of the killers in
contemporary Indonesia, which might explain the bizarre, grotesque scene of
the communist who is grateful for his own death. There is, however, a more
concrete historical referent. In a scene in The Look of Silence, Adi watches an
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NBC news clip from 1967. As an American journalist speaks with locals in Bali
about the recent killings, one man explains to him, “Now Bali has become
more beautiful without communists” and, more puzzlingly, insists that “some
of them want[ed] to be killed.” The journalist looks confused, but the report
proceeds without comment and cuts to a Goodyear rubber plantation in Sumatra, where the footage shows a number of surviving, bedraggled communists
who are now forced to work the plantation at gunpoint. What is such an affront
to the contemporary viewer of Oppenheimer’s films is that the 1965–66 killers
and their defenders seem just as convinced of the ideological righteousness of
killing communists now as during the 1967 NBC news report. We might say
that it is the time warp that transports the liberal, post–Cold War viewer back
into the midst of the bipolar standoff that makes both The Act of Killing and
The Look of Silence so disorienting. Over the course of the first film, Anwar
repeatedly refers to a social geography that is indelibly stained by the presence
of communists: This area, he remarks in one scene, was a “communist neighborhood”; in another we see Chinese merchants who are still treated as communists to extort; the background sound of a call to prayer prompts Anwar to
inform us that the muezzin himself “used to be a communist”; while in The
Look of Silence, an angry perpetrator accuses Adi of being a “secret communist” during a tense interview. The contemporary social world of Indonesia is
peopled with undead communists.
In 2012, a whole issue of the leading Indonesian news magazine Tempo was
devoted to The Act of Killing, constituting one of the most important public
interventions to date into the ongoing silence around the killings. In an opinion
article, the editors begin by restating the methods and logic of reconciliation:
Reconciliation cannot begin with a denial, but with an admission.
That is what we need to hear from the people responsible for the 1965
mass killings, and those who supported them. As in the phrase “truth
and reconciliation,” the order of the words shows the first is a prerequisite for the second.49
They then point out Indonesia’s illogical and anachronistic attachment to the
perceived communist threat and call for an end to the official government ban
on communism, which has amounted to a ban on investigating 1965:
There is no reason for us to fear communism. The ideology is long
bankrupt. The Soviet Union is no more and China is now as capitalist
as the United States. The idea of a classless society is an obsolete and
futile utopia.
Therefore there is no longer any need for a ban on spreading communist teachings such as Marxism and Leninism. . . . There must be
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no more bans on books about 1965—or anything else. What needs serious attention is the stigmatization of communism and its victims. The
long-held belief that communism equals atheism is mistaken. In other
words, there is no need to worry about communism, because as an ideology, it is really nothing special [biasa saja, or “so-so”].50
Their argument goes something like this: We are post–Cold War; global communism has been confirmed dead by history and is no longer a threat, so let us
now tell the truth about this atrocity! We are reminded here of Jacques Derrida’s
comments on communism’s lingering spectrality in the wake of the collapse of
the Soviet bloc. In his 1993 book, Specters of Marx, Derrida ventriloquizes the
triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama’s well-known “end of history” argument:
Communism “is only a spectre without a body, without a present reality, without actuality . . . it was only a spectre, an illusion, a phantasm, or a ghost: that
is what one hears everywhere today.”51 I want to argue that Oppenheimer’s
films reveal a different post–Cold War haunting than Derrida’s Marxist
hauntology. To do so, Oppenheimer presents a distinct aesthetic of communist
haunting, one that refracts the event of large-scale killing through the social
and economic world that was created in its aftermath. There are three iterations of this aesthetic mode I wish to examine: first are the scenes of consumer
stupor set in a big, glassy shopping center, where one of Anwar’s fellow perpetrators, Adi Zulkadry,52 wanders through the displays with his family; second,
the barely contained violent display of militarized homosociality in the Pemuda
Pancasila rallies; and, third, the brief interview and home tour with Haji Arif,
a successful businessman and Pemuda Pancasila member.
Of the first iteration, we can immediately note the contrast between the
shots of the sterile shopping center with the melodramatic acting, over-the-top
costumes and energy of the reenactment scenes. In two scenes, the camera
simply follows Zulkadry as he, his wife, and grown daughter languorously
wander through a gleaming mall. In the first scene they sit at a café table, a
look of supreme boredom on Zulkadry’s face as his daughter and wife take
selfies together. In the second, we see them stroll through a department store,
running their hands over merchandise and staring at watches and perfume
displays, while Zulkadry’s voice-over recites the methods used for killing their
victims: “We shoved wood in their anus until they died. . . . We hung them.
We strangled them with wire. We cut off their heads.” Interspersed with these
scenes of distracted consumerism are lingering, static shots that portray sales
clerks waiting for customers, their forced posture and sleek uniforms aligning
the humans with the commodities that surround them (Figure 9).
These odd juxtapositions of sterile, zombie-like mall culture crowded with
Western brand names remind us that Suharto’s “New Order” Indonesia was
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Figure 9. A sales clerk waits for customers in The Act of Killing.

not about terror and military repression alone. As we’ve seen in earlier chapters, the elimination of communists was also a moment of “primitive accumulation,” which produced “a cheap and submissive labor force” attractive to
foreign capital and left the country free to prioritize export-oriented economic
growth.53 Meanwhile, General Suharto explicitly supplanted Sukarno’s Third
Worldist, decolonizing ideology of “revolution” with one of technocratic,
Western-oriented “development,” or pembangunan.54 The shopping mall
functions as a metonym for the everyday world that resulted from the elimination of leftists, indexing Indonesia’s rise in the ranks of newly industrializing
Asian-Pacific economies. Heryanto summarizes the constitutive link between
Suharto-era authoritarianism and economic expansion:
Those coercive elements [of the regime] coexist alongside, and in juxtaposition with, convivial entertainment, festive activities, and the
spectacle of fun, humor and laughter. In Indonesia and its neighboring
countries, cold war authoritarian repression ran in tandem with sustained economic growth, industrialization, and an expanding desire
for global consumerism. Such jarring cognitive dissonance and irony
is illustrated abundantly in the film [The Act of Killing].55
Oppenheimer’s film, therefore, is not only an investigation into individual
guilt and responsibility for “acts of killing” from a moment that is constitutively different from the past; it gestures toward the very continuity between
past atrocity and present prosperity. Recalling that the task of the U.S. and its
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allies was to ensure “Indonesia’s full integration into a liberal international
political and economic order over which they presided,”56 we can better understand how demands for economic reconciliation during the Cold War years
have stymied political reconciliation and transitional justice in the present.
The second iteration of this aesthetic, which can be traced more briefly,
concerns the Pemuda Pancasila, which can be translated as “patriotic youth.”57
These scenes work with little need for formal juxtapositions. Here, young men
in garish orange camouflage uniforms gather in fields or stadiums and are
egged on by both their thuggish leaders and well-dressed government officials
and parliamentary representatives. The latter, amazingly, have no shame associating with a paramilitary organization whose regular functions include
political intimidation and the protection of illegal businesses. The legitimacy
of paramilitary organizations as integral to the political system was made possible, as Taufik Abdullah points out, by the fact that Suharto’s New Order state
stressed the ultra-nationalist Pancasila as the “ideological foundation of all
social and political organizations.”58 These scenes are visual evidence of the
way state-sponsored violence against leftists has been normalized as the everyday functioning of a de-radicalized society. Additionally, the militarization of
the Suharto government deployed a logic that twinned developmentalism
with anti-communism in a recipe echoing other regional autocrats. Thus,
“ ‘long-term’ military control of politics was justifiable since modernization
was a decades-long national project,” and the communist threat of instability
to that project could be countered only by “military surveillance in all fields
of national life.”59
Finally, in the third iteration (Figure 10), the soft-spoken businessman Haji
Arif patiently explains why the political elite cannot do without the organization. In a gentle voice mixing English with Indonesian, he states the obvious:
“Everyone is terrified of the paramilitaries.” He then explains that when a
business wants to expropriate land, for example, the organization “helps” and
makes the sale happen at whatever price the buyer wants. Furthermore, the
youth group “doesn’t allow for political protests” when politicians visit. Visually, Haji’s calm exposition is paired with a tour around his mansion, its rolling
grounds, and a special display room of his most prized possession—a collection of ostentatious jeweled and crystal figurines, each of which, we are
assured, is “very, very limited.” This scene, I insist, should be read as another
version of the aesthetics of killing communists. Haji’s enormous house and his
room of priceless treasures are exactly the material index of the unchallenged
ability to concentrate wealth, land, resources, and political power. In this aesthetic logic, grasping the truth of the communist purge requires no colorful
reenactments, no contemplative acts of memory or mourning, and no digging
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Figure 10. Haji Arif with his collection of crystal figurines in The Act of Killing.

up of bodies. It is to Oppenheimer’s credit that he succeeds in capturing not
only the aesthetic forms of the perpetrators’ imaginations, but the everyday
aesthetic results of the larger social “common sense” that was produced as the
enduring aftermath of the massacres: shiny, soporific malls; hyper-masculinist
displays of militarized power; and mansions full of treasures. As the press
notes from the film’s anonymous co-director put it, “the true legacy of the
dictatorship” is “the erasure of our ability to imagine anything other.”60
Anthropologist Heonik Kwon has written elegantly of the way that the bipolarization of political forces flashes up with special violence in the decolonizing world. Drawing on examples from Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia, he
notes that anti-communist violence was often justified by “essentialized idioms of differences and often targeted the collective social units to which these
individuals belonged.”61 In common expressions like “red seed” or “red blood
line,” the ideology of communism is seen as something biological, genealogical, and inheritable, requiring nothing less than its elimination from the
roots.62 As Oppenheimer’s films reveal, the communist body is that upon
which unlimited, almost imponderable, transgenerational violence may be
inflicted. In Indonesia, the national body must be constantly purified anew, a
logic evinced in the “clean-self” (bersih diri) and “clean environment” (bersih
lingkungan) movements that justified continued vigilance against communists. Former PKI members, their children, and even grandchildren were
marked as such on their national ID cards enabling discrimination in certain
jobs and educational opportunities. As we saw earlier with the Malayan Emergency, the Chinese community—with their status as perpetual foreigners and
assumed links to the PRC—were especially targeted. The logic of colonial
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racial governance is reconstituted in the targeting of certain races as always
already potential communists, enemies of the nation. The strategic adaptability of this logic is clear in the paradoxical fact that Chinese Indonesians bore
the stigma as both anti-national communists and rapacious capitalists simultaneously.63 The postcolony thus inaugurates what Kwon has called a “new
bipolar color line,” which “encompassed societies previously divided by the
traditional color line, partly replacing the latter in significance and partly
complicating it.”64
Moreover, as Lisa Yoneyama has suggested, the arrangement of “Cold War
justice has set the parameters of what can be known as violence and whose
violence, on which bodies, can be addressed and redressed.”65 Indeed, in the
world of Oppenheimer’s films, the only violence that can be recognized is still
that committed by the undead communist. These films, therefore, confound
fundamental assumptions of truth-telling and reconciliation, which aim, as
Grant Farred reminds us, for the past to be “narrativized into history [so that]
the past can be sutured (in)to the present.”66 The figure of the undead communist, I argue, blocks such a reconciliatory suturing by laying bare the way
our own post–Cold War pax neoliberal was partly achieved through such past
violence. The careful aesthetic compositions of The Act of Killing and The
Look of Silence unravel the logic of transitional justice whereby atrocities must
be addressed in a present that is differentiated from the illiberal excesses of the
past. Instead, we see how the “post–Cold War” period is haunted by an
entrenched Cold War ontology, still populated with undead communists.
Thus, in Indonesia the “specter of communism” is not the ghost of a discredited ideology put to rest by Fukuyama’s “end of history.” As in other parts of
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, communism assumes a spectral quality not
because of its historical insubstantiality—that “so-so” ideology as the editors
of Tempo reassure us—but because of the hundreds of thousands of men and
women who were slaughtered, tortured, imprisoned, and terrorized in the
name of its supposed antonym, freedom.
As already mentioned, the national context of the Gwangju 5.18 Uprising
and massacre is, in many ways, distinct from the killings in Indonesia, not
least for there having been a special inquiry and trial. We must also acknowledge the differing infrastructure of killings: In Indonesia, death squads, gangsters, and paramilitaries did the state’s dirty work, while the military, with help
from the CIA, conveniently provided lists of suspected communists and transported political prisoners to killings sites, all the while spreading propaganda
about their murderous intent.67 In South Korea, by contrast, the perpetrators
were unambiguously the military acting on orders from the political leadership. In 1995 a special legislative act was decreed that enabled the prosecution
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of crimes related to 5.18 to proceed after the statute of limitations (15 years) had
technically passed, and the decision from the special trial was handed down
in 1997. Remarkably, the appellate court convicted the two most recent former
Korean presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Ro Tae Woo (No T’ae-woo), a number of high-ranking politicians, as well as chaebol (conglomerate) business
leaders who supported them, with the somewhat tautological crime of “treason and homicide for the purpose of treason.”68 Legal scholar Han In Sup
provides a useful overview of the way the inquiry shared characteristics of a
truth commission (though it wasn’t called as such). Beyond the criminal prosecution, it was guided by five principles, namely, “truth, justice, compensation, honor restoration and commemoration.”69 In Han In Sup’s opinion, the
“justice” portion of the process was relatively well served, given the high-
ranking convictions. That all of the convicted were subsequently pardoned by
the next incoming president, former dissident opposition leader, political prisoner, and Cholla-region native Kim Dae-jung is not insignificant and shall be
discussed below. Despite the fact—alluded to in Han Kang’s epilogue—that
the individual perpetrators were never brought to trial, the Gwangju massacre
was front and center of the country’s transition to post-dictatorship in the 1990s
during South Korea’s first civilian government led by President Kim Young-
Sam (1993–98). The 5.18 Uprising thus condenses a very different public memory than the events of 1965–66 in Indonesia.
Yet my focus in Han’s novel is, again, the figure—or perhaps more accurately, the absence—of the communist and what it can reveal about the post-
authoritarian transition. According to Han In Sup’s account of the five
principles of the special inquiry, literature, film, and architectural monuments
would come under the fifth principle of “commemoration,” which he defines
as “a way to revive the memory of the original tragedy.”70 Human Acts is centrally organized around this task. Its penultimate chapter, narrated by Dong-
ho’s aging mother, is nothing short of heartbreaking in its depiction of the way
lives are shattered and permanently haunted by loss. I suggest, however, that
Han’s novel may be better understood by the logic of the fourth category,
“honor restoration.” Han In Sup defines this as the “restoration of legal status
and social position to those who were . . . stigmatized as rebels or rioters or
were colored with red (communist).”71 I suggest that at least part of the aesthetic remit of Han’s novel is to re-humanize and redeem those who suffered
not only the violence of the military, but also the biological, genealogical
stigma of rebellion and radical leftism that attached (and still attaches) to the
people of Gwangju. Recall that in the 1980s, official government reports of the
Uprising blamed “wayward rioters” and “mobsters” for the turmoil and justified the military repression by claiming “that impure elements or armed
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North Korean commandos might infiltrate Kwangju.”72 Although the Uprising was not fomented by North Koreans, the state’s view that any civil unrest
was potentially communist draws on a long history of interpretive authority
that legitimates preemptive military violence. It is no wonder that, in a sort of
reverse logic to Oppenheimer’s films, there are no communists—dead or
alive—in Han’s novel.
Human Acts does such an exemplary job of restoring honor to—or perhaps
“de-communizing”—the victims of 5.18 that the first revelation of the perpetrators’ anti-communist logic arrives as something of a surprise. For the first
half of the novel, Han provides allusive, partial accounts of middle-schooler
Dong-ho’s death, creating a foreboding that is finally discharged at the end of
Chapter 4. This chapter is narrated by a former university student and protestor who was subsequently imprisoned and mercilessly tortured for several
years; his punishment was especially harsh as he had been armed at the time
of capture. Although the bulk of the chapter recounts his harrowing time in
prison, its primary function in the larger narrative is to give testimony of
Dong-ho’s death. The latter occurs in the final, climactic standoff between
the hard core of the citizen protestors—who had occupied the Provincial
Office in the center of downtown and were armed—and the soldiers who
return to retake the city. It is at this point in the narrative that Han characterizes an individual perpetrator for the first time in the novel. An officer who
has just ordered the beating of a group of poorly armed students explains that
“I was in Vietnam, you sons of bitches. I killed thirty of those Vietcong bastards with my own two hands. Filthy fucking reds [ssip’al ppalgaengidŭl].”73
The narrator, who has been forced to the ground by other soldiers, witnesses
Dong-ho’s death in all its cruelty: “The bullets tore into those school kids
without hesitation. My head inadvertently jerked up, and when he [the officer]
whooped in the direction of his subordinates, ‘As good as a fucking movie,
right?’ I saw how straight and white his teeth were.”74 Echoing the centrality
of mediation and screen fantasies in The Act of Killing, the officer imagines
himself the hero of a Hollywood action film, picking off the evil commies. But
more relevant is the reader’s realization that from the perspective of the state
and military, the citizens of Gwangju simply are communists. Indeed, it is
widely assumed that the particular brutality of the attacking soldiers was partly
due to the fact of their being special forces intentionally trained for North
Korean combat.75 Whether the protestors were actual communists or simply
vulnerable to communist collaboration was immaterial; as Hwang Su-Kyoung
writes in her study of anti-communist violence before and during the Korean
War, South Korean counterinsurgency campaigns could be “based on the
suspicion that [leftist and workers’ groups] might collaborate with the Soviet
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Union if given half the chance.”76 By the time of the 1980 Uprising, of course,
the communist threat was a much more tangible and regional threat, with
China backing North Korea and South Korean troops only recently returned
from Vietnam.
Grandin has written of the way “the slander ‘Bolshevik’ became continental currency” in prewar Latin America, while after World War II the “evolving
Cold War offered a new repertoire of reference” with the backing of the new
imperial hegemon, the U.S.77 Anti-communism morphed into a global movement that mirrored the international left in scope and was able to translate
local conflicts and social environments into a universal struggle. In Guatemala,
the focus of Grandin’s study, anti-communist students “affected an insurgent
internationalism exuberant in tone and content, communicating with other
anti-communist movements not only throughout Latin America but in Asia as
well.”78 Han’s novel reveals—most strikingly in this pivotal scene of Dong-ho’s
death—the powerful way international anti-communism produces a hermeneutic authority that legitimizes violence. The officer boasts, “I killed thirty
of those Vietcong bastards,” with the assumption that he is merely eliminating
more of them. The scene forces us to recall the crucial pedagogical role of
other Asian “Cold” War conflicts, and the fact that, in a lucrative deal between
Presidents Johnson and Park Chung Hee, South Korea provided some 300,000
troops to support the U.S. in Vietnam.79 As Daniel Y. Kim has noted, the novel
demands to be read for the way its history “spans the distance between both
that east Asian country [South Korea] and ones in southeast Asia, and also
between that region and the US.”80 In Han’s remarkably condensed aesthetic
form, the perpetrator’s logic points to the larger geopolitical conditions of anti-
communist ideology in South Korea.
In temporal terms, the killer’s boast also takes us further back to the moment
of decolonization/division in 1945, that is, the simultaneous liberation from
the Japanese, and the partition and occupation of the peninsula by the Soviets
in the North and Americans in the South. As I’ve already argued, Cold War
decolonization is less about an “exit narrative” in which the colonizers leave,
and more an “entry, with considerable baggage, into a new world order.”81 In
this view, Gwangju 1980 may better be understood as an aftershock of a more
foundational violence that occurred during the political transitions of thirty
years prior, that is, from colony of Japan to the South’s military occupation by
the United States and the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Following the period of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK),
from 1945 to 1948, pro-U.S. Syngman Rhee was installed as first president of the
Republic of Korea (he would be in power from 1948 until ousted by popular
protests in 1960). At this transition moment during the Spring of 1948, people
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of Cheju Island (Chejudo), off the southern tip of the peninsula, staged “protests against USAMGIK, the state of division, and the incumbent president
Syngman Rhee.”82 They were, in other words, explicitly voicing the problems
of decolonization and objecting to the solidifying of the Cold War boundary.
In response, and beginning as a campaign against a few hundred leftist rebels,
police repression morphed into an island-wide conflagration in which the
U.S.-directed South Korean military and police killed an estimated 8,000–
30,000 people, or roughly 10 percent of the island’s population. People’s various grievances were effectively “communized” by the government, which
assumed the rebellion either was instigated or could be instrumentalized by
the Soviet Union.83 The paradigm-setting, orgy of anti-communist violence
on Chejudo is perhaps more directly comparable to events in Indonesia in
1965. Subsequently, South Korean society was “oversocialized with the politics
of anti-communism” for the next four decades,84 and a robust discrimination
and shame attached to relatives of accused communists or survivors of anti-
communist violence. Thus, Hwang Su-Kyoung observes via Judith Butler’s
work, until recently, “the actual victims of anti-communist violence . . . were
not treated as grievable lives.”85
We see the enduring logic of the grievable and ungrievable in representations of Gwangju, 1980, as we did in Oppenheimer’s films. To return to Han’s
novel, the careful staging of the climactic scene at the Provincial Office with
its loathsome military officer shooting an unarmed schoolboy is meant, I
think, to distinguish Dong-ho and other innocents as far as possible from any
actual communists. The readerly pathos and moral outrage produced is precisely a function of the distance between Dong-ho, the frail teenager who
tends unclaimed victims’ bodies, and the cinematically mediated image of
“filthy fucking reds.” In other words, the monstrosity of the Chun Doo Hwan
regime is confirmed not only in the bloodletting of the massacre itself but also
in its blatantly erroneous epistemology, whereby middle-schoolers apparently
posed a political threat to the state. What is left intact in the logic of “restoring
honor” to Gwangju citizens in order to make them grievable, however, is that
the killing of actual communists remains acceptable, or even necessary. The
crime of the state lies primarily in the misdirection, rather than the illegality
or immorality, of anti-communist violence.
In Han In Sup’s account of the 1995–97 trials, he explains that it was not
just the massacre’s perpetrators, but Chun Doo Hwan’s entire regime that was
on trial. One consequence of indicting the illiberal “evil regime”86 of the past
was that Gwangju citizen-victims were “not only recognized as having suffered abuse, but were now honored as the defenders of the Constitution
because they had protested against the lawless military junta who pillaged,

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 175

5/18/21 3:13 PM

176

GENRES OF COLD WAR RECKONING, 1997–2017

massacred, and disgraced the constitutional order of the nation.”87 The notion
of “honor restoration” thus erases the demands of radical anti-government
politics via the logic of recuperation and reconciliation within the nation-state,
casting the protestors as simply patriotic defenders of the nation. Lewis’s study
of the politics of memory around the Uprising confirms that by the late 1990s,
the state largely “commemorated 5.18 for its pro-democracy legacy.”88 Interestingly, the Uprising is sometimes referred to as “Korea’s Tiananmen Square,”
in a conflation of time (since it occurred well before Tiananmen) and ideology
(blending anti-communist and communist). A parallel displacement and depoliticization seems to occur in Han’s novel, in which there are no communists
or leftists, but only patriotic citizens. The emphasis on personal, individualized suffering has tended to shade out links to the larger minjung (popular)
movement of the 1970s and 1980s, with its militant labor movement and
demands for “decolonization, represented by the achievement of reunification.”89 Instead, the class and anti-government nature of the Uprising was
repackaged into an ideal symbol of civic value whereby Gwangju becomes the
region’s “Mecca of democracy”90 and model human rights struggle, producing
a transnational justice narrative of an illiberal past that appears “remade” by
the liberal, post-ideological present.91 Moreover, in a conjuncture where the
dictates of neoliberalism awkwardly parade as post-authoritarian liberalism,
President Kim Dae-Jung was forced to pardon those found guilty, since the
verdict coincided with the chaos of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis—the
very crisis that also brought down Suharto’s government. Dealing with mass
layoffs, an IMF bailout loan, and the neoliberalization of the economy, 1998
was exactly the wrong year to reckon with the past collusion of state, business,
and military violence in eliminating leftists from the country. Indeed, at the
1998 anniversary of the Uprising held in the new 5.18 cemetery, the acting
prime minister went so far as to appeal to the memory of “May 18 democratic
fighters” and their sacrifices as a model for accepting austerity measures in the
context of the Asian Financial Crisis and IMF bailout package.92 Han’s novelistic aesthetic is structured by a similar conundrum: to represent 5.18 in a way
that honors the victims’ suffering and political agency but in a (neo)liberal
present that obscures “the structural historical processes and political conflicts that gave rise to the human rights violations” in the first place.93
In another chapter of Human Acts, we see Han grapple more fully with the
complex politicized landscape of South Korea in the 1970s and early ’80s.
Titled “The Eye (or pupil) of the Moon” (Pam ŭi nundongja), and translated
as “Factory Girl. 2002,” this chapter is narrated by Lim Seon-ju (Lim Sŏn-ju)
some twenty-two years after the events of May 1980. Her story—or rather
testimony—of imprisonment, torture, and lingering trauma focuses, as does
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Han’s larger project, on the lyrical investigation into human pain and suffering. Yet it nevertheless discloses the ways that the labor movement of the 1970s
and ’80s was deeply imbricated in the anti-dictatorship movement. Formally,
Seon-ju’s fragmented biographical segments are interspersed with her present-
day dilemma of responding to a professor’s request for her testimony; we thus
learn that in the late 1970s Seon-ju was a teenage factory worker in a textile
company and one of thousands of women who helped build the South Korean
“miracle economy” by working 15-hour days for low pay. The second-person
narrative bluntly recounts the conditions of this work: “The wages were half
of what the men got paid for the same work. . . . You took pills to keep you
awake, but exhaustion still battered you like a wave. . . . Hacking coughs.
Nosebleeds. Headaches. Clumps of what looked like black threads in the
phlegm you hacked up.”94 At eighteen, Seon-ju joins a women’s labor protest
against the company-dominated union. In a strike, she and other women are
beaten by strikebreakers and police, and she ends up hospitalized for an intestinal rupture. In Seon-ju’s understanding, the authoritarian government is
inseparable from the abuses she experiences as a worker:
You never forgot that the government actively trained and supported
the strike-breakers, that at the peak of this pyramid of violence stood
President Park Chung-hee himself, an army general who had seized
power through a military coup. You understood the meaning of emergency measure no. 9, which severely penalized . . . practically any criticism of the government. . . .
When President Park was assassinated that October, you asked yourself: Now the peak has been lopped off [ije p’ongnyŏk ŭi chŏngjŏmi
sarajyŏssŭni], will the whole pyramid of violence collapse? Will it no
longer be possible to arrest screaming, naked factory girls? Will it no
longer be permissible to stamp on them and burst their intestines?95
Seon-ju’s testimony allows us to understand that the resistance to the renewed
dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan is not an abstract defense of human rights or
of the sanctity of the national constitution. It is grounded in the very concrete
demands of working people and includes, simply, the right to decent working
conditions and the right to not be beaten for those demands.
That spring, Seon-ju is drawn into the Gwangju Uprising after encountering a bus full of singing factory girls who dangle a banner proclaiming, “End
Martial Law. Guarantee Labour Rights [kye’ŏm haeje, nodong samgwon
pojang].”96 In giving the reader access to this wider political landscape, Han’s
preferred aesthetic mode of documenting lyrical suffering and personal trauma
comes under some pressure. Seon-ju’s first experience with the women’s labor
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group, for example, involves sitting on a rooftop eating peaches, where she is
told by an older member that the moon is called “the eye of the night [pam ŭi
nundongja rago haettda].”97 The union leader, Seong-hui, who teaches them
labor law and to read hanja (Chinese characters), has a voice like a “primary
school teacher” (162), while the girls in the bus on their way to the protest have
“pale faces [that] put you in mind of mushrooms [bŏsŏt katch’i ŏlguri ch’angbaekhan yŏja].”98 Following the Uprising, Seon-ju’s two years of imprisonment
and torture—where she is assumed to be a North Korean spy—is narrated
elliptically in terms of the horrendous physical abuse she undergoes and the
lyrical account of her ongoing psychic trauma. On the one hand, then, the
aesthetic again works to ban any potential communists from the narrative as
it softens and feminizes—with “peaches,” “moons,” and faces like “mushrooms”—the labor movement that Seon-ju and her fellow workers participate
in. We have already noted the way that official memorializations of 5.18 have
worked to depoliticize and “domesticate” the event by downplaying the fact of
armed resistance and focusing on nonviolence, victimhood, and military brutality.99 According to this logic, if Gwangju victims are re-humanized—or de-
communized—as the subjects of human rights, it would appear that they
cannot also be subjects of political action other than defending an abstract
“true” nation. Han’s narrative thus walks the line between doing justice to the
concrete demands of the labor movement, and avoiding the possible stain of
leftist radicalism. The novel is symptomatic of the powerful, and enduring,
construction of personhood during the Korean peninsula’s Cold War, whereby
leftists and communists were seen as an inhuman excess outside the nation,
no matter the scale of actual violence heaped upon them.
On another level, however, we might read Han’s characterization of
Seon-ju as subverting the deeper ontological logic of communists and leftists
as outside humanity. As in the discourse of totalitarianism examined in
Chapter 2, a central trope of anti-communism was not the fear of loss of life
per se, but “the loss of self, the subjugation of individual thought to an all-
enveloping and unquestioned system of belief and behavior.”100 We might
read Seon-ju’s poetic testimony of her political awakening, especially her
ability to connect the daily violence of factory work to patriarchal dictatorship, as an affirmation of her individuality within what otherwise could be
dismissed as a de-individuating politics. Her story functions similarly to the
way that “most of Latin America’s testimonial literature . . . conveys how [leftist] politics helped define people’s self-understanding”101 rather than subtract
from it. In this reading, Han refutes the dehumanizing logic attributed to
leftist collective politics, although the specter of communism cannot quite
come onto the page.
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Finally, we can read Han’s novel for what it reveals about the “unpredictable calendar” of truth commissions and transitional justice. If the temporality
of truth commissions “freezes the past into its distinct temporality,” in certain
cultural texts, by contrast, “the past survives as a political, affective, and material remainder in the present.”102 For Han, although this remainder is largely
signified through individualized trauma and the body in pain, it also emerges
in the political sense via the metaphor of radiation exposure (p’ip’ok). In her
epilogue, she writes of the ongoing fact of state violence in contemporary,
post-liberalized South Korea:
In January 2009, when an illegal raid by riot police on activists and
tenants protesting their forced eviction from central Seoul left six
dead, I remember being glued to the television, watching the towers
burning in the middle of the night and surprising myself with the
words that sprang from my mouth: But that’s Gwangju. In other words,
“Gwangju” had become another name for whatever is forcibly isolated,
beaten down and brutalised, for all that has been mutilated beyond
repair. The radioactive spread is ongoing. [P’ip’oki ajik kkŭtnaji anattda.] Gwangju has been reborn only to be butchered again in an endless cycle.103
In this violent reverberation of 1980, Han suggests that no clear line between
the illiberal past and the liberal present can be easily drawn. Rather, “Gwangju”
is a heuristic that allows for the recognition of ongoing repression and state
terror in an era which has supposedly transcended such illiberalism; more
directly, the raid reveals the inhumanity wrought by neoliberalism in its valuing of profits and markets over human life. Han’s metaphor of radioactivity,
however, need not be read as metaphorical at all. In Korean, p’ip’ok can also
mean “being bombed”; thus another meaning of the sentence is, “the bombing is still ongoing/unfinished.” The extraordinary, mid-century violence
which characterized the bipolar struggle over decolonization continues to
structure the peninsula.

The Trials of the (post–) Cold War
A decade after the special 1995–97 trials, a broader South Korean truth commission addressed issues going back to the Japanese colonial era, including
the period before and during the Korean War. Remarkably, in the commission’s final report in 2010, it found that 82 percent of the 9,609 petitions regarding wartime civilian massacres were attributable to South Korean state agents
(the police, the military, and rightist groups associated with the state), and only
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18 percent to the North Korean military and to leftist groups.104 The main
patterns of violence were: detention and execution of former communists and
their supporters; retaliation against alleged communist collaborators; killings
during the rooting-out of communists; and killings by U.S. bombings.105
According to this evidence, anti-communist violence by the U.S.-backed
South Korean state was a far more deadly force than the communist enemy
themselves. Han In Sup has pondered the difficulty of approaching those turbulent founding years of the Republic:
However, [in contrast to later periods under dictatorship] it was difficult
to come to a consensus about how to deal with the military and police
atrocities committed from 1948 through 1953. During these years, state
terrorism had constituted a part of building the state itself.106
Officially formed in 1948, the South Korean state, it could be said, is anti-
communist all the way down. The central role of “state terrorism” confirms
Walter Benjamin’s observation on the lawmaking function of violence, in
which “violence crowned by fate, is the origin of law.”107 Similarly, we can posit
1965 as the foundational moment of both mass violence and state-building for
the New Order government in Indonesia. Accordingly, The Act of Killing
should not be read primarily as the indictment of certain individuals since
“the crimes Anwar committed are constitutive of the state.”108
The bipolar Cold War logic that seems to persist past its global use-by date
reveals contradictions within the periodizations of both the Cold War and
post–Cold War. If the legal technologies of transitional justice promise us
entry into the time of the post-authoritarian now, or “the time not possible
before,”109 there is something strangely tautological about the time that liberalizes an anti-communist regime. That is, the transition to liberal democracy
from the human rights abuses of the past must obscure the way that decades
of anti-communist violence and terror itself played a major role in “liberalism’s
world-historical defeat of its principal Cold War political adversaries.”110 Such
“sleights of hand” cover up a range of “illiberal” histories, but rhetorically
guarantee entry into the post-ideological, universal time of the post–Cold
War.111 In a parallel argument from a different (post–) Cold War location, Chinese cultural critic Dai Jinhua has written of the multiple inversions and
scramblings that Chinese historiography has had to undergo in order to legitimize that country’s capitalist rise. For example, the 1972 Sino-U.S. Communiqué marked the start of Deng Xioaping’s era of reform and opening, thus
“beginning a post–Cold War era within the socialist camp even before the
end of the Cold War. Time itself was foreshortened, displaced from the
communist-utopian processes into global capitalist time.”112 If, for Marx,
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communism was a spectral presence from the future, in China today Marxism is “a phantom from the past that now and then emerges and takes place
in the present.”113 The result is that in contemporary China “heterogeneous
historical narratives that arose from the binary cultural logic of the Cold War
[have] fought for ownership and narrative of history and time.”114 Oppenheimer’s films, the Tempo editorial, and Han’s novel reveal another strange
folding of (post–) Cold War time. In these particular struggles over narratives
of history and time, the time of the Cold War leaks into, shapes, and subtends
the post-transition, post-authoritarian liberal order. In these sites, the confirmation of “global capitalist time” comes not from communism’s historically
verifiable exhaustion (the Soviet Union) or its inexorable evolution into the
latest stage of capitalism (the PRC), but from the way anti-communism itself
leveraged a certain path for Third World development.
I suggest, then, that the mass killings of communists in the past is the disavowed underside of the triumphalist end-of-history narrative that firmly proclaims the “death” of communism in the present. We might understand
Oppenheimer’s and Han’s texts less as poetic, imaginative efforts to stage alternative truth-tellings of state violence, and more as revealing the enunciatory
logic of a stalled exorcism, which, Derrida reminds us, “pretends to declare
the death [of a person] only in order to put to death.”115 Put another way, the
trials of transitional justice surreptitiously enact the larger trial and judgment
of global communism. In Dai’s words, such “victor’s justice” demands nothing
less than the “total negation of an alternative future other than capitalism,”116
which also includes, importantly, writing out those paths which might have
resulted in moderate social-democratic societies. Even as The Act of Killing,
The Look of Silence, and Human Acts participate in the grammars of post-
socialist common sense, they nevertheless point to its unacknowledged material conditions of possibility, whereby millions of suspected communists—as
well as other futures and forms of justice—were killed off in sites where the
Cold War was not “cold” at all. The figure of the communist, dead or alive,
spectral or imaginary, not only occludes the actual richness and complexity of
leftist movements and their desires. It condenses the contradictions and complicity of transitional justice with today’s neoliberal order. He or she must
remain outside humanity in order to shore up the humanity of the capitalist
system that dictates our world today.
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Epilogue
Authoritarian Lessons for Neoliberal Times

With the recent surge of right-wing populism and antidemocratic strongman
leaders, many have read our current moment as a puzzling redux of twentieth-
century authoritarianism and fascism. (Moreover, as this book goes to press,
the unfolding novel coronavirus pandemic crisis is bringing authoritarianism,
individual liberties, collective action, and capitalist futures into ever more
strained configurations.)1 If we take a more global perspective, however, it is
difficult to see today’s autocratic turn as a return after an interval of postwar
democracy.2 Instead, we might understand the current regimes of Trump,
Johnson, Putin, Modi, Bolsonaro, Duterte, and others—whether of the global
North or South—less as a surprising return after an absence and more as an
expansion or intensification of a global phenomenon that never went away. My
intention in these concluding remarks is not to assert that the “free world”
authoritarian regimes studied in this book are direct precursors to today’s crisis
of democracy. Rather, I have been at pains to show that the coupling of
capitalist development and Cold War authoritarianism was not a geographical
anomaly nor a transitional phase, but an essential unfolding of the story of
both decolonization and capital since World War II. Only through such a
perspective can we appreciate the broader formation of what only appears to
be the oxymoronic appearance of “freedom and authoritarianism.”3 Put
otherwise, how can we think more capaciously about the dialectics of modern
democracy, freedom, and authoritarianism if we include in our account the
profound legacies of colonial dictatorships and the complications of Cold War
decolonization? Although authoritarianism is clearly not a single substance,
what light does a more global perspective on the phenomenon shed on today’s
illiberal turn?
183
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In this brief coda I take up some of these questions. In what follows, I
examine some recent political thought indicting neoliberalism for the rise of
contemporary right-w ing populism, and contrast this with accounts of
neoliberalism that place decolonization at the center. I pair these theoretical
and historical observations with a brief reading of a 2014 South Korean
blockbuster film, Ode to My Father (Kukje sijang), directed by Yoon Je-kyoon
(Yun Che-kyun). The latter, as a filmic plotting of the political-economic
transformations of the developmental state, presents the struggles of
decolonization as a nationalist tale compatible with neoliberalism’s own self-
narrative. Counterintuitively, I suggest that the U.S.-aligned region of the
Asia-Pacific has preserved within it a form of antidemocratic capitalist development that provides a certain epistemological privilege for our neoliberal
present. Its enduring logic, I stress, is not merely a lesson in realpolitik and
forecasting disappointing outcomes. It demands that we interrogate more
carefully the hinge of “freedom” around which we typically cast “liberal freedoms” in opposition to the authoritarian state.
In the introduction to their 2018 study, Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in
Critical Theory, Wendy Brown, Peter E. Gordon, and Max Pensky ponder the
apparent return of illiberal regimes. They suggest that “the advent of the new
era of antidemocratic politics, much of it with increasingly authoritarian
features”4 prompts a reexamination of Frankfurt School thinkers such as
Adorno and Horkheimer who sought to understand “the slide into fascism in
the 1930s.”5 Thus, “Notwithstanding the very real differences between the
fascist movements of the mid-twentieth century and the antidemocratic
movements of our time, critical theory remains of urgent relevance today,
when many of the same phenomena . . . seem to have resurfaced in a new
guise.”6 Acknowledging that their focus is on the “crisis of democracy in the
Euro-Atlantic world,”7 the authors imply that the period between World War
II and the present has been, more or less, one of liberal democracy. Brown
deepens this analysis—and extends it further in her 2019 book In the Ruins of
Neoliberalism8—with an investigation into the way neoliberalism has prepared
the ground for the current rollback of Western democracy. Focusing on the
discourses of Trump in the U.S., Marine Le Pen in France, and those around
Brexit in the U.K., Brown traces the way the concept of freedom undergoes a
profound resignification. Central to her analysis are two strands characteristic
of neoliberal thought. In the first, as freedom “is submitted to market means,
it is stripped of the political valences that attach it to popular sovereignty and
thus to democracy.”9 As David Harvey has noted, and Karl Polanyi before him,
freedom here “degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise.”10 Second,
neoliberal freedom involves a moral dimension, “equated wholly with the
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pursuit of private ends,”11 and results in the elevation of family values over
social ones. Reviewing the thought of neoliberalism’s major ideologues,
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, Brown shows how the market becomes
the quintessential realm of “freedom” and “choice” by way of its contrast to
the necessary “coercion” of any political or collective system. By this logic,
paraphrasing Hayek, “liberty prevails where there is no intentional
coercion,”12 where coercion is equated with any state or collective regulatory
effort toward “equality, inclusion, access, and even civility.”13 Freedom thus
paradoxically ends up legitimizing “social exclusion and social violence.”14
The result is bleak.
When the nation itself is economized and familialized in this way,
democratic principles of universality, equality, and openness are
jettisoned, and the nation becomes legitimately illiberal toward those
designated as aversive insiders or invading outsiders. Statism, policing,
and authoritarian power also ramify since walling, policing, and
securitization of every kind are authorized by the need to secure this
vast expanse of personal, deregulated freedom.15
In both the second part of Brown’s essay and in In the Ruins of Neoliberalism
she explores the kind of subjectivity that is produced by a combination of
white resentment and the neoliberal denial of the social. In this configuration,
“freedom abandons all of the affinity with political self-determination found
in Rousseau, Tocqueville, or Marx,”16 and deteriorates into an impoverished,
nihilistic freedom “which posits no value apart from that generated by price
and speculative markets.”17
A lucid theorization of the Euro-American world’s autocratic turn, Brown’s
work does not simply “argue that the fascisms of the 1930s are ‘returning.’ ”18
She also acknowledges the neoliberal structural adjustment regimes in the
Global South that began in the late 1970s, and briefly notes, following Quinn
Slobodian, the way neoliberalism was “intellectually conceived and practically
unveiled as a global project.”19 Yet Brown’s North Atlantic focus does not allow
us to see the constitutive role the decolonizing world played in contemporary
neoliberal formations. First, we must complicate the zero-sum-g ame
between “free” capitalist markets and the more substantive freedom of
political self-determination raised above. As we have seen, U.S.-backed
postcolonial regimes in the decolonizing Asia-Pacific could use the Cold War
standoff to their advantage, wielding anti-communism as a means to discipline
labor, gain entrance to lucrative military and trade alliances, and build export
manufacturing economies just as Western economies were de-industrializing.
Authoritarianism as “revolutionary promotion” was justified by reference to a
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deferred but imminent postcolonial sovereignty in the future—brought about
by the various slogans we have seen of the “New Society,” “New Order,” or
“Revitalizing Reforms.” This book has provided a thick cultural-historical
description of the conjoining of capitalism and illiberalism that occurred
precisely in the name of political self-determination. Thinking through the
global Cold War, we must also recall that the Western welfare state and its
historic compromise between capital and labor was partially dependent on its
opposition to the Soviet system, which “set itself up as a challenge to capitalism
and so stimulated it.”20 Yet that “stimulation” manifested very differently in
different parts of the world. In the North Atlantic, it forced capital to accede
to some labor demands with increased rights and benefits, while in those Cold
War frontiers of the decolonizing world—where U.S. Cold War administrators
were making the world “safe for capitalism”—the “deification of the market”
went hand in hand with the violent disciplining of decolonizing struggles.21
As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, in newly liberated Asia, the cultural and political
meanings of “freedom,” “revolution,” and “liberty” became flash points where
the demands of postcolonial sovereignty met the imperatives of bipolar
economic and political restructuring. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I examined the
ways those multiple “futures past” of decolonizing imaginaries were vehemently
eradicated by developmentalist projects and security regimes, even while such
imaginaries continue to haunt our present. Although Brown acknowledges the
Cold War influence on neoliberal thinking—it was “born in the shadow of
European fascism and Soviet totalitarianism”22—her story sidelines the way the
contests and violence of the global Cold War actively enabled the hegemonic
rise of neoliberal logic in Euro-America. Rather than see today’s illiberalism as
the disquieting “reappearance in a new guise” of mid-century fascisms, Cold
War Reckonings has argued for another political genealogy where mass
violence, social exclusion, and repression of “aversive insiders” occurred
precisely under the banner of “freedom.”
My larger claim is that we must situate the rise of neoliberal orthodoxy
within the matrix of bipolarized, twentieth-century decolonization. Following
neoliberalism’s career from this particular vantage point of the postcolonial
world allows a clearer understanding of the way the U.S. empire and local
dictatorships worked in tandem to effect a rollback of Third Worldist demands,
producing the triumphant victory of the “free” market. If we attend to the
cultural texts and narratives born of this struggle, we gain a more nuanced
sense of the way bipolar decolonization comprised a surprisingly dense web of
historical forces, competing and desiring subjectivities, and multiple political
imaginaries. It is also to suggest, as Chandan Reddy has done via queer critique
in the U.S. context, that authoritarian state power and liberal democracy are
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not the antinomies we often assume.23 Put simply, to understand our
increasingly authoritarian present, a broader account of neoliberalism’s
original function as a brake on decolonization is needed.
We can look to several examples of recent scholarship that tell precisely this
more global story of neoliberalism, which I hope my book complements. First
is Quinn Slobodian’s alternative account of neoliberal doctrine in his 2018 book
Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Slobodian’s
history of neoliberal thought—or “ordoliberalism,” focusing on the Geneva
School of economists—does not tell the typical story of market fundamentalism
and the unleashing of markets from their social or governmental fetters.
Instead, his study shows that neoliberalism worked by enthusiastically
constructing new layers of international laws and regulations that would protect
or “encase” the market from the dangers of nationalist and democratic forces.
In sum, “What neoliberals seek is not a partial but a complete protection of
private capital rights, and the ability of supranational judiciary bodies like the
European Court of Justice and the WTO to override national legislation that
might disrupt the global rights of capital.”24 Central to Slobodian’s account is
that figures such as Hayek were in large part responding to the perceived perils
of “the end of empire” and Third World self-determination, a process that
would endanger those “global rights of capital” through socialist and
redistributionist claims.25 In particular, the 1970s demands for a more just
global economy via the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—which
has been described as the “high noon of ‘Third Worldism’ and its vision of
solidarity”26—prompted a fierce “countermove by neoliberals.”27 This pushback
ultimately resulted in binding international legal mechanisms to contain such
challenges and further enshrine the rights of transnational corporations.28 Our
twenty-first-century neoliberal consensus did not arise simply out of the “crisis
of profitability and stagflation” of the 1970s29—the usual narrative—but by
actively negating the Third World’s brazen demands for social and economic
decolonization. In Adom Getachew’s recent examination of the career of the
NIEO and the projects of Jamaica’s Michael Manley and Tanzania’s Julius
Nyerere, she similarly shows how postcolonial nation-building required
“anticolonial worldmaking,” or the transformation of the global economy, to
avoid the pitfalls of neocolonial underdevelopment. In her telling, a major
factor in the NIEO’s demise was the depoliticization of economic decision-
making, which became merely “an arena of technical and legal expertise,
better left to economists rather than politicians.”30 One of the central claims of
Cold War Reckonings is that the non-communist postcolonies of Asia were key
battlegrounds for the defusing of socialist redistributive demands, in part by
recasting “freedom” as incorporation into the “free world.”
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Despite Slobodian’s assertion that the Cold War is not particularly
important to his narrative, he observes that during the 1970s “Hong Kong was
a model for neoliberals.”31 The city was
a model of a nonmajoritarian market economy that limited popular sovereignty while maximizing capital sovereignty with a much-touted free-
trade policy, a robust bank secrecy law, and a low corporate tax rate. In
many ways Hong Kong was the inverted version of the demands of the
NIEO and the Global South in the 1970s.32
The singling out of Hong Kong deserves attention for its broader metonymic
function. From a postcolonial perspective, the “nonmajoritarian”—read anti-
democratic—character of the city was, of course, due to its still being a British
crown colony at the time. Yet Hong Kong was also a “free world” trading and
finance center on the edge of the vast communist territory of the PRC, and its
famed entrepreneurialism, hardworking migrant population, and global
economic outlook were very much shaped by the bipolar configuration. Due
to its strong export-oriented industrialization, Hong Kong is regularly included
in the quartet of first generation “Asian Tigers,” along with South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore. Such a grouping, I suggest, extends to the way the
colonial, postcolonial, and bipolar overlapped in these sites in similarly
complex ways, notwithstanding the fact that Hong Kong was ruled by
foreigners for longer. Put simply, in the Cold War–decolonizing matrix, these
locations functioned as authoritarian bulwarks against communism and as
safe harbors for global capital.
Sites such as Hong Kong were therefore not simply fortuitous models of
“non-majoritarian capitalism” that happened to fit neoliberal ideology and the
tutelary “discipline of freedom”33 appropriate to non-Western development.
These “miracle” economies were, in fact, integral to the pushback against
alternative political demands made by the NIEO since they constituted anti-
democratic, heteronomous models of “miraculous” Third World develop
ment.34 We might consider them paradigms of one definition of the neoliberal
state, “a state apparatus whose fundamental mission [is] to facilitate conditions
for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign
capital.”35 Their enduring influence (whether recognized or not) is evident in
many sites around the Global South: in the dominance of export-oriented
development, the craze for special economic zones, the deferral of democracy,
and the optimization of domestic labor forces and industries for foreign direct
investment. The regional repression, purges, and massacres of leftists—and
the accompanying disciplining and exploitation of workers—is occluded by
bootstrapping developmentalist stories. Nevertheless, because of their ability
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to industrialize, to a greater or lesser degree, these states and those that
followed a similar formula constituted an influential example of the
compatibility between capitalist development and antidemocratic rule, which
lies at the heart of the neoliberal imagination. As C. J. W.-L. Wee writes of
Singapore and Malaysia in the 1980s, “It is as if parts of the Non-A ligned
Movement have reinvented themselves into the World Trade Organisation.”36
That such states are either viewed routinely as “sell-outs” (in a Third Worldist,
non-aligned vision) or as unproblematic success stories of non-Western
development that can be repeated (in the view of neoliberals and technocrats)
indicates the need for a fuller accounting of their pivotal role in consolidating
a neoliberal “common sense” of the world. It is such an account that this book
has hoped to offer.37
In a different key, Joseph Slaughter has told a parallel story of neoliberalism’s
imbrication with decolonization, this time centered on human rights. Also
from 2018, his essay “Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New
Historiography, and the End of the Third World” recovers an earlier, more
plural conceptualization of human rights that had been central to the
discourses of Third Worldist national liberation and the watershed Bandung
Conference of 1955. However, beginning in the late 1960s, these more open
and collectivist notions of rights were “hijacked” and attenuated, resulting in
the contemporary notion of human rights as limited to individual civil and
political rights against a state. Paralleling Slobodian’s account, the demise of
the 1970s efforts for a NIEO, along with other struggles for international
solidarity and self-determination, were central plot moves to the “rollback
of human rights”38 and the larger effort “to resubordinate the post-colonial
world.”39 By the end of the 1970s, this had resulted in the more general
discrediting of Third Worldist economic, social, and cultural rights that
“human rights” had hitherto signified.40 Crucially, Slaughter links post-1970s
human rights to the neoliberalization of both “markets and sentiments.”41 The
shift in human rights discourse to liberal concerns for individual prisoners of
conscience thus aligned with “overt and covert operations to undermine
communist and democratic socialist governments across the globe,” as well as
with “neo-liberal capital reforms around the world in the name of Structural
Adjustment Programs.”42 To this compelling account, I would add that the
developmental authoritarian states examined in this study have played a
significant—but often overlooked—role in the larger repression of “communist
and democratic socialist governments across the globe.” That is, the complex
internal contests between leftists, nationalists, anti-dictatorship movements,
and pro-U.S. elites constituted a key terrain on which the struggle was fought
both during the actual Cold War period and, more recently, around the
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historiography of the perceived “successes” and “failures” of the period.
Paradoxically, what today is now recognized as the unfortunate “human rights
violations” of those regimes can also be properly thought of as contributing to
the erasure of those earlier, more capacious models of human rights.
One irony is that the strong-state models of Singapore, South Korea, and
other would-be “tigers” were not themselves strictly free-market economies.
As a number of critics have noted, a level of protectionism was tolerated in
these countries by virtue of their Cold War security function.43 As Joseph
Jonghyun Jeon points out in his study of post-IMF South Korean cinema, that
country “faced the end of favourable developmental conditions in the 1990s,
as labor costs rose and competition increased from rapidly industrializing
neighbors in the region.”44 After the devastating 1997 Asian Financial Crisis—
which affected South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand most severely—the
IMF bailout package “radically reshaped the Korean economy” with the usual
prescriptions of “trade liberalization, labor flexibilization and financialization
oriented to global firms.”45 More succinctly, “Further neoliberalism was the
answer.”46 The very sites that had helped to make capitalism safe from
communism themselves had to be reined in by neoliberal restructuring.
Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o has pointed out a similar double bind pertaining to
African postcolonial states, where Structural Adjustment Programs and
economic liberalization are touted as the solution to their inefficient and anti-
democratic regimes, even as the West continues to support those dictatorial
leaders, underscoring the profoundly antidemocratic tendency of those
“global rights of capital.” Moreover, those austerity measures of neoliberalism—
SAP reforms, debt regimes, the super-exploitation of labor, and minimalist
social provisions—have long been familiar phenomena outside the West.
“What is emerging is a very unholy alliance between the IMF, the World
Bank and the West as a whole, and African civilian and military dictatorships.”47
Put simply, neoliberalism gets to have its cake and eat it too.48
I want to conclude with a brief reading of a cultural text that evidences the
way a neoliberal plotting of history may be made compatible with certain
Third World developmentalist narratives. Yoon Je-kyoon’s 2014 Ode to My
Father (Kukje sijang, or “International market” in Korean) is one of the highest-
grossing films ever in Korean cinema, earning over $100 million at the box
office.49 Unlike the global consumption of K-pop or K-drama, however, it is
not a film that drew a large international audience for reasons that will become
clear. The film is a sweeping tale of the hardships of Yun Dŏk-su (played by
Hwang Jung-min), who overcomes war, family tragedy, displacement, and
poverty to become a successful market stallholder in the port city of Busan.
At the same time, the film is the story of South Korea’s stunning postwar
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industrialization of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s that produced its widely touted
economic “miracle.” Through the parallel “rags-to-riches”50 tale of both the
Yun family and the South Korean nation, we follow the newly decolonized,
divided, and war-ravaged country’s transformation into one of the world’s
largest economies and most successful high-tech societies. The film’s global
imaginary of upward mobility is metonymically figured in Busan’s own transformation from colonial port city, destination for war refugees, regional center
for the country’s heavy industries, and finally to today’s world-class metropolis.51 Interestingly, there is only a single passing mention of Japan in the film,
no Japanese language, and no explicitly Japanese cultural legacies—in fact, no
reckoning with the typical postcolonial concerns of colonial violence, anti-
colonial nationalisms, or hybrid identities. As we’ve seen already, for sites like
the Korean peninsula, the decades following formal independence are less
structured by the familiar postcolonial idioms of vertical resistance to colonial
power and its cultural hierarchies,52 and more by the way the “binary structure
of the global order” (Kwon) subtended or, better, constituted decolonization.
I am most interested in the historical vision the film stages, especially the
structure of narrative repetition that frames both personal and national dramas. I then examine the transnational connections, or the film’s global imaginary of development, that such a historical vision implies. It is precisely the
“fit” between the Cold War plotting of the film and our contemporary moment
of neoliberal orthodoxy that I wish to elucidate.
The film is told largely in flashback mode from the perspective of the aging
patriarch, Yun Dŏk-su, now a bad-tempered grandfather who resents his family’s taken-for-granted prosperity. Its opening scene is one of material comfort
and minor family conflict: Dŏk-su and his wife are left to care, reluctantly, for
their numerous grandchildren as their own children depart for a carefree overseas vacation. In dramatic contrast, the following flashback scene thrusts the
viewer squarely into the midst of the violence and trauma of the Korean War.
It is 1951 and we are in the port city of Hŭngnam, in today’s North Korea,
where thousands of civilian refugees are fleeing violence; the scene of mass
terror and panic is captured in breathtaking, high-budget Hollywood style.
Escaping with his family, the eight-or nine-year-old Dŏk-su is charged with
taking care of his younger sister Mak-sun as they desperately compete with
other refugees—many of whom are crushed or drowned in the process—in the
attempt to board several U.S. warships which are evacuating the city. An imperious American general, at first unwilling to play the humanitarian, is eventually persuaded to save the civilians and agrees to unload the ship’s weapons to
make room. In the chaos of boarding the ship, Dŏk-su loses hold of Mak-sun
(Figure 11); his father decides to go back to look for her at the very moment the
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Figure 11. The young Dŏk-su realizes he has lost hold of his sister, Mak-sun, as they struggle to
board a U.S. warship evacuating Hŭngnam in Ode to My Father.

ship departs. The family unit is thus violently and tragically sundered, confirming the tight structural analogy between family and nation throughout
the film. The film goes on to narrate Dŏk-su’s life over the next decades as he
struggles to provide for his mother and two remaining younger siblings in
their new life as displaced people in Busan.
After arriving with nothing in Busan in 1951, Dŏk-su and his family are
begrudgingly given a tiny storeroom to sleep in by his father’s sister’s family,
and they begin their hard life in the Busan marketplace, the Kukje sijang of
the film’s title. Dŏk-su is ashamed by both his northern origins and his poverty; he is immediately accused of being a “commie” (ppalgaengi) by his new
classmates, and after school he shines shoes on the street to make extra money.
Confirming the disgraceful dependency of Koreans on the powerful Americans, Dŏk-su is one of the many ragged children who chase American jeeps
in the hopes of receiving GI candy. When the North-South armistice is
announced one day on a radio in the marketplace, Dŏk-su innocently asks the
crowd if he can now go home; a member of the crowd tells him matter-of-
factly, “Our country’s weak so other countries came in, and now they fight and
divide us up as they please.” Dŏk-su understands the larger lesson: A weak
nation caught in the bipolar confrontation of larger nations can rely only on
its own sweat and blood in order to transcend such conditions.
Given the film’s almost simplistic historical narrative, what might account
for the film’s staggering popularity among South Korean audiences? I suggest
that it is not simply the nationalistic bootstrapping account of Korean history,
but how its Cold War narrative figures a larger global history from mid-
twentieth-century decolonization to early twenty-first-century globalization.
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That is, Dŏk-su’s life is not merely allegorical of the sufferings and tribulations
of this small nation, but—despite its triumphalist plotting—convincingly
indexes the global contradictions that shaped South Korea’s major developmental achievements, resulting in the film’s structuring affect of ambivalence.
It does so by viscerally illustrating the nation’s traumatic incorporation into
the bipolar restructuring of the globe, emphasizing both the Cold War transnational economy and the transnational household.
Notably, the two extended flashback scenes that follow the initial war-time
sequence are both set overseas. The first unfolds in the early 1960s when
Dŏk-su takes a mining job in the Duisburg district of West Germany; the
second is set in 1974 when he goes to Vietnam to work for a Korean company
that supplies the U.S. military. The key to understanding South Korea’s
developmental story is thus both its tragic origins in division and war and its
highly successful integration with Western bloc industries, war economies,
and labor markets. Dŏk-su is precisely the figure who narratively traverses
these personal, political, and economic levels. Take, for example, the flashback section of Ode set in West Germany. At the level of plot, Dŏk-su’s labor
allows him to send money home to his struggling mother and siblings, and it
is in Germany that he also meets his future wife Yŏng-ja, who is there as a
nurse in training. But structurally and historically, it is significant because
the wave of guestworkers South Korea sent abroad in the 1960s and ’70s—primarily construction workers to the Gulf States and West Germany—was critical to the country’s economic rise. While the Duisburg section of the film
includes the lighthearted story of Dŏk-su and Yŏng-ja’s awkward courtship, it
employs a super-realist aesthetic to depict the labor conditions they and their
compatriots endure. Dŏk-su and his co-workers toil underground in unbearably dark, hot, dirty conditions, risking life and limb until a huge gas explosion seriously injures both Dŏk-su and his best friend Dal-gu, forcing them
to return home. Nor does the camera gloss over Yŏng-ja’s unglamorous work:
We see her wipe excrement off elderly patients and wash and prepare corpses
at the hospital morgue. In the film’s diegetic present that immediately precedes this flashback, the elderly Dŏk-su witnesses some Korean students making fun of a South Asian couple at a local coffee shop in Busan. Dŏk-su
becomes enraged in his attempt to defend the migrants’ right to be there. The
moral lessons for the modern Korean viewer are made clear. In a formal
structure of repetition that the film employs several times, South Korea’s promotion to the ranks of modern, developed nations catches on this moment
of painful self-recognition: We got here because we too were once despised
and exploited migrant workers. The critique, however, can go no further
than this recognition. The film presents migrant labor as patriotic duty,
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simply a necessary step on the way to overcoming the country’s shameful
postcolonial predicament.
Dŏk-su has barely returned from Germany, married, and started a family
when he is compelled to venture overseas again. Now 1974, this time it is to
Saigon to earn U.S. dollars to help pay for his younger sister’s wedding. The
Vietnam War section of the film is again presented as a repetition, both in
terms of Dŏk-su’s own life narrative—he must leave his family again and risk
his life for their material betterment—and in terms of geopolitics, where the
Vietnam War is a veritable replay of the Korean War. But this is a repetition
where Koreans have changed position. Working for a South Korean military
supplier to the U.S., it is now Dŏk-su who rides in a jeep while ragged bands
of Vietnamese children play in the street. Recognizing himself in the figure
of small boy who is bullied over a candy bar, he goes out of his way to give the
child an extra piece of chocolate. In a more traumatic replay of history, the
next scene has Dŏk-su and his team loading up a boat of military goods for
transport down a river. Just as they are about to pull out, a crowd of Vietnamese civilians arrives at the dock desperate to escape from the approaching
Vietcong. Dŏk-su—echoing the cold-hearted American general in the
Hŭngnam scene—initially refuses since the boat is already full. But after a
beautiful young Vietnamese woman begs piteously for them to save them, he
assents and—just like the Americans at Hŭngnam —unloads equipment to
allow the civilians to board, with the added suspense of doing so under a Vietcong attack. An inter-title concludes the action-packed Vietnam sequence
with “April 30, 1975: End of Vietnam War.” We are suddenly back at the Busan
Kukje sijang, and a trader is touting her market stall, “Look! We have new
goods from Japan and the U.S.” Cartons of Kool cigarettes, Cheerios, and
Heinz products are suddenly prominent in Dŏk-su’s and Yŏng-ja’s storefront. A
little later, a newspaper reveals the wedding picture of Dŏk-su’s best friend
Dal-gu and the young Vietnamese woman from the boat scene, proclaiming
“First Korean-Vietnamese Marriage.”
At least two aspects of the film’s narrative align with the neoliberal view of
history we have discussed. First, according to the film’s aesthetic structure of
repetition, Koreans may have been the colonized victims of twentieth-century
history, but they are not destined to remain there. Where once their lives were
at the mercy of American military power, through hard work and the benevolence of international markets they now command a similar authority over
other decolonizing Asians. Where they once were a source of cheap labor
to the West (or Middle East), they now are receivers of it. This essentially
relational, or promotional, model of advancement clearly negates Third
Worldist demands like the NIEO to overturn the entrenched hierarchy of the
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imperialist global economy, rather than merely ascend in its ranks.53 Moreover, the film makes clear that the motivation for Korean participation in the
Vietnam War is not any lofty moral belief in anti-communism (although predictably, the Vietcong are presented one-dimensionally as bloodthirsty killers
and terrorists). Rather, the battlefield of bipolar confrontation in Vietnam is
the pragmatic, depoliticized means by which South Korea is successfully
brought into the “single, integrated market”54 of the U.S. capitalist empire,
with its attendant material benefits attested to by the new commodities in
Dŏk-su’s and Yŏng-ja’s market stall. By naturalizing the trajectory of competitive, incorporated capitalist development, the film’s Cold War episteme fosters
an aspirational nationalist project that borrows legitimacy from anti-colonialist
energies, even while it sidesteps the Third Worldist program of international
solidarity and self-determination.
Second, the film’s view of history imagines a transnationalism appropriate
to a neoliberal world. The film’s deliberate aesthetic of repetition notably
offers no opportunity for South-South solidarity or collective action, confirming that “the neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all forms of social solidarity that put restraints on capital accumulation.”55 Genuine personal
sympathies—for the Vietnamese street children and refugees, or South Asian
migrant workers—can be addressed only at the level of individualized benevolence and liberal incorporation: a kindness to strangers which allows access
into the capitalist bloc via labor (for nations) or through marriage (for individuals).56 In addition, the concluding section of the film reveals that Dŏk-su’s
long-lost sister Mak-sun had ended up in an orphanage in the North and was
subsequently adopted and raised by Americans. In an emotional scene, they
are reunited with the added pathos that Mak-sun can no longer speak Korean.
The film suggests, then, only a diminished set of possible transnational relations for South Koreans: those of the labor or military contract, or transnational marriage and adoption.
It is this naturalized, and enduring, Cold War view of Third World national
integration that has served neoliberal thinking so well. Symptomatic of such
an understanding is the controversy that arose after the film’s release. For
those on the right (including then-president Park Geun-hye, Park Chung
Hee’s daughter), the film appropriately honored the postwar generation of
South Koreans whose sweat, blood, and patriotism resulted in the country’s
present gleaming modernity—explicitly visualized in the film by stunning
vistas of Busan’s hyper-modern port. Aligning with this view, the director has
described his motivation for the film not in terms of any “political, social, or
historical consciousness,” but simply from the desire to honor his father who
lived a difficult life and died young:57 “Nowadays young people aren’t aware

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 195

5/18/21 3:13 PM

196

EPILOGUE: AUTHORITARIAN LESSONS FOR NEOLIBERAL TIMES

of just how poor this country was and how much older people sacrificed for
our development.”58 The left, however, objected to the fact that the film makes
no mention of the human rights abuses of the Park regime or the fact that
Korea was under military rule until 1987. Completely absent are the jailings,
surveillance, anti-labor repression, and the Busan-Masan protests of 1979
which preceded the 1980 Gwangju Uprising. As a spokesperson for the leftist
view put it, the film “effectively endorses the idea that the state can exploit its
people.”59 More interesting is that the only historical debate available today is
between heroic national development versus human rights abuses. Any alternative path to self-determination has been foreclosed by the neoliberal rendering of history, just as any notion of human rights as other than the supranational
protection of individuals is erased.
Tellingly, in Yoon’s film, the clearest marker of time between “then” and
“now” is not dictatorship and post-dictatorship, or pre-1991 and post-1991, but
simply the gap in material progress, most clearly marked by panoramic scenes
of the present-day port of Busan (Figure 12). Politically and aesthetically, there
is no demarcation between a world in which there are one or two (or three)
competing social-political systems. At an obvious level this is because the peninsula remains divided but, at a deeper one, I suggest that it is because the
Cold War was less experienced as an abstract ideology than through the material traumas and struggles of the developmental state itself. In a heartrending
scene at the end of the film, the elderly Dŏk-su collapses in grief and tears at
the still-fresh memory of losing his father in the Korean War. When his father
appears to him in a kind of wish-image, he tearfully explains that he did his
best to look after the rest of his family in his father’s absence—but “it was so,

Figure 12. The elderly Dŏk-su and his wife sit overlooking a view of present-day Busan in Ode
to My Father.
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so hard.” Meanwhile, his children and grandchildren are gathered for a lavish
family celebration in the next room, singing, laughing, and oblivious to his
suffering. The poignant emotional impasse here may be read as the affective
surplus that cannot fit into the miraculous developmental story. Here, South
Korea’s painful reckonings with the Cold War can be viewed only as a success,
symbolized by his family’s celebration and the gleaming port.
At the beginning of this book, I discussed the way some postcolonial critics
have lamented the post–Cold War horizon of liberal democracy for its inability
to view postcolonial socialist attempts as anything but aberrant.60 The controversy around Yoon’s Ode, I argue, may be viewed as the other side of the same
coin. The inexorable—albeit painful—logic of authoritarian, catch-up development is viewed as the only successful route of postcoloniality, writing out all
other alternatives. I suggest that the film has attracted such large domestic audiences and spurred such fierce debates precisely because although its nationalist
message is triumphant, its affective message remains one of deep ambivalence.
The attempt to “strike a balance”61 in terms of historical accounting—either
triumphant development or human rights abuses—simply misses the point of
this unbearable, devastating ambivalence of history.
Just five years after the release of Ode to My Father, Bong Joon-ho’s 2019 hit
Parasite (Kisaengch’ung) caused a sensation at the 2020 Academy Awards by
being the first foreign-language movie to win best film (as well as best director,
best screenplay, and best international film). His bitingly satiric film of
egregious class inequality in contemporary Seoul follows the trials of the
struggling basement-dwelling Kim family as they pose as high-class tutors and
servants in the opulent home of the Park family. Bong’s story of haves and have-
nots—told through a quirky mix of horror, comedy, and haunted-house film
genres—has resonated around the globe. Even the filmmaker was surprised at
the film’s wide appeal: “I tried to express sentiments specific to Korean
culture, [but] all the responses from different audiences were pretty much the
same. Essentially, we all live in the same country, called Capitalism.”62 That
a South Korean film should deliver such a reverberating critique of twenty-
first-century capitalism is perhaps not so surprising. Although departing from
the narrative of nationalist triumphalism in Ode to My Father, the film
similarly makes visible the contradictions of a transpacific developmental path
that is coming to resemble capitalism everywhere. Yoon’s and Bong’s works,
therefore, can be seen as belonging to the broader archive of literary and
cultural genres that explore the Cold War–decolonizing matrix and its
afterlives. They help us understand that today’s rising authoritarianism is less
a reappearance of a superannuated European political form—mid-century
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fascism—and more the revealing of neoliberalism’s essential historical logic,
a logic that has been global all along.
Finally, our own historical moment demands that we recognize the way in
which the intensifying climate and ecological crisis (vividly allegorized in
Parasite’s remarkable flood scene) is casting doubt on even the most triumphant stories of Asian development and prosperity. Amitav Ghosh has eloquently argued that we are only now coming to terms with empire’s role in
climate change and the way rapidly industrializing postcolonial Asia has
played a “dual role as both protagonist and victim” in this crisis.63 As Asia’s
remarkable capitalist expansion in the latter part of the twentieth century
warrants closer scrutiny, it is my hope that we recognize the Cold War–
decolonizing conjuncture as an entanglement of victorious development
with profoundly antidemocratic, illiberal structures of domination. Such recognition, in turn, may allow us to produce better analyses and thus better
political alternatives to our present.
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concept. Crediting U.S. President Truman with inaugurating “the development
age”—largely through the famous “Point Four” of his 1949 presidential address—
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the discredited and antiquated civilizing mission of imperialism.
79. Recall from the introductory chapter Monica Popescu’s observation that
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80. Rist, History of Development, 78.
81. Yip, Envisioning Taiwan, 22. A United Daily News article on the 1976 Asian
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efficiently launched.” April 26, 1976, 12. Translation by Paris Liu.
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(PKP) had been squarely routed in the U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns of the
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opposition to the Marcos regime. P. N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and
Society in the Philippines (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 200–201.
86. Caroline Hau notes that “the seeds for the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship
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91. See Crystal Parikh’s Writing Human Rights (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2017) for the way literature responds to the postwar “human rights
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95. Ibid., 193.
96. Duk-yong Kang, “Literature and Social Justice,” in Literature and Social
Justice: Papers Presented to the Second Asian Writers Conference [1981] (Manila:
Philippine Center of International P.E.N., 1982), 35–36.
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Development, 86n13.
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26. Unfortunately, due to language limitations, I am reliant on Max Lane’s
translation in reading Pramoedya’s works. Nevertheless, these translations themselves
have circulated widely and have formed part of the corpus of postcolonial transpacific
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90. Ibid., 262. Also see Child of All Nations for Pramoedya’s extended metaphor
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98. Ibid., 148. Arendt’s anti-Marxism is part of this argument. For Arendt, true
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104. The longer legacy of Kim Chi-ha’s radicalism is difficult to evaluate. In
2012, to great surprise, Kim announced his avid support for the now-disgraced and
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131. Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid
Industrialization, 1961–79 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 82.
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138. Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010), 43.
139. The broad outlines of this model—detached from the specificity of Japanese
colonial development, the devastation of the Korean War and subsequent U.S.
occupation—would become disproportionately influential around the developing
world. Robert B. Stauffer, in The Philippines under Marcos: Failure of Transnational
Developmentalism (Sydney: Transnational Corporations Research Project, University
of Sydney, 1986), notes the problem with the EOI model being inherently ahistorical,
where development experts are “blind to vastly different productive conditions left by
defeated or retreating colonial powers” (151), as well as the all-important timing of the
moment of entry into the export market.
140. Although Kim’s aesthetic bears some similarity to Achille Mbembe’s account
of the “grotesque art of representation” (115) in The Postcolony (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001), I am arguing that it results from a different historical and
material genealogy. See my discussion in the Introduction.
141. Kim Chi-ha, “Five Bandits,” 100.
142. Kim Chi-ha, Ojŏk/Five Thieves, 240.
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Epilogue: Authoritarian Lessons for Neoliberal Times

1. See, for example, Selam Gebrekidan’s article “For Autocrats, and Others,
Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More Power,” New York Times, March 30,
2020.
2. Neil Lazarus, drawing on Samir Amin, writes how the long postwar boom of
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nollan tanghwang [International Market, a film of communication and harmony . . .
and ideological controversy],” Interview on JTBC, January 6, 2015. Translation mine.
http://news.jtbc.joins.com/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB10712210
58. Je-kyoon Yoon, quoted in Borowiec, “Ode to My Father.”
59. Lee Taek-kwang, quoted in Borowiec, “Ode to My Father.”
60. See my discussion in the Introduction and Scott, Refashioning Futures:
Criticism after Postcoloniality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
61. See Chapter 4’s discussion of Paik Nak-chung in regard to assessing the legacy
of Park Chung Hee’s “meritorious dictatorship.”
62. Eileen Jones, “Parasite Is Our Film,” Jacobin, February 12, 2020, https://
jacobinmag.com/2020/02/parasite-bong-joon-ho-academy-awards.
63. Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 92.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 251

5/18/21 3:13 PM

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 252

5/18/21 3:13 PM

Bibliography

Abdullah, Taufik. “Introduction: The New Order: A Historical Reflection.” In
Indonesia in the Soeharto Years: Issues, Incidents and Images, edited by McGlynn
et al., xx–xxiii. Singapore: Lontar, 2007.
Abinales, P. N., and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
Achebe, Chinua. Anthills of the Savannah. London: Heinemann, 1987.
Ahmad, Aijaz. In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. 1992. London: Verso, 2008.
Ahmad, Siti Nuraishah. Review of Confrontation, by Mohamed Latiff Mohamed.
Translated by Shafiq Selamat. Asiatic 8, no. 1 (2014): 268–70.
Alisjahbana, S. Takdir. “Tradition and Modernity in Asian Literature.” Report of the
Asian Writers’ Conference. Published in Comment: The Filipino Journal of Ideas,
Discussion, and the Arts 17 (1963): 17–26.
Aljunied, Syed Muhd Khairudin. “Political Memoirs as Contrapuntal Narratives.”
Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 18, no. 4 (2016): 512–25.
Almario, Virgilio S. “Literary ‘Consumerism’: Notes on the Liberation of Philippine
Critical Theory in Poetry.” In Literature and Social Justice: Papers Presented to
the Second Asian Writers Conference [1981], 113–24. Manila: Philippine Center of
International P.E.N., 1982.
Amin, Samir. Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary. Translated by
Michael Wolfers. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Present: Six Exercises in Political Thought. New
York: Viking Press, 1961.
———. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New ed. San Diego: Harvest, 1966. First
published 1951 by Schocken Books (New York).

253

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 253

5/18/21 3:13 PM

254

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armah, Ayi Kwei. The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1968.
Armillas-Tiseyra, Magalí. The Dictator Novel: Writers and Politics in the Global
South. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2019.
Avena, Mauro R. “The Filipino Writer and Social Justice.” In Literature and Social
Justice: Papers Presented to the Second Asian Writers Conference [1981], 37–40.
Manila: Philippine Center of International P.E.N., 1982.
Barker, Joshua. “State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s
New Order.” In Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, edited by Benedict
R. O’G. Anderson, 20–53. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Bautista, Cirilo F. “Philippine Literature: From National Liberation to Aesthetic
Liberation.” In Literature and Social Justice: Papers Presented to the Second Asian
Writers Conference [1981], 135–41. Manila: Philippine Center of International
P.E.N., 1982.
Bayly, Christopher, and Tim Harper. Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in
Southeast Asia. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2010.
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken
Books, 1968.
———. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographic Writings. Translated by
Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken Books, 2007.
Birdsall, Nancy, et al. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy.
The World Bank, 1993. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/975081468244550798/Main-report.
Bishop, Cécile. Postcolonial Criticism and Representations of African Dictatorship:
The Aesthetics of Tyranny. London: Legenda, Modern Humanities Research
Association and Maney Publishing, 2014.
Boyer, Dominic. “Censorship as Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural
Logic of Media Control in the German Democratic Republic.” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 45, no. 3 (2003): 511–41.
Brennan, Timothy. “The National Longing for Form.” In Nation and Narration,
edited by Homi K. Bhabha, 44–70. London: Routledge, 1990.
Brouillette, Sarah. “UNESCO and the Book in the Developing World.”
Representations 127, no. 1 (2014): 33–54.
Brown, Wendy. In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in
the West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.
———. “Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein: Authoritarian Freedom in Twenty-first
Century ‘Democracies.’ ” In Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory,
by Wendy Brown, Peter E. Gordon, and Max Pensky, 7–44. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2018.
Brown, Wendy, et al. “Introduction: Critical Theory in an Authoritarian Age.” In
Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory, by Wendy Brown, Peter E.
Gordon, and Max Pensky, 1–6. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 254

5/18/21 3:13 PM

BIBLIOGRAPHY	

255

Campomanes, Oscar V. “Filipinos in the United States and Their Literature of
Exile.” In Reading the Literatures of Asian America, edited by Shirley Geok-lin
Lim and Amy Ling, 49–78. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
Camus, Albert. Create Dangerously: The Power and Responsibility of the Artist.
Translated by Sandra Smith. New York: Vintage, 2019.
Castro de Guzman, Domingo. “Notes on Art, Freedom, and Society.” In Literature
and Social Justice: Papers Presented to the Second Asian Writers Conference [1981],
142–55. Manila: Philippine Center of International P.E.N., 1982.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization the Politics of Culture.”
In Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives,
edited by Christopher J. Lee, 45–68. Athens, OH: Center for International
Studies, Ohio University: 2010.
———. Provincializing Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Chang, Ha-Joon. The East Asian Developmental Experience: The Miracle, the Crisis
and the Future. New York: Zed, 2006.
Chang, Paul. Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’s Democracy
Movement, 1970–1979. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Chari, Sharad, and Katherine Verdery. “Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism,
Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War.” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 51, no. 1 (2009): 6–34.
Chatterjee, Partha. “Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years after Bandung.” Inter-Asia
Cultural Studies 6, no. 4 (2005): 487–96.
———. The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993.
———. Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?
London: Zed Books, 1986.
Chaudhary, Zahid R. “This Time with Feeling: Impunity and the Play of Fantasy in
The Act of Killing.” boundary 2 45, no. 4 (2018): 65–101.
Cheah, Pheng. “Of Other Worlds to Come.” In Delimiting Modernities: Conceptual
Challenges and Regional Responses, edited by Sven Trakulhun and Ralph Weber,
3–24. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2015.
———. Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial
Literatures of Liberation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
———. What Is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2016.
Chen, Kuan-Hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010.
Chen, Y. C. “Closing Remarks.” In Thirty Years of Turmoil in Asian Literature:
The Fourth Asian Writers’ Conference, April 25th–May 2nd, 1976, 60–64.
Taipei: Taipei Chinese Center, International P.E.N., 1976.
———. “Opening Remarks.” In Thirty Years of Turmoil in Asian Literature: The
Fourth Asian Writers’ Conference, April 25th–May 2nd, 1976, 18–20. Taipei: Taipei
Chinese Center, International P.E.N., 1976.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 255

5/18/21 3:13 PM

256

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ching, Leo T. S. Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019.
Choi, Jang Jip. “Political Cleavages in South Korea.” In State and Society in Con
temporary Korea, edited by Hagen Koo, 13–50. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1993.
Choi, Young-Jin, and Jim Glassman. “Heavy Industries and Second Tier City
Growth in South Korea: A Geopolitical Economic Analysis of the ‘Four Core
Plants Plan.’ ” In Developmentalist Cities? Interrogating Urban Developmentalism
in East Asia, edited by Jamie Doucette and Bae-Gyoon Park, 17–43. Leiden:
Brill, 2019.
Chua, Beng Huat. “Disrupting Hegemonic Liberalism in East Asia.” boundary 2 37,
no. 2 (2010): 199–216.
———. Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in
Singapore. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017.
Connery, Christopher L. “Pacific Rim Discourse: The U.S. Global Imaginary in the
Late Cold War Years.” boundary 2 21, no. 1 (1994): 30–56.
Cousins, Norman. Introduction to Asian PEN Anthology, edited by F. Sionil José,
xv–xvi. New York: Taplinger, 1966.
Cumings, Bruce. “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations and Area
Studies during and after the Cold War.” In Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area
Studies, edited by Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian, 262–302. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
———. “Webs with No Spiders, Spiders with No Webs: The Genealogy of the
Developmental State.” In The Developmental State, edited by Meredith Woo-
Cumings, 61–92. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Cvetkovich, Ann. “Drawing the Archive in Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home.” Women’s
Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1–2 (2008): 111–27.
Dai, Jinhua. After the Post–Cold War: The Future of Chinese History, edited by Lisa
Rofel. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018.
Davis, Rocio G. “Postcolonial Visions and Immigrant Longings: Ninotchka Rosca’s
Versions of the Philippines.” World Literature Today 73, no. 1 (1999): 63–70.
Day, Tony. “Still Stuck in the Mud: Imagining World Literature during the Cold
War in Indonesia and Vietnam.” In Cultures at War: The Cold War and Cultural
Expression in Southeast Asia, edited by Tony Day and Maya H. T. Liem, 131–70.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
de Manuel, Dolores. “Decolonizing Bodies, Reinscribing Souls in the Fiction of
Ninotchka Rosca and Linda Ty-Casper.” MELUS 29, no. 1 (2004): 99–118.
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning,
and the New International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge,
1994.
Diamond, Catherine. “Maturation and Political Upheaval in Lloyd Fernando’s
‘Scorpion Orchid’ and Robert Yeo’s ‘The Singapore Trilogy.’” Comparative Drama
36, no. 1/2 (2002), 125–44.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 256

5/18/21 3:13 PM

BIBLIOGRAPHY	

257

Djagalov, Rossen. From Internationalism to Postcolonialism: Literature and Cinema
between the Second and Third Worlds. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2020.
Doyle, Laura. “Inter-imperiality: Dialectics in a Postcolonial World History.”
Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 16, no. 2 (2014): 159–96.
Durran, Mary. “Asking Forbidden Questions.” New Internationalist, December
1989. https://newint.org/features/1989/12/05/endpiece.
Elstob, Peter. “Message.” In Literature and Social Justice: Papers Presented to the
Second Asian Writers Conference [1981], 1–2. Manila: Philippine Center of
International P.E.N., 1982.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox. New
York: Grove, 2004. First published by F. Maspero (Paris) in 1961 as Les Damnés
de la Terre.
Farid, Hilmar. “Indonesia’s Original Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion,
1965–66.” In The Inter-A sia Cultural Studies Reader, edited by Kuan-hsing Chen
and Beng Huat Chua, 207–22. London: Routledge, 2007.
Farred, Grant. “Many Are Guilty, Few Are Indicted.” Review of In My Country,
directed by John Boorman, Sony Pictures Classics, 2004. Radical History Review
97 (2007): 155–62.
Ferguson, James. The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
“First Literary Session, Part B.” In Proceedings of the Third Asian Writers’
Conference, 34–44. Taipei: Chinese Center, International P.E.N., 1970.
Foulcher, Keith. Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: The Indonesian
“Institute of People’s Culture,” 1950–1965. Centre of Southeast Asian Studies/
Monash University, 1986.
“Fourth Literary Session.” In Thirty Years of Turmoil in Asian Literature: The Fourth
Asian Writers’ Conference, April 25th–May 2nd, 1976, 50–59. Taipei: Taipei
Chinese Center, International P.E.N., 1976.
Frank, Andre Gunder. Crisis: In the Third World. New York: Homes and Meier, 1981.
Frantz, Erica. Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
Getachew, Adom. Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
Ghosh, Amitav. The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Gilman, Nils. “The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction.”
Humanity 6, no. 1 (2015): 1–16.
GoGwilt, Chris. “Pramoedya’s Fiction and History: An Interview with Indonesian
Novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer.” Yale Journal of Criticism 9, no. 1 (1996): 147–64.
Goodman, Brian. “Philip Roth’s Other Europe: Counter-Realism and the Late Cold
War.” American Literary History 27, no. 4 (2015): 717–40.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 257

5/18/21 3:13 PM

258

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gordolan, Lourdes. “Butch Dalisay, Ricky Lee, and Other Writers Remember
Prison Life in Martial Law Era.” Rogue, April 2012. http://rogue.ph/
butch-dalisay-ricky-lee-writers-remember-prison-life-martial-law-era/.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International, 1971.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of
the New Imperialism. New York: Holt, 2006.
———. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004.
Grandin, Greg, and Thomas Miller Klubock. “Editor’s Introduction.” Radical
History Review 97 (2007): 1–10.
Gready, Paul. “Novel Truths: Literature and Truth Commissions.” Comparative
Literature Studies 46, no. 1 (2009): 156–76.
Gupta, Akhil. “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture
of Politics, and the Imagined State.” American Ethnologist 22, no. 2 (1995):
375–402.
Gupta, Akhil, David Nugent, and Shreyas Sreenath. “State, Corruption,
Postcoloniality: A Conversation with Akhil Gupta on the 20th Anniversary of
‘Blurred Boundaries.’ ” American Ethnologist 42, no. 4 (2015): 581–91.
Gwee, Li Sui. “Cyril Wong in the Face of Power.” Introduction to The Dictator’s
Eyebrow, by Cyril Wong, 4–10. Singapore: Ethos Books, 2013.
Halim, Hala. “Lotus, the Afro-A sian Nexus, and Global South Comparatism.”
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 32, no. 3 (2012):
563–83.
Hammond, Andrew. “From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold
War Writing.” In Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict, edited by
Andrew Hammond, 1–14. London: Routledge, 2006.
———. “On the Frontlines of Writing: Introducing the Literary Cold War.” In
Global Cold War Literature: Western, Eastern, and Postcolonial Perspectives,
edited by Andrew Hammond, 1–16. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Han, In Sup. “Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atrocities in South
Korea.” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 998–1045.
Han, Kang. Human Acts: A Novel. Translated by Deborah Smith. London:
Portobello, 2016.
———. Sonyoni onda [Here comes the boy]. Seoul: Changbi, 2014.
Haridas, Swami Anand. “Pramoedya Ananta Toer.” Index on Censorship 5 (1978):
49–52.
Harlow, Barbara. Barred: Women, Writing, and Political Detention. Hanover, NH:
University Press of New England, 1992.
———. Resistance Literature. New York: Methuen, 1987.
Hart, Matthew, and Jim Hansen. “Introduction: Contemporary Literature and the
State.” Contemporary Literature 49, no. 4 (2008): 491–513.
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 258

5/18/21 3:13 PM

BIBLIOGRAPHY	

259

———. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Hatley, Barbara. “Recalling and Representing Cold War Conflict and Its Aftermath
in Contemporary Indonesia Film and Theater.” In Cultures at War: The Cold
War and Cultural Expression in Southeast Asia, edited by Tony Day and Maya
H. T. Liem, 265–84. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
Hau, Caroline. Elites and Ilustrados in Philippine Culture. Manila: Ateneo de
Manila University Press, 2017.
Hau’ofa, Epeli. “Our Sea of Islands.” In We Are the Ocean: Selected Works, by Epeli
Hau’ofa, 27–40. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008.
Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of
Truth Commissions. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2011.
Heryanto, Ariel. “Great and Misplaced Expectations.” Critical Asian Studies 46, no.
1 (2014): 162–66.
Hitchcock, Peter. “The Genre of Postcoloniality.” New Literary History 34, no. 2
(2003): 299–330.
———. The Long Space: Transnationalism and Postcolonial Form. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2010.
———. “Postcolonial Failure and the Politics of Nation.” South Atlantic Quarterly
106, no. 4 (2007): 727–52.
Holden, Philip. “Histories of the Present: Reading Contemporary Singapore Novels
between the Local and the Global.” Postcolonial Text 2, no. 2 (2006): n.p.
———. “ ‘Is It Manipulative? Sure. But That’s How You Tell Stories’: The Graphic
Novel, Metahistory and the Artist in The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye.”
Journal of Postcolonial Writing 52, no. 4 (2016): 510–23.
———. “Postcolonial Desire: Placing Singapore.” Postcolonial Studies 11, no. 3
(2008): 345–61.
———. “Reading for Genre.” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial
Studies 12, no. 3 (2010): 442–58.
———. “Refusing the Cultural Turn: Amir Muhammad’s Politics of Surfaces.” In
Locating Life Stories, edited by Maureen Perkins, 15–34. Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 2012.
Hong, Yong-hee. Kim Chi-ha Munhak Yon’gu [Literary research on Kim Chi-ha].
Seoul: Si wa Sihaksa, 2000.
Honna, Jun. “Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure during the
Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts.” In Violence and the State
in Suharto’s Indonesia, edited by Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, 54–89. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2001.
Hoskin, Janet, and Viola Lasmana. Review of The Act of Killing. Visual
Anthropology 28, no. 3 (2015): 262–65.
Hossain, Selina. “Literature and Social Justice.” In Literature and Social Justice:
Papers Presented to the Second Asian Writers Conference [1981], 22–30. Manila:
Philippine Center of International P.E.N., 1982.
Hughes, Theodore. Literature and Film in Cold War South Korea: Freedom’s
Frontier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

19505-Watson_ColdWarReckonings.indd 259

5/18/21 3:13 PM

260

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hutchcroft, Paul D. “Reflections on a Reversed Image: South Korea under Park
Chung Hee and the Philippines under Marcos.” In The Park Chung Hee Era:
The Transformation of South Korea, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F.
Vogel, 542–72. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
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of the other]. Munhak kyoyukhak [Literary education] 13 (2004): 33–62.
Keith, Joseph. Unbecoming Americans: Writing Race and Nation from the Shadows
of Citizenship. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013.
Kelly, John D., and Martha Kaplan. Represented Communities: Fiji and World
Decolonization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
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Writer Ng ũgı̃ wa Thiong’o greatly inspired by Kim Chi-ha’s “Five Thieves,”
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Watson

“Cold War Reckonings is not only a sophisticated work of cultural criticism but also an astounding articulation of political theory. Analyzing literary and cinematic texts alongside occasions like
PEN regional meetings, Jini Kim Watson offers an altogether original story about the Cold War and
decolonization in Asia, on the one hand, and about the relationship between capitalism and author-

In short, it offers a new theory of the state in general, and of the capitalist authoritarian state in
particular.” —Jodi Kim, University of California, Riverside
“Jini Kim Watson’s Cold War Reckonings is an important, brilliant, and extremely engaging book that
is beautifully written and bold and innovative in its arguments. Watson shows how the social and
political promises of decolonization were derailed by the developmentalism that permitted certain
sectors of postcolonial states to seize power by vowing to ‘fast-forward the time of national development.’ Treating Third World dictatorial regimes neither as unprepared political actors nor as
dupes, Watson shows the overlapping interests between global capitalism and authoritarianism in
some of Asia’s ‘capitalist success stories.’” —Joseph Slaughter, Columbia University
Cold War Reckonings tells a new story about the Cold War and the global shift from colonialism to
independent nation-states. Across a body of transpacific cultural works, Jini Kim Watson reveals the
problem of “free world” authoritarianism to be not a deficient form of liberal democracy but the
result of Cold War entanglements with decolonization.
Focusing on the U.S.-allied illiberal regimes of South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, and
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decolonization, postcolonial sovereignty, and the developmental state within capitalist modernity.
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itarianism, on the other. The book profoundly shifts our understanding of the Cold War, arrested
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Indonesia, the book scrutinizes cultural texts ranging from dissident poetry, fiction, and writers’
conference proceedings of the Cold War period to more recent literature, graphic novels, and films
that retrospectively look back to these decades with a critical eye. Watson’s book argues that the
cultural forms and narrative techniques that emerged from the Cold War–decolonizing matrix offer
new ways of comprehending these histories and connecting them to our present.
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